UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 08-5021
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
MAURICE YOUNG, a/k/a Peanut,
Defendant – Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Baltimore. Andre M. Davis, District Judge. (1:07-
cr-00229-AMD-7)
Submitted: July 6, 2009 Decided: July 24, 2009
Before MOTZ, KING, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Mark A. Van Bavel, MARK VAN BAVEL, P.A., Baltimore, Maryland,
for Appellant. Rod J. Rosenstein, United States Attorney,
Michael C. Hanlon, Assistant United States Attorney, Baltimore,
Maryland, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Maurice Young pled
guilty to one count of bank robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 2113 (a) & (d) (2006) and one count of use of a firearm during
a crime of violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(c)(1)(A)(ii) (2006). The district court sentenced Young
to 300 months’ imprisonment on the bank robbery conviction and
an additional 144 months on the firearms conviction, to be
served consecutively. Young timely noted his appeal.
On appeal, Young argues that the district court
improperly enhanced his sentence for obstruction of justice. A
district court’s factual findings, including those that serve as
a basis for an obstruction of justice enhancement under
U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual (“USSG”) § 3C1.1, are reviewed
for clear error. United States v. Kiulin, 360 F.3d 456, 460
(4th Cir. 2004). This deferential standard of review requires
reversal only if this court is “left with the definite and firm
conviction that a mistake has been committed.” United States v.
Stevenson, 396 F.3d 538, 542 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting
Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573 (1985)). However,
a district court’s legal conclusions regarding whether to apply
a sentencing enhancement are reviewed de novo. See United
States v. Layton, 564 F.3d 330, 334 (4th Cir. 2009).
2
According to USSG § 3C1.1, a defendant’s base offense
level is to be increased two levels for obstruction of justice
if
the defendant willfully obstructed or impeded, or
attempted to obstruct or impede, the administration of
justice with respect to the investigation,
prosecution, or sentencing of the instant offense of
conviction, and . . . the obstructive conduct related
to (i) the defendant’s offense of conviction[.]
USSG § 3C1.1. Obstructive conduct within the meaning of § 3C1.1
includes, but is not limited to, “threatening, intimidating, or
otherwise unlawfully influencing a co-defendant, witness, or
juror, directly or indirectly, or attempting to do so.” USSG
§ 3C1.1, comment (n.4(a)).
Here, the district court enhanced Young’s base offense
level pursuant to USSG § 3C1.1 after determining that Young
yelled at a cooperating witness in the courthouse lock-up in the
presence of other prisoners and called the cooperating witness a
“snitch” and a “rat.” Young’s statements and the context in
which they were made establish his intent to, directly or
indirectly, intimidate or unlawfully influence the cooperating
witness. By knowingly revealing the witness’ willingness to
cooperate with authorities, Young exposed the witness to a
potentially hostile crowd, and the district court could properly
conclude based on Young’s statements and the context in which
they were made that Young intended to obstruct justice. See
3
United States v. Hurst, 228 F.3d 751, 761-62 (6th Cir. 2000).
Accordingly, the district court did not err in enhancing Young’s
offense level by two levels for obstruction of justice.
Young also argues on appeal that the district court
committed procedural error in sentencing him. This court
reviews a sentence imposed by a district court under a
deferential abuse of discretion standard. Gall v. United
States, 552 U.S. 38, ___, 128 S. Ct. 586, 597 (2007). United
States v. Evans, 526 F.3d 155, 161 (4th Cir. 2008). In
reviewing a sentence, we must first ensure that the district
court committed no procedural error, such as failing to
calculate (or improperly calculating) the Guidelines range,
treating the Guidelines as mandatory, failing to consider the
§ 3553(a) factors, selecting a sentence based on clearly
erroneous facts, or failing to adequately explain the chosen
sentence - including an explanation for any deviation from the
Guidelines range. Gall, 128 S. Ct. at 597. If there are no
procedural errors, we then consider the substantive
reasonableness of the sentence. Id. A substantive
reasonableness review entails taking into account the totality
of the circumstances. United States v. Pauley, 511 F.3d 468,
473 (4th Cir. 2007) (quotations and citation omitted). Further,
this court may presume a sentence within the Guidelines range to
be reasonable. Id. Even if the reviewing court would have
4
reached a different result, this fact alone is insufficient to
justify reversal of the district court. Id. at 474.
“When rendering a sentence, the district court must
make an individualized assessment based on the facts presented.”
United States v. Carter, 564 F.3d 325, 328 (4th Cir. 2009)
(quoting Gall, 128 S. Ct. at 597) (internal quotations omitted)
(emphasis in the original)). Accordingly, a sentencing court
must apply the relevant § 3553(a) factors to the particular
facts presented and must “state in open court” the particular
reasons that support its chosen sentence. Id. Stating in open
court the particular reasons for a chosen sentence requires the
district court to set forth enough to satisfy this court that
the district court has a reasoned basis for its decision and has
considered the parties’ arguments. Id.
We have reviewed the record, and it is clear that the
district court conducted a thorough and particularized
sentencing hearing during which it considered and, ultimately,
rejected Young’s sentencing arguments. Also, the district court
applied the relevant § 3553(a) factors and clearly stated in
open court the basis for the chosen sentence. Accordingly,
Young fails to demonstrate that his sentence was procedurally
unreasonable. Additionally, this court may presume on appeal
that a sentence within a defendant’s advisory Guidelines range
is substantively reasonable, and Young fails to offer anything
5
to rebut that presumption. Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338,
__, 127 S. Ct. 2456, 2459 (2007). Accordingly, we affirm the
judgment of the district court. We dispense with oral argument
as the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in
the materials before the court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED
6