UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 08-2251
CHEN JING,
Petitioner,
v.
ERIC H. HOLDER, JR., Attorney General,
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration
Appeals.
Submitted: June 22, 2009 Decided: July 24, 2009
Before MOTZ and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Petition denied by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Eric Y. Zheng, New York, New York, for Petitioner. Michael F.
Hertz, Acting Assistant Attorney General, William C. Peachey,
Assistant Director, Matthew A. Spurlock, Office of Immigration
Litigation, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington,
D.C., for Respondent.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Chen Jing, a native and citizen of the People’s
Republic of China, petitions for review of an order of the Board
of Immigration Appeals (“Board”) dismissing her appeal from the
immigration judge’s order denying her applications for asylum,
withholding from removal and withholding under the Convention
Against Torture (“CAT”). We deny the petition for review.
The INA authorizes the Attorney General to confer
asylum on any refugee. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a) (2006). It defines a
refugee as a person unwilling or unable to return to her native
country “because of persecution or a well-founded fear of
persecution on account of race, religion, nationality,
membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.”
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (2006). “Persecution involves the
infliction or threat of death, torture, or injury to one’s
person or freedom, on account of one of the enumerated grounds.
. . .” Li v. Gonzales, 405 F.3d 171, 177 (4th Cir. 2005)
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
An alien “bear[s] the burden of proving eligibility
for asylum,” Naizgi v. Gonzales, 455 F.3d 484, 486 (4th Cir.
2006); see 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(a) (2008), and can establish
refugee status based on past persecution in her native country
on account of a protected ground. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1)
(2009). Without regard to past persecution, an alien can
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establish a well-founded fear of persecution on a protected
ground. Ngarurih v. Ashcroft, 371 F.3d 182, 187 (4th Cir.
2004). The well-founded fear standard contains both a
subjective and an objective component. The objective element
requires a showing of specific, concrete facts that would lead a
reasonable person in like circumstances to fear persecution.
Gandziami-Mickhou v. Gonzales, 445 F.3d 351, 353 (4th Cir.
2006). “The subjective component can be met through the
presentation of candid, credible, and sincere testimony
demonstrating a genuine fear of persecution . . . . [It] must
have some basis in the reality of the circumstances and be
validated with specific, concrete facts . . . and it cannot be
mere irrational apprehension.” Li, 405 F.3d at 176 (internal
quotation marks and citations omitted).
To establish eligibility for withholding of removal,
an alien must show a clear probability that, if she were removed
to her native country, her “life or freedom would be threatened”
on a protected ground. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A) (2006); see
Camara v. Ashcroft, 378 F.3d 361, 370 (4th Cir. 2004). A “clear
probability” means that it is more likely than not the alien
would be subject to persecution. INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407,
429-30 (1984).
A determination regarding eligibility for asylum or
withholding of removal is affirmed if supported by substantial
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evidence on the record considered as a whole. INS v. Elias-
Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481 (1992). Administrative findings of
fact, including findings on credibility, are conclusive unless
any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to decide to the
contrary. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B) (2006). Legal issues are
reviewed de novo, “affording appropriate deference to the BIA’s
interpretation of the INA and any attendant regulations.”
Lin v. Mukasey, 517 F.3d 685, 691-92 (4th Cir. 2008). This
court will reverse the Board only if “the evidence . . .
presented was so compelling that no reasonable factfinder could
fail to find the requisite fear of persecution.” Elias-
Zacarias, 502 U.S. at 483-84; see Rusu v. INS, 296 F.3d 316, 325
n.14 (4th Cir. 2002). The immigration judge’s order is the
final decision for this court’s review as a result of the
Board’s affirmance without opinion. Khattak v. Ashcroft, 332
F.3d 250, 253 (4th Cir. 2003).
We find substantial evidence supports the Board’s
finding that Jing did not establish a well-founded fear of
persecution. Because Jing did not meet her burden of proof to
qualify for asylum, she is necessarily ineligible for
withholding of removal. See Camara v. Ashcroft, 378 F.3d 361,
367 (4th Cir. 2004). We also find the Board did not engage in
any improper factfinding. We further find the Board did not err
in finding that Jing did not establish that it was more likely
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than not she will be tortured if returned to China; thus, Jing
is not eligible for relief under the CAT. See 8 C.F.R.
§ 208.16(c)(2) (2009).
Accordingly, we deny the petition for review. We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
PETITION DENIED
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