PUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. No. 07-5127
JAMES RICHARD RICKS,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of North Carolina, at Charlotte.
Robert J. Conrad, Jr., Chief District Judge.
(3:06-cr-00134-RJC-CH-1)
Argued: March 26, 2009
Decided: July 20, 2009
Before GREGORY and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges, and
Jackson L. KISER, Senior United States District Judge for
the Western District of Virginia, sitting by designation.
Reversed by published opinion. Judge Gregory wrote the
opinion, in which Judge Duncan and Senior Judge Kiser
joined.
COUNSEL
ARGUED: Ross Hall Richardson, FEDERAL DEFENDERS
OF WESTERN NORTH CAROLINA, INC., Charlotte, North
2 UNITED STATES v. RICKS
Carolina, for Appellant. Adam Christopher Morris, OFFICE
OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Charlotte, North
Carolina, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Claire J. Rauscher, Exec-
utive Director, Kevin Tate, FEDERAL DEFENDERS OF
WESTERN NORTH CAROLINA, INC., Charlotte, North
Carolina, for Appellant. Gretchen C. F. Shappert, United
States Attorney, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellee.
OPINION
GREGORY, Circuit Judge:
James Richard Ricks was convicted in the United States
District Court for the Western District of North Carolina for
violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (2006), possession of a fire-
arm by a convicted felon, and was sentenced to 180 months’
imprisonment. At trial, the district court denied Ricks a jury
instruction on a justification defense because the court did not
believe the defense was available in this Circuit. Recognizing
its legal error post-trial, the district court nonetheless denied
Ricks’ motion for a new trial because it found that Ricks had
not presented sufficient evidence to warrant the instruction.
We find that the district court’s decision at trial to deny the
instruction was not justified by either the law or the facts,
because a reasonable trier of fact could have found that Ricks’
possession was justified. We therefore reverse Mr. Ricks’
conviction.
I.
In determining the sufficiency of the evidence to support a
criminal defendant’s request for a jury instruction on a theory
of defense, "the testimony most favorable to the defendant
should be accepted." United States v. Al-Rekabi, 454 F.3d
1113, 1121 (10th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted). The evidence presented at Ricks’ trial, taken
in the light most favorable to Ricks, established the following:
UNITED STATES v. RICKS 3
On the night of December 15, 2005, Ricks’ partner, Clar-
ence Blue, returned to their shared apartment after having dis-
appeared for several days. Ricks noticed immediately that
Blue was acting erratically—walking strangely and talking
incoherently. Realizing that Blue had a gun in his hand, Ricks
ran up to him, pinned him against the wall, and hit the gun out
of his hand. Ricks then picked up the gun, removed the clip,
and threw the gun and the clip in different directions. When
Ricks stepped away from Blue, Blue ran out the door.
Although Ricks shouted after him, Blue kept running and
eventually got into his car and drove away.
After Blue left, Ricks retrieved the gun and clip from where
he had thrown them and, without returning the clip to the gun,
placed the pieces on top of a dresser, underneath some
clothes, in the bedroom he and Blue shared. Ricks then went
back into the living room and began to watch television. Fif-
teen to thirty minutes later, Blue returned to the apartment,
this time accompanied by two police officers. According to
Ricks, the officers asked repeatedly whether there was a gun
in the house. Although Ricks did not respond immediately, he
finally acknowledged that there was a gun in the house and
took the officers into the bedroom, where he retrieved the gun
and the clip and turned them over to the police. After Ricks
admitted to a prior felony conviction, the officers took him
into custody as a convicted felon in possession of a firearm.
At trial, Ricks’ counsel argued that Ricks was entitled to a
jury instruction on a justification defense. Initially, the district
court agreed with counsel that, if a justification defense were
available in this Circuit, the evidence that had been presented
would have been "sufficient . . . to warrant the instruction."
(J.A. 177.) However, because the court found that the Fourth
Circuit had never concretely recognized a justification
defense to violations of the felon-in-possession statute, 18
U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (2006), it ultimately denied the instruction.
Ricks was convicted on August 9, 2006.
4 UNITED STATES v. RICKS
While Ricks was awaiting sentencing, we published our
decision in United States v. Mooney, 497 F.3d 397 (4th Cir.
2007), in which we found that the petitioner was entitled to
relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 for ineffective assistance of
counsel after his lawyer advised him that a justification
defense was unavailable for a § 922(g) violation. The publica-
tion of Mooney prompted the district court to hold a sua
sponte status conference on August 14, 2007, to consider the
effect of Mooney on Ricks’ case. At those proceedings, Ricks’
attorney moved for a new trial. After briefing by both parties,
the district court denied the motion on September 28, 2007.
Inverting the position it took at trial, the court found that
while Mooney made clear that a justification defense was
available for § 922(g) violations, there was insufficient evi-
dence to warrant a justification instruction in Ricks’ case.
Ricks timely filed an appeal with this Court, in which he
argues both that the district court’s mid-trial decision not to
allow a justification instruction was reversible error and, in
the alternative, that its denial of his motion for a new trial was
an abuse of discretion.
II.
"[A] defendant is entitled to an instruction as to any recog-
nized defense for which there exists evidence sufficient for a
reasonable jury to find in his favor." Mathews v. United
States, 485 U.S. 58, 63 (1988). A district court’s refusal to
instruct the jury on such a defense presents a question of law
that we review de novo. United States v. Perrin, 45 F.3d 869,
871 (4th Cir. 1995).
At Ricks’ trial, the district court concluded that this Circuit
had never explicitly recognized a justification defense and
thus no jury instruction on that defense needed to be given.
Ricks contends that this was reversible error because the
instruction "‘(1) was correct; (2) was not substantially cov-
ered by the court’s charge to the jury; and (3) dealt with some
UNITED STATES v. RICKS 5
point in the trial so important, that failure to give the
requested instruction seriously impaired [his] ability to con-
duct his defense.’" United States v. Lewis, 53 F.3d 29, 32 (4th
Cir. 1995) (quoting United States v. Camejo, 929 F.2d 610,
614 (11th Cir. 1991)). The second and third prongs of the
Lewis test are plainly met here, so for purposes of this appeal
we need look only at prong one—whether the instruction was
correct, meaning it was a correct statement of the law and it
was supported by the evidence. See United States v. Fiedeke,
384 F.3d 407, 410 (7th Cir. 2004).
The district court concluded that a justification defense was
not available as a matter of law in this jurisdiction because no
prior controlling Fourth Circuit case law had explicitly recog-
nized such a defense. Indeed, though a number of our deci-
sions have hinted at the availability of the defense, our pre-
Mooney case law has hardly been a font of clarity on the mat-
ter. See, e.g., United States v. Crittendon, 883 F.2d 326, 329-
30 (4th Cir. 1989) (acknowledging the defense and outlining
its elements but finding no need to recognize the defense
because the defendant could not satisfy those elements); Per-
rin, 45 F.3d at 873, 875 (noting that Crittendon had "adopted"
a four-prong test for the defense and suggesting that
"[c]onsistent with other circuits, we [would] continue to con-
strue the justification defense for possession of a firearm by
a felon very narrowly" (emphasis added)); United States v.
Rush, 90 Fed. App’x 695, 698 (4th Cir. 2004) (per curiam)
(declining "once again to reach the question of whether such
a defense would be available if the defendant had satisfied
each of its elements"). After repeatedly tipping our hat to the
defense but finding that the defendants who sought to use it
were unable to satisfy its requirements,1 we finally clarified in
1
See United States v. Hillian, 210 Fed. App’x 251, 252 (4th Cir. 2006)
(per curiam); United States v. Campbell, 104 Fed. App’x 302, 303 (4th
Cir. 2004) (per curiam); United States v. Powell, 42 Fed. App’x 565, 571
(4th Cir. 2002) (per curiam); United States v. Brown, 5 Fed. App’x 292,
295 (4th Cir. 2001) (per curiam); United States v. Lindsay, No. 00-4256,
2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 25376, at *1-2 (4th Cir. Oct. 11, 2000) (per
curiam); United States v. Poole, No. 98-4231, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS
32630, at *4-7 (4th Cir. Dec. 31, 1998) (per curiam).
6 UNITED STATES v. RICKS
Mooney, 497 F.3d 397, that the defense was available and
acknowledged its applicability in that case.
Now, in Mooney’s wake, the government and Ricks appar-
ently agree that the district court erred in finding that the
defense was not available as a matter of law. (See Gov’t Br.
at 8 ("[T]he district court’s initial reasoning – that Perrin and
Crittendon did not allow a justification defense in this Circuit
– appears to have been a legal error . . . ." (internal citation
omitted)).) As Mooney explains, because justification is a
common-law defense, "‘Congress’ failure to provide specifi-
cally for [it] in drafting a criminal statute does not necessarily
preclude a defendant charged with violating the statute from
relying on [that] defense.’" 497 F.3d at 403 (quoting United
States v. Panter, 688 F.2d 268, 271 (5th Cir. 1982)). More-
over, "‘[c]ommon sense dictates that if a previously convicted
felon is attacked by someone with a gun, the felon should not
be found guilty for taking the gun away from the attacker in
order to save his life.’" Id. (quoting United States v. Singleton,
902 F.2d 471, 472 (6th Cir. 1990)). Given that there is no dis-
pute between the parties that justification is available as a
defense as a matter of law, we turn now to the question of
whether, in Ricks’ case, the evidence presented at trial was
sufficient to warrant an instruction on the defense.
Although the government concedes that the court’s reason-
ing on the general availability of the justification defense was
erroneous, it argues that the district court’s decision at trial to
deny the justification instruction was nonetheless correct
because the evidence did not support such an instruction. The
district court reasoned similarly in its decision on Ricks’
motion for a new trial. However, at trial, the district court
took the view that there was sufficient evidence to support a
jury instruction on justification, and we agree.
In Crittendon, we laid out the elements that a defendant
would have to satisfy to be entitled to a justification instruc-
tion:
UNITED STATES v. RICKS 7
[T]he defendant must produce evidence which would
allow the factfinder to conclude that he:
(1) was under unlawful and present threat of death
or serious bodily injury;
(2) did not recklessly place himself in a situation
where he would be forced to engage in criminal
conduct;
(3) had no reasonable legal alternative (to both the
criminal act and the avoidance of the threat-
ened harm); and
(4) a direct causal relationship between the crimi-
nal action and the avoidance of the threatened
harm.
883 F.2d at 330 (internal quotation marks and citation omit-
ted).
Applying Crittendon at trial, the district court reasoned:
I think there is [sic] sufficient facts if believed by the
jury that would show that—if Mr. Blue was
believed, that he brought the gun to the house in an
agitated state; that at the door there was a confronta-
tion between Mr. Blue and the defendant and that the
defendant took the gun from Mr. Blue. And prior to
taking the gun, he would have been in a present
threat of such a nature as to induce a well-grounded
fear of death or serious bodily injury [Crittendon
factor (1)]. . . . If Mr. Blue is believed, Mr. Ricks
was just at the home that Mr. Blue had not been to
for a number of days and so did not recklessly place
himself in a situation where he would be forced to
possess the gun [Crittendon factor (2)]. And at that
point would not have had a reasonable legal alterna-
8 UNITED STATES v. RICKS
tive other than to struggle with Mr. Blue [Crittendon
factor (3)]. And that there’s a causal relationship
between the possession and the elimination of the
risk [Crittendon factor (4)].
(J.A. 185-86.)
Notwithstanding this, the government would now have us
take the position that the district court took in its post-trial
order denying Ricks’ motion for a new trial. In that order, the
district court about-faced and found that the evidence did not
in fact support a justification instruction. While the court
acknowledged that Mooney made clear that justification was
an available defense in this Circuit, it went on to find that
Ricks could not satisfy the third prong of the Crittendon test.
The district court accepted that Ricks was arguably in immi-
nent danger at the time he disarmed Blue, but it concluded
that Ricks continued to possess the gun after that point
although he "had other reasonable alternatives to continued
possession of the gun." (J.A. 335.)
It is true that, after disarming Blue, Ricks briefly retook
possession of the gun. Apparently understanding the gun to
belong to Blue, Ricks picked up the gun and the clip from the
floor and brought them to the bedroom he and Blue shared,
where he placed them underneath some clothes on the dresser.
As the government points out, courts have found that even
such fleeting possession can be enough to show actual posses-
sion for purposes of § 922(g) liability. See, e.g., United States
v. Adkins, 196 F.3d 1112, 1115 (10th Cir. 1999). The question
before us, however, is whether a reasonable finder of fact
could have found that such possession was justified. See Mat-
thews, 485 U.S. at 63. Had the jury properly been instructed
on justification, it could very well have found Ricks’ brief
repossession to be a reasonable effort to place the gun out of
harm’s way. See Mooney at 407 (finding that "it is the reten-
tion of a firearm, rather than the brief possession for disposal
. . . which poses the danger which is criminalized"); cf.
UNITED STATES v. RICKS 9
Adkins, 196 F.3d at 1115 ("[E]ven if a felon held a firearm for
a mere second or two, unless that felon truly did not know
that what he possessed was a firearm or there was some rec-
ognized legal justification for his holding the firearm,
§ 922(g) will still impose criminal liability." (emphasis
added)); United States v. Parker, 566 F.2d 1304, 1306 (5th
Cir. 1978) (finding that the fact that defendant continued to
hold the gun in his hands for thirty minutes after threat dissi-
pated defeated applicability of justification defense).
Perhaps recognizing that Ricks’ brief actual repossession of
the gun might still be covered by a justification defense, the
government also argues that Ricks constructively possessed
the gun from the time he placed it on the dresser until he
turned it over to the police. But "[w]hen the government seeks
to establish constructive possession under § 922(g)(1), it must
prove that the defendant intentionally exercised dominion and
control over the firearm, or had the power and the intention
to exercise dominion and control over the firearm." United
States v. Scott, 424 F.3d 431, 435-36 (4th Cir. 2005) (empha-
sis added). The record here does not allow us to conclude that
the government proved that Ricks had the intent to exercise
dominion and control over the gun at any point after he placed
it on the shared dresser.2 After leaving the bedroom, Ricks
went into the living room and watched television until Blue
and the police arrived at the apartment. Nothing in these
2
Intent is an element of a § 922(g)(1) charge, whether possession is
being proved with evidence of actual or constructive possession. Scott,
424 F.3d at 435. Thus, in order to find Ricks guilty of a § 922(g)(1) viola-
tion, the jury must necessarily have found an intentional possession of the
gun. However, on this record it is unclear at what point the jury found an
intentional possession. It is possible that the jury found intentional posses-
sion with respect to Ricks’ immediate and actual possession as he dis-
armed Blue. With the benefit of a justification instruction, the jury could
well have found that possession to be a nullity. Whether subsequent to that
immediate possession, Ricks was guilty of continued possession under a
constructive possession theory is a jury question that the Government must
prove beyond a reasonable doubt. See id.
10 UNITED STATES v. RICKS
actions inherently suggests an intention to exercise dominion
and/or control over the gun. See United States v. Blue, 957
F.2d 106, 108 (4th Cir. 1992) ("The mere proximity of a
weapon to a [defendant] goes only to its accessibility, not to
the dominion or control which must be proved to establish
possession." (internal quotation marks and citation omitted));
cf. United States v. Singleton, 902 F.2d 471, 472-73 (6th Cir.
1990) (finding continued unjustified possession where, after
alleged threat dissipated, defendant kept gun in his car while
visiting a friend). Nor does the record support a conclusion
that the jury found continued constructive possession from
this conduct.
We agree with the government that "a defendant seeking a
justification instruction must produce evidence that he took
reasonable steps to dispossess himself of the weapon once the
threat entitling him to possess it abated." (Gov’t. Br. 10). We
disagree, however, that Ricks has not met this burden. The
evidence presented permits the conclusion that, after Ricks
disarmed Blue, he took immediate steps to dispossess himself
of the gun by placing it on the bedroom dresser.
Apparently reading our decision in Mooney as support for
its position, the government implies that Ricks did not act rea-
sonably to dispossess himself of the gun because he did not
immediately turn it over to the police.3 In Mooney, we found
that the defendant would have been able to satisfy prong three
of the Crittendon test because the evidence showed that after
3
The government also suggests that a reasonable alternative would have
been to leave the apartment, rather than retrieve the gun and place it on
the dresser. However, Ricks was under no obligation to leave his own
home simply to avoid being in the vicinity of a firearm. Section 922(g)(1)
may, as the government puts it, "place[ ] a high burden on felons-in-
possession seeking legal justification" (Gov’t Br. 29), but it does not
create criminal liability for a convicted felon who simply lives with some-
one who possesses a firearm. Moreover, it might well have been danger-
ous for Ricks to leave the gun on the floor where an upset Blue could
easily have accessed it had he returned to the apartment.
UNITED STATES v. RICKS 11
he disarmed his intoxicated ex-wife, "[t]he trajectory of Moo-
ney’s actions all pointed toward handing over the gun to the
police." 497 F.3d at 408. This conclusion, however, did not
create a bright-line rule that the only reasonable way for a
felon to dispossess himself of a gun he has justifiably come
to possess is to turn that gun over to the police. Mooney’s
method of dispossession was a reasonable one, not the only
reasonable one. Given the facts of this case, a reasonable trier
of fact could find that Ricks’ conduct was "necessary and effi-
cient in disposing of the gun," id. at 407, because he took pos-
session of the gun no longer than needed to avoid threatened
harm from Blue and then dispossessed himself of the gun by
placing it somewhere where Blue, the gun’s owner, could
retrieve it once in a better frame of mind.
In many cases, a defendant’s options for reasonable dispos-
session of a firearm may include turning the gun over to the
authorities, but that is not the only option, and ultimately, the
reasonableness of the defendant’s course of conduct is a ques-
tion for a jury. For purposes of determining the propriety of
a jury instruction on justification, we need only see whether
there is sufficient evidence for a jury to conclude that the
defendant’s actions were reasonable, and we find that there
was sufficient evidence here.
III.
Having found that the district court committed reversible
error by denying Ricks a jury instruction on justification at
trial, we need not consider whether the district court abused
its discretion in denying Ricks’ motion for a new trial. Ricks’
conviction for violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) is hereby
reversed.
REVERSED