UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 08-5069
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
CRAIG QUINZEL JONES,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle
District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. William L. Osteen,
Jr., District Judge. (1:08-cr-00007-WO-1)
Submitted: June 12, 2009 Decided: June 30, 2009
Before MOTZ, TRAXLER, and KING, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Stacey D. Rubain, QUANDER & RUBAIN, P.A., Winston-Salem, North
Carolina, for Appellant. Anna Mills Wagoner, United States
Attorney, Lisa B. Boggs, Assistant United States Attorney,
Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
A federal grand jury indicted Craig Quinzel Jones for
possession of a firearm by a felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(g)(1) (2006). Prior to trial, Jones moved to suppress the
evidence seized the day of his arrest because the officers who
frisked him did not have reasonable suspicion to perform a Terry *
frisk. The district court denied his motion, and Jones entered
a conditional guilty plea pursuant to a plea agreement. The
court sentenced Jones to thirty-nine months of imprisonment, and
Jones now appeals. Finding no error, we affirm.
Jones first argues that the district court erred in
denying his suppression motion. “In reviewing a district
court’s ruling on a motion to suppress, we review the court’s
factual findings for clear error, and its legal conclusions de
novo.” United States v. Cain, 524 F.3d 477, 481 (4th Cir. 2008)
(citation omitted). When the district court denies a
defendant’s suppression motion, we construe “the evidence in the
light most favorable to the [G]overnment.” United States v.
Grossman, 400 F.3d 212, 216 (4th Cir. 2005) (citation omitted).
“[A]n officer may, consistent with the Fourth
Amendment, conduct a brief, investigatory stop when the officer
has a reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity
*
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
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is afoot.” Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123 (2000)
(citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 30). “Moreover, if the officer has a
reasonable fear for his own and others’ safety based on an
articulable suspicion that the suspect may be armed and
presently dangerous, the officer may conduct a protective search
of, i.e., frisk, the outer layers of the suspect’s clothing for
weapons.” United States v. Holmes, 376 F.3d 270, 275 (4th Cir.
2004) (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 30-31) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
The officer must have “at least a minimal level of
objective justification for making the stop” and “must be able
to articulate more than an inchoate and unparticularized
suspicion or hunch of criminal activity.” Wardlow, 528 U.S. at
123-24 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Courts
assess the legality of a Terry stop under the totality of the
circumstances, giving “due weight to common sense judgments
reached by officers in light of their experience and training.”
United States v. Perkins, 363 F.3d 317, 321 (4th Cir. 2004)
(citations omitted). Applying these principles, we conclude
that the arresting officers had reasonable suspicion to stop
Jones and frisk him for weapons.
Jones next argues that the district court erred in
imposing a variant sentence. We review a sentence for
reasonableness, applying an abuse of discretion standard.
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Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, __, 128 S. Ct. 586, 597
(2007); see also United States v. Seay, 553 F.3d 732, 742 (4th
Cir. 2009). In so doing, we first examine the sentence for
“significant procedural error,” including: “failing to calculate
(or improperly calculating) the [g]uidelines range, treating the
[g]uidelines as mandatory, failing to consider the § 3553(a)
factors, selecting a sentence based on clearly erroneous facts,
or failing to adequately explain the chosen sentence . . . .”
Gall, 128 S. Ct. at 597. “If the district court decides to
impose a sentence outside the [g]uidelines range, it must ensure
that its justification supports ‘the degree of the variance’;
. . . .” United States v. Evans, 526 F.3d 155, 161 (4th Cir.
2008) (quoting Gall, 128 S. Ct. at 597). Finally, we then
“‘consider[] the substantive reasonableness of the sentence
imposed.’” Id. (quoting Gall, 128 S. Ct. at 597).
We have thoroughly reviewed the record and conclude
that the district court did not err in imposing a variant
sentence two months above the advisory guidelines range and that
the sentence is reasonable. We therefore affirm the judgment of
the district court. We dispense with oral argument because the
facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the
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materials before the court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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