UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 08-5213
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
MICHAEL DEANDRE WILSON,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Anderson. Henry M. Herlong, Jr., Senior
District Judge. (8:08-cr-00286-HMH-1)
Submitted: June 25, 2009 Decided: July 7, 2009
Before TRAXLER and KING, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Lora E. Collins, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Greenville,
South Carolina, for Appellant. Winston David Holliday, Jr.,
Assistant United States Attorney, Columbia, South Carolina, for
Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Michael Deandre Wilson pleaded guilty to mail fraud,
in violation of 18 U.S.C.A. § 1341 (West Supp. 2009), and use of
the identification of another person in relation to mail fraud,
in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1028A (2006). The district court
sentenced Wilson to seventy months of imprisonment. His
attorney has filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386
U.S. 738 (1967), raising three issues but stating that there are
no meritorious issues for appeal. Wilson was informed of his
right to file a pro se supplemental brief but did not do so. We
affirm.
In the Anders brief, counsel questions whether the
district court erred in accepting Wilson’s guilty plea. Prior
to accepting a guilty plea, a trial court, through colloquy with
the defendant, must inform the defendant of, and determine that
he understands, the nature of the charges to which the plea is
offered, any mandatory minimum penalty, the maximum possible
penalty he faces, and the various rights he is relinquishing by
pleading guilty. Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b). The court also must
determine whether there is a factual basis for the plea. Id.;
United States v. DeFusco, 949 F.2d 114, 120 (4th Cir. 1991).
The purpose of the Rule 11 colloquy is to ensure that the plea
of guilt is entered into knowingly and voluntarily. See United
States v. Vonn, 535 U.S. 55, 58 (2002).
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Because Wilson did not move in the district court to
withdraw his guilty plea, any error in the Rule 11 hearing is
reviewed for plain error. United States v. Martinez, 277 F.3d
517, 525 (4th Cir. 2002). “To establish plain error, [Wilson]
must show that an error occurred, that the error was plain, and
that the error affected his substantial rights.” United
States v. Muhammad, 478 F.3d 247, 249 (4th Cir. 2007). Even if
Wilson satisfies these requirements, “correction of the error
remains within our discretion, which we should not exercise
. . . unless the error seriously affect[s] the fairness,
integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Id.
Our review of the transcript reveals substantial compliance with
the requirements of Rule 11, and we conclude that Wilson pleaded
guilty knowingly and voluntarily.
The remaining two issues raised by Wilson’s counsel
assert sentencing errors. Counsel questions whether the
district court erred in applying an adjustment under the
guidelines for obstruction of justice or otherwise committed
plain error in sentencing Wilson. We review a sentence for
reasonableness, applying an abuse of discretion standard.
Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, ___, 128 S. Ct. 586, 597
(2007); see also United States v. Layton, 564 F.3d 330, 335 (4th
Cir. 2009). In so doing, we first examine the sentence for
“significant procedural error,” including “failing to calculate
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(or improperly calculating) the [g]uidelines range, treating the
[g]uidelines as mandatory, failing to consider the § 3553(a)
factors, selecting a sentence based on clearly erroneous facts,
or failing to adequately explain the chosen sentence . . . .”
Gall, 128 S. Ct. at 597. This court then “‘consider[s] the
substantive reasonableness of the sentence imposed.’” United
States v. Evans, 526 F.3d 155, 161 (4th Cir.) (quoting Gall, 128
S. Ct. at 597), cert denied, 129 S. Ct. 476 (2008) (quoting
Gall, 128 S. Ct. at 597). “Substantive reasonableness review
entails taking into account the ‘totality of the circumstances,
including the extent of any variance from the [g]uidelines
range.’” United States v. Pauley, 511 F.3d 468, 473 (4th Cir.
2007) (quoting Gall, 128 S. Ct. at 597). If the sentence is
within the guidelines range, we apply a presumption of
reasonableness. Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, ___, 127
S. Ct. 2456, 2462-69 (2007) (upholding presumption of
reasonableness for within-guidelines sentence).
We have reviewed the record and conclude that the
district court neither erred in applying an adjustment for
obstruction of justice nor committed reversible procedural error
in sentencing Wilson. Furthermore, we conclude that Wilson’s
within-guidelines sentence is substantively reasonable.
We have examined the entire record in accordance with
the requirements of Anders and have found no meritorious issues
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for appeal. We therefore affirm the judgment of the district
court. This court requires that counsel inform Wilson, in
writing, of the right to petition the Supreme Court of the
United States for further review. If Wilson requests that a
petition be filed, but counsel believes that such a petition
would be frivolous, then counsel may move in this court for
leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must
state that a copy thereof was served on Wilson. We dispense
with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
adequately presented in the materials before the court and
argument would not aid in the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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