PUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
JOHN ALLEN MUHAMMAD,
Petitioner-Appellant,
v.
No. 08-13
LORETTA K. KELLY, Warden,
Sussex I State Prison,
Respondent-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Alexandria.
Liam O’Grady, District Judge.
(1:07-cv-01022-LO-TRJ)
Argued: May 12, 2009
Decided: August 7, 2009
Before MOTZ, GREGORY, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by published opinion. Judge Gregory wrote the
opinion, in which Judge Motz and Judge Duncan joined.
COUNSEL
ARGUED: Jonathan P. Sheldon, DEVINE, CONNELL &
SHELDON, PLC, Fairfax, Virginia, for Appellant. Katherine
Baldwin Burnett, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
OF VIRGINIA, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee. ON
2 MUHAMMAD v. KELLY
BRIEF: James G. Connell, III, DEVINE, CONNELL &
SHELDON, PLC, Fairfax, Virginia; Nathaniel H. Akerman,
Joseph Perkovich, DORSEY & WHITNEY LLP, New York,
New York, for Appellant. William C. Mims, Attorney Gen-
eral of Virginia, Jerry P. Slonaker, Senior Assistant Attorney
General, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF
VIRGINIA, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee.
OPINION
GREGORY, Circuit Judge:
John Allen Muhammad petitions this Court for a writ of
habeas corpus. He alleges nondisclosure of exculpatory infor-
mation by the prosecution, ineffective assistance of his trial
counsel, improper exclusion of expert testimony during his
sentencing phase, and improper time and page restrictions on
his habeas petition in the district court below. We are unable
to find reversible error in the conclusions of the state and dis-
trict courts, and we therefore affirm the district court’s deci-
sion to deny habeas relief.
I.
Paul J. LaRuffa was a restaurateur in Clinton, Maryland. At
the end of the day on September 5, 2002, LaRuffa closed his
restaurant and proceeded to take his laptop computer and
$3500 in cash and credit receipts to his car. After he sat
behind the steering wheel, he saw a figure to his left and a
flash of light, then heard gunshots. LaRuffa was shot six
times, but survived. An employee who left the restaurant with
LaRuffa witnessed the shooting and called 911. He testified
that he saw a "kid" run up to LaRuffa’s car, fire into it, and
take the briefcase and laptop. Muhammad v. Virginia, 619
S.E.2d 16, 25 (Va. 2005). The briefcase and empty deposit
bags were found six weeks later in a wooded area approxi-
MUHAMMAD v. KELLY 3
mately a mile from the shooting. The DNA from clothing
found nearby was consistent with that of Lee Boyd Malvo.
On September 15, 2002, there was a second shooting in
Clinton, Maryland: Muhammad Rashid was locking the front
door of the Three Roads Liquor Store from the outside when
he heard gunshots behind him. A young man then rushed him
and shot him in the stomach. Rashid testified that the young
man was Malvo.
Almost a week later, on September 21, 2002, Claudine Par-
ker and Kelly Adams were shot after closing the Zelda Road
ABC Liquor Store in Montgomery, Alabama. Parker died as
a result of her gunshot wound through the back—the bullet
transected her spinal cord and passed through her lung.
Adams was shot through the neck, and the bullet exited
through her chin, breaking her jaw in half, shattering her face
and teeth, paralyzing her left vocal cord, and severing nerves
in her left shoulder. Yet, she survived. Bullets recovered from
the shooting were eventually identified as coming from a
Bushmaster high-powered rifle. While the rifle was being
fired, Malvo was seen approaching Parker and Adams. A
police car passed by the scene immediately after the shooting,
and the officers observed Malvo going through the women’s
purses. The officers gave chase, but Malvo escaped. In the
process, however, he dropped a gun catalog. Malvo’s finger-
prints were found on the catalog, and a .22-caliber, stainless-
steel revolver was found in the stairwell of an apartment
building that Malvo traversed. The revolver was the same as
the one used to shoot LaRuffa and Rashid.
Two days later, on September 23, 2002, the manager of a
Baton Rouge, Louisiana, Beauty Depot store, Hong Im Bal-
lenger, was walking to her car after closing the store for the
evening when she was shot once in the head. The bullet
entered the back of her head and exited through her jawbone.
She died as a result of the wound. The bullet was determined
to have come from the Bushmaster rifle found on Muhammad
4 MUHAMMAD v. KELLY
during his arrest. Witnesses saw Malvo flee from the scene
with Ballenger’s purse.
The sixth and seventh shootings occurred in Silver Spring,
Maryland, on October 3, 2002. At approximately 8:15 a.m.,
Premkumar A. Walekar was shot while fueling his taxicab.
The bullet went through his left arm and entered his chest,
where it fatally damaged his heart. At approximately 8:30
a.m., Sarah Ramos was killed while sitting on a bench in front
of the Crisp & Juicy Restaurant in the Leisure World Shop-
ping Center. The bullet entered through the front of her head
and exited through her spinal cord at the top of the neck. Both
bullets were identified as having come from a Bushmaster
rifle, and an eyewitness identified Muhammad’s Chevrolet
Caprice at the scene of the second shooting.
On October 3, 2002, at approximately 10:00 a.m., Lori
Lewis-Rivera was shot in the back while vacuuming her car
at a Shell gas station in Kensington, Maryland. The bullet was
identified as coming from a Bushmaster rifle. An eyewitness
said that he saw a Chevrolet Caprice in the area approxi-
mately twenty minutes before the shooting. At approximately
7:00 p.m., a police officer stopped Muhammad for running
two stop signs. The officer gave Muhammad a verbal warning
and released him. Later that night, at approximately 9:15 p.m.,
Pascal Charlot was shot in the chest as he crossed the inter-
section of Georgia Avenue and Kalmia Road in the District of
Columbia. Charlot’s shooting happened about thirty blocks
from where Muhammad was stopped. The bullet fragments
from both the Lewis-Rivera and the Charlot shootings were
identified as coming from a Bushmaster rifle.
The next day, October 4, 2002, Caroline Seawell was put-
ting bags in her minivan outside of a Michael’s craft store in
Fredericksburg, Virginia, when she was shot once in the back.
The bullet damaged her liver and exited through her right
breast, but she survived the attack. An eyewitness testified to
seeing a Caprice in the parking lot at the time of the shooting,
MUHAMMAD v. KELLY 5
and ballistics tests determined the bullet fragments came from
a Bushmaster rifle.
On October 6, 2002, Tanya Brown was taking Iran Brown
to Tasker Middle School in Bowie, Maryland. As Iran was
walking on the sidewalk to the school, he was shot once in the
chest. Tanya drove Iran to a health care center where surgeons
were able to save his life despite lung damage, a large hole
in his diaphragm, damage to the left lobe of his liver, and lac-
erations to his stomach, pancreas, and spleen. Two eyewit-
nesses testified that they saw a Caprice in the vicinity of the
school the day before and the morning of the shooting. One
eyewitness positively identified both Muhammad and Malvo
in the Caprice the morning of the shooting. The police
searched the surrounding area and found a ballpoint pen and
a shell casing in the woods near the school. The area had been
pressed down like a blind used to conceal hunters. The tissue
samples from the pen matched Muhammad’s DNA, and the
shell casing and bullet fragments were determined to have
come from a Bushmaster rifle. The Brown shooting was also
the first time that police discovered communications from the
shooters. The tarot card for death was found, and on it was
written, "Call me God." On the back, someone had written,
"For you, Mr. Police. Code: Call me God. Do not release to
the Press." Muhammad v. Virginia, 619 S.E.2d at 27.
Three days later, on October 9, 2002, Dean Meyers was
fueling his car at a Sunoco station in Manassas, Virginia,
when he was shot in the head by a single bullet. The bullet
was later determined to have come from a Bushmaster rifle.
An eyewitness testified that she saw Muhammad and Malvo
in the area approximately one hour prior. The police actually
interviewed Muhammad in a parking lot across the street
immediately after the shooting, and they later found a map
with Muhammad’s fingerprints in the parking lot.
On October 11, 2002, Kenneth Bridges was fired upon at
an Exxon gas station in Massaponax, Virginia. He was shot
6 MUHAMMAD v. KELLY
once in the chest by a bullet identified as having come from
the Bushmaster rifle. Two eyewitnesses testified that they saw
a Caprice at or near the Exxon that morning.
The fourteenth shooting occurred on October 14, 2002, in
Falls Church, Virginia. Linda Franklin and her husband were
loading their car outside of a Home Depot when she was shot
in the head by a single bullet and killed. Ballistics experts
determined that the bullet was from a Bushmaster rifle.
The next day, October 15, a Rockville, Maryland, dis-
patcher received the following telephone call: "Don’t say any-
thing, just listen, we’re the people who are causing the
killings in your area. Look on the tarot card, it says, ‘call me
God, do not release to press.’ We’ve called you three times
before trying to set up negotiations. We’ve gotten no
response. People have died." Id. at 28. The caller hung up
before the dispatcher could transfer the call to the Sniper Task
Force.
Three days later, on October 18, Officer Derek Baliles of
the Montgomery County, Maryland, Police received a tele-
phone call. The caller told Baliles to "shut up" and said that
he knew who was doing the shootings, but wanted the police
to verify some information before he said anything further. Id.
The caller asked questions about the Parker and Adams shoot-
ings in Alabama and hung up again. When the caller called
again, Baliles verified the shootings. The caller stated that he
needed to find more coins and a telephone without surveil-
lance, then hung up. The same day, William Sullivan, a priest
in Ashland, Virginia, received a telephone call from two peo-
ple. The first male voice told him that someone else wanted
to speak to him. The second male voice said that "the lady
didn’t have to die," and "it was at the Home Depot." Id. The
caller then told him about the shooting in Alabama and said,
"Mr. Policeman, I am God. Do not tell the press." Id. The
caller concluded by telling Sullivan to relay the information
to the police.
MUHAMMAD v. KELLY 7
The next day, October 19, 2002, Jeffery Hopper and his
wife were leaving a restaurant in Ashland, Virginia, when he
was shot in the abdomen. Hopper survived, but his injuries
required five surgeries to repair his pancreas, stomach, kid-
neys, liver, diaphragm, and intestines. In the woods near the
crime scene, police discovered another blind similar to the
one at the Brown shooting. They also found a shell casing, a
candy wrapper, and a plastic sandwich bag that was attached
with a thumbtack to a tree at eye level and was decorated with
Halloween characters and self-adhesive stars. The shell casing
and bullets were determined to have come from a Bushmaster
rifle. The candy wrapper contained Muhammad’s and
Malvo’s DNA. The sandwich bag contained a handwritten
message:
For you Mr. Police. "Call me God." Do not release
to the Press.
We have tried to contact you to start negotiation . . .
These people took our call for a Hoax or Joke, so
your failure to respond has cost you five lives.
If stopping the killing is more important than catch-
ing us now, then you will accept our demand which
are non-negotiable.
(i) You will place ten million dollar in Bank of amer-
ica account . . . We will have unlimited withdrawl at
any atm worldwide. You will activate the bank
account, credit card, and pin number. We will con-
tact you at Ponderosa Buffet, Ashland, Virginia, tel.
# . . . 6:00 am Sunday Morning. You have until 9:00
a.m. Monday morning to complete transaction. "Try
to catch us withdrawing at least you will have less
body bags."
(ii) If trying to catch us now more important then
prepare you body bags.
8 MUHAMMAD v. KELLY
If we give you our word that is what takes place.
"Word is Bond."
P.S. Your children are not safe anywhere at anytime.
Id. at 28-29 (alterations in original). However, the note was
not discovered until after the deadline had passed. Surveil-
lance videotapes from that day identified Muhammad at a Big
Lots store near the shooting.
The day after Hopper was shot, the FBI Sniper Tip Line
received a call from a male who stated, "Don’t talk. Just lis-
ten. Call me God. I left a message for you at the Ponderosa.
I am trying to reach you at the Ponderosa. Be there to take a
call in ten minutes." Id. at 29. On October 21, 2002, the FBI
negotiations team received a call that had been re-routed from
the Ponderosa telephone number. A recorded voice said:
Don’t say anything. Just listen. Dearest police, Call
me God. Do not release to the press. Five red stars.
You have our terms. They are non-negotiable. If you
choose Option 1, you will hold a press conference
stating to the media that you believe you have caught
the sniper like a duck in a noose. Repeat every word
exactly as you heard it. If you choose Option 2, be
sure to remember we will not deviate. P.S. – Your
children are not safe.
Id.
The next day at around 6:00 a.m., Conrad Johnson, a bus
driver for the Montgomery County Transit Authority, was
shot in the chest as he was entering his bus in Aspen Hill,
Maryland. Johnson was conscious when the rescue workers
arrived, but died at the hospital. The bullet fragments were
determined to have come from a Bushmaster rifle. At another
blind discovered nearby, a black duffle bag and a brown left-
MUHAMMAD v. KELLY 9
handed glove were found. DNA from hair found in the duffle
bag matched that of Muhammad. Another plastic bag that
contained self-adhesive stars and a note was left behind.
On October 24, 2002, the FBI captured Muhammad and
Malvo at a rest area in Frederick County, Maryland. They
were asleep in a Caprice, where police found a loaded .223-
caliber Bushmaster rifle behind the rear seat. The DNA on the
rifle matched that of both Muhammad and Malvo, although
the only fingerprints found on the rifle were those of Malvo.
The Caprice had been modified with heavy window tint, a
hinged rear seat that provided easy access to the trunk from
the passenger compartment, and a hole that had been cut into
the trunk lid just above the license plate. Covering the hole
was a right-handed brown glove that matched the left-handed
glove found near the Johnson shooting, and a rubber seal
crossed over the hole. Moreover, the trunk had been spray-
painted blue.
Police also found the following items in the Caprice: a
global positioning system receiver; a magazine about rifles;
an AT&T telephone charge card; ear plugs; maps; plastic
sandwich bags; a rifle scope; .223-caliber ammunition; two-
way radios; a digital voice recorder; a receipt from a Baton
Rouge, Louisiana, grocery store, dated September 27, 2002;
an electronic organizer; a plastic bag from Big Lots; a slip of
paper containing the Sniper Task Force telephone number;
and a list of schools in the Baltimore area. Moreover, police
found LaRuffa’s laptop computer, onto which Muhammad
had loaded "Microsoft Streets and Trips 2002" on September
2, 2002. In the software program, maps had been marked with
icons, including some with a skull and crossbones. Icons indi-
cated where Walekar, Lewis-Rivera, Seawell, Brown, Mey-
ers, and Franklin had been shot. There was also a document
entitled "Allah8.rtf" that contained portions of the text com-
municated to police in the extortion demands.
In total, Muhammad was accused of shooting sixteen peo-
ple and killing ten of them. Muhammad was convicted by a
10 MUHAMMAD v. KELLY
jury in the Circuit Court of Prince William County, Virginia,
on November 17, 2003, for the 2002 capital murder of Dean
Meyers as more than one murder in three years, in violation
of Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-31(8) (2003); for the capital murder
of Meyers in the commission of an act of terrorism, in viola-
tion of Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-31(13) (2003); for conspiracy to
commit capital murder; and for the illegal use of a firearm
during the commission of murder. On November 24, 2003,
the jury sentenced Muhammad to death for the capital murder
and to twenty-three years in prison for the other crimes. The
trial court entered final judgment in accordance with the ver-
dict on March 29, 2004. The Supreme Court of Virginia
upheld Muhammad’s convictions on April 22, 2005, Muham-
mad v. Virginia, 619 S.E.2d 16, and denied rehearing on Sep-
tember 23, 2005. The Supreme Court of the United States
denied Muhammad’s petition for a writ of certiorari on May
15, 2006. Muhammad v. Virginia, 547 U.S. 1136 (2006).
The Prince William County Circuit Court appointed coun-
sel to represent Muhammad on habeas corpus review.
Muhammad filed his petition on July 31, 2006, and the
Supreme Court of Virginia dismissed the petition on June 12,
2007, Muhammad v. Warden, 646 S.E.2d 182 (Va. 2007). It
denied rehearing on September 25, 2007. The Supreme Court
of the United States denied Muhammad’s petition for a writ
of certiorari on April 14, 2008. Muhammad v. Kelly, 128 S.
Ct. 1889 (2008). On October 4, 2007, the Prince William
County Circuit Court set Muhammad’s execution date for
November 5, 2007. On October 10, 2007, a group of attorneys
requested that the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District
of Virginia appoint them to represent Muhammad and stay his
execution pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2251 (2006) so that they
could file a petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2006). The dis-
trict court granted their request on October 26, 2007, and
directed them to file, within sixty days, a petition of not more
than fifty pages. They subsequently filed a motion requesting
that the district court rescind its briefing order and allow them
to wait a year to file Muhammad’s § 2254 petition. The dis-
MUHAMMAD v. KELLY 11
trict court denied the motion, but allowed the attorneys an
additional thirty days to file an eighty-page petition. On Janu-
ary 22, 2008, the district court allowed Muhammad to file a
placeholder petition on the ninetieth day from the stay and
gave advance permission to file an amended petition three
months afterward. On January 24, 2008, Muhammad filed his
placeholder petition, and on April 23, 2008, he filed his
amended petition.
On April 23, 2008, Muhammad also filed a motion request-
ing funding for a neuropsychologist, a neuropsychiatrist, and
brain imaging in the amount of $29,000. Additionally,
Muhammad filed a motion for leave to file a third habeas peti-
tion, arguing that his one-year time limit had not expired. On
August 6, 2008, the district court denied Muhammad’s motion
to file a third amended petition. On September 24, 2008, the
district court denied his motion for funding and granted the
Warden’s motion to dismiss the petition and to lift the stay of
execution. Muhammad requested a certificate of appealability
(COA) on October 20, 2008, and filed a notice of appeal. The
district court denied a COA. On January 30, 2009, Muham-
mad filed a motion with this Court seeking a COA, and we
granted his motion on February 10, 2009.
II.
The district court’s denial of a petition for a writ of habeas
corpus is reviewed de novo. Bell v. Ozmint, 332 F.3d 229, 233
(4th Cir. 2003). We may grant relief on a claim adjudicated
on the merits in a state court only if the state-court proceeding
"resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an
unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law,
as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States." 28
U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). With this in mind, we turn to the merits
of Muhammad’s claims.
12 MUHAMMAD v. KELLY
III.
A.
Muhammad’s first argument is that the government with-
held exculpatory information during his trial. "[A] Brady [v.
Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963),] violation has three essential
elements: (1) the evidence must be favorable to the accused;
(2) it must have been suppressed by the government, either
willfully or inadvertently; and (3) the suppression must have
been material, i.e., it must have prejudiced the defense at
trial." Monroe v. Angelone, 323 F.3d 286, 299-300 (4th Cir.
2003) (citing Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281-82
(1999)).
Muhammad notes that in June 2006, one month before the
due date for filing his state habeas petition, his Virginia attor-
neys received from his Maryland attorneys a DVD with
approximately 30,000 pages of discovery responses that were
not produced during his Virginia case over two years earlier
even though they were possessed by the same multijurisdic-
tional joint investigation team. Muhammad contends that sev-
eral of these undisclosed documents contained exculpatory
information that would have undermined portions of the pros-
ecution’s case in Virginia.
First, Muhammad takes issue with the government’s failure
to disclose an FBI criminal analysis that indicated that the
sniper committing the shootings was likely acting alone. He
believes that this analysis would have undermined the testi-
mony of sniper expert Mark Spicer, who opined that a sniper
team carried out the shootings because one person could not
have done so alone. Moreover, in the murder of Pascal Char-
lot, the government had no direct evidence of Muhammad’s
involvement, but used Spicer’s testimony to draw the connec-
tion. The district and state courts concluded that the analysis
was not exculpatory because the report did not definitively
conclude that the killings were the work of a single shooter.
MUHAMMAD v. KELLY 13
Muhammad v. Warden, 646 S.E.2d at 186-87. For example,
the report opined that "[i]f there is a second offender, he is not
likely to be an equal partner in these crimes, and would be
subservient to the primary offender." (J.A. 2019.) Further-
more, the FBI profile explicitly notes, "This analysis is not a
substitute for a thorough, well-planned investigation, and
should not be considered all inclusive. The information pro-
vided is based upon probabilities." (Id. at 2016.) Given the
inconclusive language in the report, it cannot be considered
exculpatory, and the state court’s conclusion that there was no
Brady violation was not in error.
Second, Muhammad takes issue with the ballistics evidence
used to convict him. Among the undisclosed information, he
points to reports that the evidence recovered from the Septem-
ber 5 and September 14 shootings were too damaged to pro-
vide a conclusive ballistics match. (J.A. 2536.) He also
highlights a report from the Prince George’s County Police
Department that there was insufficient evidence to determine
whether the handgun recovered at the Alabama shooting was
that used to fire the bullets that killed the victims. (J.A. 2537.)
Finally, he points to a December 3, 2002, report that prelimi-
nary ballistics findings were inconclusive. (J.A. 2539-40.)
The district court dismissed the claims after it determined that
Muhammad failed to present them to the state court. Muham-
mad concedes that he did not present the claims to the state
court initially (Pet’r’s Br. 9-10), but he responds that the War-
den raised the issue by arguing that the suppressed evidence
was not material and that he disputed the claim.
Upon review of the portions of the record that Muhammad
cites in support of his argument that these claims were prop-
erly presented to the state court, we must rule against him.
There is no indication in the record that the government
directly presented the issue of the materiality of the undis-
closed ballistics evidence to the court. And although Muham-
mad claims to have disputed the prosecution’s ballistics
testimony in his motion for rehearing, the motion does not
14 MUHAMMAD v. KELLY
mention the ballistics reports detailed above. Thus, it appears
that Muhammad did not present these claims to the state court
and they are therefore forfeited.1
Third, Muhammad disputes evidence of his involvement in
the Parker shooting in Alabama, which was used as one of the
predicate killings for his capital charges. He claims that sev-
eral witnesses reported conflicting information, and relevant
to the undisclosed information, two witnesses who identified
someone other than Malvo at the scene were not disclosed to
him, and witnesses who reported seeing a handgun were also
not disclosed. Muhammad interprets the previously undis-
closed interviews to indicate that Clyde Wilson—who, along
with James Gray, chased after Malvo—saw Malvo point and
fire a handgun. Yet, Wilson does not actually say that he saw
a handgun; in fact, he could not specifically identify the type
of gun that he saw, but demonstrated what he saw by extend-
ing his arms straight out. (J.A. 2512.) Additionally, Muham-
mad argues that Wilson’s account could have been used to
impeach other witnesses because Wilson stated that the sus-
pect was wearing a green or turquoise shirt—different from
other descriptions given—and he could not identify Malvo in
the lineup, casting doubt on Gray’s identification. The
Supreme Court of Virginia determined that his testimony
could not have been used to impeach Gray because Wilson
saw Malvo from a different vantage point and chased Malvo
down a different route from Gray, and Gray saw Malvo face-
to-face. Moreover, because Wilson did not testify, the report
would have been of minimal use. We cannot say that the
Supreme Court of Virginia’s conclusion was unreasonable.
Further, in an undisclosed report, forensics experts in Ala-
bama had previously determined that the bullets used in the
killing were .22 caliber and likely came from a handgun.
1
We note that even if Muhammad had presented these claims, there was
other, conclusive ballistics evidence to support his convictions. Therefore,
the challenged ballistics evidence would not have been exculpatory.
MUHAMMAD v. KELLY 15
Muhammad contends that it was only after his apprehension
that the experts determined, without examining the weapon,
that the bullets came from his .223-caliber Bushmaster rifle
and not the .22-caliber handgun found nearby. But Muham-
mad’s challenges to the ballistics information were not made
in state court. Moreover, ATF firearms examiner Dandridge
made an independent conclusive match of the bullets found in
Montgomery to the Bushmaster rifle. (J.A. 713-15.) Thus,
these claims must fail.2
Fourth, Muhammad challenges additional evidence related
to the Charlot shooting in the District of Columbia, another
predicate killing for his capital murder conviction. He alleges
that the government suppressed evidence that one witness,
Gail Howard, had previously provided only a vague descrip-
tion of the car seen at the scene; did not speak to the police
until weeks after the shooting, contrary to her testimony; and
had letters written by the D.C. police to the Immigration and
Naturalization Service on her behalf in order to assuage her
fears about her immigration status. Moreover, those witnesses
who talked to the police within hours after the shooting sup-
posedly indicated that a handgun, not a rifle, was used in the
shooting.
Howard’s police statement said that the car she saw was an
"American made, big police looking car, square shape. The
same type of car people buys [sic], after the police had them.
I think it was a four door and the windows were tinted. And
the car was dark colored." (J.A. 2054B.) This description is
not vague; it accurately describes a 1990s-model Chevrolet
Caprice, which is what Muhammad drove. As for the immi-
gration letters, as the Supreme Court of Virginia noted,
Muhammad makes no allegation that Howard testified falsely,
so it is unclear how this information would prove exculpatory.
2
Muhammad makes an additional argument that the statement of one
Officer D.L. Johnson, given within days of the shooting, was not disclosed
to him, but this argument also was not made in state court.
16 MUHAMMAD v. KELLY
Regarding the statements from the other seven witnesses, only
one of them, Ayman Gomma, states that a handgun was fired,
and this was not from personal observation, but was instead
a deduction he drew from his training in the Army and the
sound that he heard. Moreover, none of them testified at trial,
and Howard’s testimony, which the witnesses would have
supposedly impeached, was corroborated by the ballistics evi-
dence. Thus, the Supreme Court of Virginia’s conclusion that
the information was not exculpatory was not incorrect.
The fifth category of evidence that Muhammad raises as
exculpatory concerns the Ballenger killing in Baton Rouge,
Louisiana, which was used as one of the predicate offenses
for the Virginia capital charges. Ingrid Shaw testified that she
saw Malvo running from the murder scene and identified
Muhammad’s Caprice as the one that Malvo entered. How-
ever, when she was first interviewed, and in two subsequent
interviews, she did not mention seeing a car parked nearby
that later picked up Malvo. When she did mention a car, she
said it could be an "Olds Cutlass," and the Louisiana license
plate number she gave was registered to a 1979 Ford LTD.
(J.A. 2496.) Presumably, this information could have been
used to impeach her testimony, and the district court found as
much. However, the district court ultimately concluded that
the information was not prejudicial because of the ballistics
evidence, her positive identification of Malvo, and the fact
that the Ballenger murder was one of several predicate kill-
ings for the capital murder charge. We can find no error in
this conclusion.
Finally, Muhammad contends that the Commonwealth
failed to disclose a series of twelve letters written by Malvo
to another inmate named "Pac-Man." These letters allegedly
contradict the Commonwealth’s position that Muhammad
directed or controlled Malvo’s acts, as required by Virginia
law in order to subject Muhammad to the death penalty. See
Muhammad v. Virginia, 611 S.E.2d 537, 553-56 (Va. 2005).
While the letters do not discuss Muhammad directly, (J.A.
MUHAMMAD v. KELLY 17
1534-43) Muhammad argues that the letters could be used to
demonstrate that Malvo was not malleable and could think
independently of Muhammad. The district court and the
Supreme Court of Virginia determined that the letters were
largely cumulative because there was trial testimony that also
indicated that Malvo could think independently. Given this,
the conclusion of the state courts in this regard was not unrea-
sonable.
Let it be clear that we by no means condone the actions of
the Commonwealth in this case. As a matter of practice, the
prosecution should err on the side of disclosure, especially
when a defendant is facing the specter of execution. When
questioned at oral argument regarding why this information
was withheld or why the Commonwealth did not take the step
of instituting an open-file policy, the Commonwealth had no
explanation. Yet, at this stage of the criminal process, we deal
only with actions that were clear violations of the Constitu-
tion. While not admirable, the Commonwealth’s actions did
not violate the Constitution. Even if the withheld evidence
were exculpatory, Muhammad cannot show that he was preju-
diced by any nondisclosure. The jury determined that he mur-
dered several people, the evidence against him in most
instances was compelling, and any number of the killings
could serve as the one predicate killing necessary for his con-
viction. See Griffin v. United States, 502 U.S. 46, 49 (1991)
("[A] general jury verdict [is] valid so long as it was legally
supportable on one of the submitted grounds—even though
that gave no assurance that a valid ground, rather than an
invalid one, was actually the basis for the jury’s action.").
Thus, we find no constitutional violation.
B.
Muhammad’s next set of claims involves his belief that his
trial attorneys were ineffective because they did not object to
his representing himself despite evidence that indicated brain
abnormalities and difficulties processing and communicating
18 MUHAMMAD v. KELLY
information. In order to establish a claim of ineffective assis-
tance of counsel, Muhammad must first "show that counsel’s
performance was deficient. This requires showing that coun-
sel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as
the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amend-
ment." Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).
Second, Muhammad must demonstrate that "the deficient per-
formance prejudiced the defense. This requires showing that
counsel’s errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant
of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable." Id.
Muhammad alleges that his trial attorneys were informed of
three abnormalities in an MRI taken prior to his October 20,
2003, request to represent himself: a) a shrunken cortex, b) a
cavum septum pellucidum, and c) an abnormal shortening of
the corpus callosum. The shrunken cortex shows "the loss of
vital brain tissue that control’s [sic] an individual’s ability to
analyze information, organize, control and direct his behavior
and emotions, solve problems and learn from his own experi-
ences." (Pet’r’s Br. 24.) Muhammad claims that this is the
result of severe beatings he received as a child. The cavum
septum pellucidum is a space in the brain that should close
during childhood, but Muhammad’s did not. He notes a rela-
tionship between a cavum septum pellucidum and psychoses
and schizophrenia. There is a similar relationship between
schizophrenia and a shortened corpus callosum.
Additionally, Muhammad presents a topographic display
that shows the damage to his brain, as indicated by shades of
color. (Pet’r’s Br. 27.) The display was created for his habeas
petition, but Muhammad alleges that his trial attorneys knew
the information at the time of his pro se request. Moreover,
an IQ test, the WAIS-III, indicated that his performance was
below seventy-three percent of other men his age. Dr. Doro-
thy Lewis, a psychiatrist, determined that although Muham-
mad could display a "superficial brightness," (J.A. 2549)3 he
3
Although Dr. Lewis references the period from September through
October 2003—before Muhammad’s first trial—in her declaration, the
declaration is dated December 2007 and was prepared for Muhammad’s
federal habeas proceedings below.
MUHAMMAD v. KELLY 19
was not competent to represent himself (Id.; see also J.A.
2052-54).4 Finally, Muhammad alleges that his trial attorneys
knew that he had been diagnosed with schizophrenia and
bipolar disorder. Muhammad contends that all of this evi-
dence should have led his trial attorneys to object to his repre-
senting himself and prevented them from calling him "very
bright" when the judge questioned them about Muhammad’s
ability to represent himself. (J.A. 214-15.)
Even if we assume that his attorneys should have objected
to Muhammad’s self-representation, the state and district
courts found that Muhammad did not show that he was preju-
diced, since he represented himself for only two days during
the government’s presentation of its case, and his defense
attorneys were heavily involved as standby counsel, preserv-
ing objections to the government’s evidence and attempting to
"play as full a role as the court [would] allow." (J.A. 215.)
Muhammad points only to the fact that eighteen witnesses
were presented, including the government’s sniper expert, and
that he made ramblings in front of the jury that damaged its
view of him. However, Muhammad does not point to any evi-
dence that was improperly received and considered by the
jury, or any potentially prejudicial piece of evidence. Thus,
the decision of the state courts on Muhammad’s IAC claim
was not an unreasonable application of clearly established law.5
4
Dr. Lewis’s competency evaluation, dated March 27, 2006, was pre-
pared for Muhammad’s Maryland trial, not the Virginia trial at issue,
although it was utilized during his state habeas proceedings.
5
We note that Muhammad desires us to factor into our consideration the
standard for competence to stand trial set forth in Drope v. Missouri, 420
U.S. 162, 172 (1975) (quoting Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402
(1960) (per curiam)): "whether a criminal defendant ‘has sufficient present
ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational
understanding—and whether he has a rational as well as factual under-
standing of the proceedings against him.’" Specifically, Muhammad asks
the Court to consider whether there is a "reasonable probability . . . that,
had his trial counsel raised the issue of his competency, he would have
been found incompetent." (Pet’r’s Br. 61.)
20 MUHAMMAD v. KELLY
C.
According to Muhammad, the district court further erred
when it excluded all defense expert testimony during the pen-
alty phase of his trial as a sanction for failing to submit to an
interview by the Commonwealth’s psychiatrist. Muhammad
had planned to present the opinion of Dr. Mark Cunningham,
a psychologist who had interviewed Muhammad’s friends and
family, in order to show how his upbringing influenced his
subsequent adult actions, including the shootings at issue.
Muhammad did not plan to use Dr. Cunningham in order to
Muhammad’s claim, however, is one of ineffective assistance of coun-
sel, not mental incompetence to stand trial. The two are separate inquiries,
and Muhammad does not pursue the latter. Instead, he argues that if his
attorneys had raised the competency issue, then the judge would have pos-
sibly ordered a competency hearing, and "if examined for competency,
there is at least a reasonable probability that Muhammad would not have
been found competent to represent himself." (Pet’r’s Br. 65-66.) But even
if all of the conditions in Muhammad’s far-fetched hypothetical had been
met, the result simply would have been an inability to represent himself.
It is by no means certain that the judge would have gone further to rule
him incompetent to stand trial.
At oral argument, counsel for Muhammad contended that it was struc-
tural error to allow the appellant to represent himself while incompetent.
But again, Muhammad’s competence is not at issue, and it is unclear how
structural error should factor into our analysis at all since it would require
us to presume Muhammad to be incompetent. Indeed, it is unclear whether
a structural error even exists in the form in which Muhammad wishes to
use it. See Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 8 (1999) (noting that the
Supreme Court has "found an error to be ‘structural,’ and thus subject to
automatic reversal, only in a very limited class of cases" and listing cases
that do not encompass the present situation (internal quotation omitted)).
We would only be speculating if we were to hold that, had his counsel
objected, Muhammad (possibly) would have been found incompetent and
that, moreover, he was indeed incompetent and therefore it was structural
error to allow him to represent himself during that limited portion of his
trial in which he did so. We reject this argument and find that the Strick-
land standard alone, not in conjunction with the Drope standard, applies
to this case.
MUHAMMAD v. KELLY 21
present a psychiatric defense to his crimes. Instead, he argues,
Dr. Cunningham would have been used only in mitigation so
that he would receive life imprisonment instead of death. The
defense attorneys concluded that they could not introduce the
lay testimony without Dr. Cunningham because "only Dr.
Cunningham could provide the jury a conceptual basis for
assessing Muhammad’s moral culpability and understanding
the truly mitigating character of this evidence." (Pet’r’s Br.
41.)
The lay testimony that the defense attorneys would have
presented included accounts from Muhammad’s sister, Auro-
lyn Williams, who would have testified that their mother died
of breast cancer while they were young. The children then
moved into their grandparents’ three-bedroom house, where
they lived with twenty other people and were beaten, forced
to eat black-eyed peas separately from everyone else every
night, prevented from entering the house during the day, and
never told their birthdays until they were older. Another of
Muhammad’s sisters, Bessie Williams, would have testified
similarly. His brother, Edward Williams, would have testified
about how their uncle, Felton Holiday—a reform school
guard convicted of battery with a dangerous weapon in 1962
for beating a minor to death—constantly attacked them.
Muhammad was allegedly forced to place his hand on a spark
plug while his grandfather, Guy Holiday, pulled the cord.
According to the Supreme Court of Virginia:
Consideration of Muhammad’s arguments on these
matters requires a clear understanding of what the
trial court ruled concerning these issues. The trial
court ruled that Muhammad could not present expert
testimony on mitigation factors at sentencing
because of his refusal to abide by the trial court’s
order to submit to an evaluation by the Common-
wealth. The trial court did not bar the presentation
of non-expert testimony on this issue. Thereafter,
22 MUHAMMAD v. KELLY
Muhammad sought the ability to present limited
expert testimony purporting not to be based upon
expert interviews. The Commonwealth objected. The
trial court overruled the Commonwealth’s objection
and gave Muhammad the opportunity to present evi-
dence out of the presence of the jury that would
allow the trial court to rule on its admissibility.
Muhammad did not take advantage of this invitation.
Only after all the evidence was presented at the sen-
tencing phase and both parties rested their case did
Muhammad offer an affidavit as a proffer of Dr.
Cunningham’s testimony. He may not be heard to
complain about the exclusion of Dr. Cunningham’s
limited testimony when he did not give the trial court
the contemporaneous opportunity to evaluate its
admissibility.
Muhammad v. Virginia, 619 S.E.2d at 47 (emphasis added).
Pursuant to its Rule 5:25,6 the Supreme Court of Virginia
found that Muhammad had waived his argument about the
trial court’s failure to allow Dr. Cunningham to testify only
as to his risk for future dangerousness. Additionally, we
emphasize once more that the trial court did allow Muham-
mad to present the testimony outside of the presence of the
jury so that the court could determine its admissibility, but
Muhammad chose not to take advantage of the opportunity.
The district court found this claim therefore to be procedur-
ally defaulted, and our precedent supports this decision. E.g.,
Weeks v. Angelone, 176 F.3d 249, 270 (4th Cir. 1999).
The district and state courts also found that Muhammad
knowingly waived his right to present expert mitigation testi-
6
The Rule states: "Error will not be sustained to any ruling of the trial
court or the commission before which the case was initially tried unless
the objection was stated with reasonable certainty at the time of the ruling,
except for good cause shown or to enable this Court to attain the ends of
justice."
MUHAMMAD v. KELLY 23
mony: "Muhammad is correct that limiting the evidence that
a criminal defendant may present in his defense implicates
numerous constitutional rights. What Muhammad fails to
appreciate is that he may, by his knowing and informed deci-
sions, waive such rights." Muhammad v. Virginia, 619 S.E.2d
at 48. The trial court informed Muhammad, pursuant to Va.
Code Ann. § 19.2-264.3:1 (2003), that if he did not submit to
a psychiatric evaluation by the government’s experts, he
would not be able to present expert testimony of his own.
Muhammad indicated that he understood. (J.A. 79-80.) After
Muhammad refused to be examined by the government’s psy-
chiatrist, the trial court once again questioned him about the
consequences of his doing so, and he once again indicated
that he understood. (J.A. 170.) Thus, the state court’s determi-
nation that Muhammad waived the presentation of expert mit-
igation evidence was neither inconsistent with the facts in the
record nor contrary to clearly established law.
Muhammad believes that the outcome of this claim is gov-
erned by Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982), Lockett
v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978) (plurality), and Taylor v. Illi-
nois, 484 U.S. 400 (1988), and not by Buchanan v. Kentucky,
483 U.S. 402 (1987), which the district and state court relied
upon. In Buchanan, the Supreme Court held that "if a defen-
dant requests [a psychiatric] evaluation or presents psychiatric
evidence, then, at the very least, the prosecution may rebut
this presentation with evidence from the reports of the exami-
nation that the defendant requested." Id. at 422-23; see also
Savino v. Murray, 82 F.3d 593, 604 (4th Cir. 1996) ("When
a defendant asserts a mental status defense and introduces
psychiatric testimony in support of that defense, he may face
rebuttal evidence from the prosecution taken from his own
examination or he may be required to submit to an evaluation
conducted by the prosecution’s own expert.") The district and
state courts read Buchanan to uphold Virginia’s rule requiring
Muhammad to submit to reciprocal examination if he wanted
to present his own expert testimony. Muhammad argues, how-
ever, that he did not purport to present psychiatric evidence,
24 MUHAMMAD v. KELLY
just evidence of his "reduced moral culpability" due to his
family background. (Pet’r’s Br. 84.) However, Dr. Cunning-
ham would have performed a psychiatric evaluation on
Muhammad that could have informed his view of Muham-
mad’s background. Hence, the state also was entitled to per-
form an evaluation, and the state courts’ so holding is
reasonable in light of the Supreme Court’s decision and our
precedent.
D.
Muhammad believes that the district court erred when it did
not allow him the full 365-day statutory filing period in order
to file his habeas petition and when it limited the petition to
fifty pages. Upon subsequent motions by Muhammad, the dis-
trict court extended its original sixty-day deadline by thirty
days, raised the page limit to eighty pages, and granted
Muhammad leave to amend the petition within ninety days
from that deadline. Muhammad did as the court instructed.
Three months after the court’s deadline, but before the expira-
tion of the statute of limitations, Muhammad filed another
motion to amend along with his second amended petition,
which Muhammad contends developed his Brady claims more
extensively. The district court denied leave to amend. We
review these claims for abuse of discretion. Hill v. Ozmint,
339 F.3d 187, 193 (4th Cir. 2003).
According to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1) (2006): "A 1-year
period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of
habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judg-
ment of a State court." Muhammad cites no case law that has
found that a district court must grant a petitioner an entire
year in order to file his habeas petition. Moreover, even if we
assume that the district court erred in denying Muhammad an
entire year in which to file his petition, "the trial court’s error
must have a ‘substantial and injurious effect or influence in
determining the jury’s verdict.’" Tuggle v. Netherland, 79
MUHAMMAD v. KELLY 25
F.3d 1386, 1393 (4th Cir. 1996) (quoting Brecht v. Abraham-
son, 507 U.S. 619, 637 (1993)).
Muhammad claims that if he had been allowed the full lim-
itations period, he would have been able to produce more
inconsistent testimony, more exculpatory witness statements,
more evidence that Muhammad and Malvo were not at the
Parker shooting, evidence that a shooter in a white box truck
was responsible for the Ramos shooting (including evidence
that one Danaus Ford drove a white box truck that contained
gunshot residue and owned a .223-caliber firearm, claimed to
be God, and had unsuccessfully attempted to get into sniper
school), and he would have developed the claims in his first
amended petition at greater length. However, Muhammad’s
problem is that, given the abundance of evidence against him,
none of these things likely would have resulted in a different
outcome, and thus he can show no prejudice. Therefore, any
error in denying Muhammad the full statutory period in which
to file his petition was harmless.
E.
Finally, Muhammad argues that the district court erred in
not providing him with expert assistance or with an evidenti-
ary hearing to develop his claims of ineffective assistance of
counsel and incompetence. According to the district court,
"the record, viewed in light of the forecasted evidence, would
not entitle the petitioner to an evidentiary hearing on his
claims, nor would the petitioner be able to win on the merits
regardless of the experts’ findings." (J.A. 2987.) The district
court is given discretionary authority to provide for expert
assistance by 18 U.S.C. § 3599(f) (2006):
Upon a finding that investigative, expert, or other
services are reasonably necessary for the representa-
tion of the defendant, whether in connection with
issues relating to guilt or the sentence, the court may
authorize the defendant’s attorneys to obtain such
26 MUHAMMAD v. KELLY
services on behalf of the defendant and, if so autho-
rized, shall order the payment of fees and expenses
therefor . . . .
Moreover, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2) provides:
If the applicant has failed to develop the factual basis
of a claim in State court proceedings, the court shall
not hold an evidentiary hearing on the claim unless
the applicant shows that—
(A) the claim relies on—
(i) a new rule of constitutional law, made
retroactive to cases on collateral review
by the Supreme Court, that was previ-
ously unavailable; or
(ii) a factual predicate that could not
have been previously discovered through
the exercise of due diligence; and(B) the
facts underlying the claim would be suf-
ficient to establish by clear and convinc-
ing evidence that but for constitutional
error, no reasonable factfinder would
have found the applicant guilty of the
underlying offense.
Given the foregoing discussion of Muhammad’s IAC and
incompetence claims, and the deficiencies therein, the district
court’s decisions to deny further expert assistance and to deny
Muhammad an evidentiary hearing were not abuses of discre-
tion. See Wright v. Angelone, 151 F.3d 151, 163 (4th Cir.
1998).
IV.
After a full review of the record and Muhammad’s claims,
we conclude that we must affirm the decision of the district
MUHAMMAD v. KELLY 27
court. Muhammad’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus is
hereby denied.
AFFIRMED