UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 08-5229
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
JERRY LEE HILL,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at Wilmington. James C. Fox, Senior
District Judge. (7:04-cr-00001-F-1)
Submitted: August 20, 2009 Decided: August 24, 2009
Before WILKINSON and MICHAEL, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON,
Senior Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Thomas P. McNamara, Federal Public Defender, G. Alan DuBois,
Assistant Federal Public Defender, Raleigh, North Carolina, for
Appellant. George E.B. Holding, United States Attorney, Anne M.
Hayes, Jennifer P. May-Parker, Assistant United States
Attorneys, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Jerry Lee Hill appeals the district court’s judgment
imposing a twenty-four month prison sentence upon the revocation
of his supervised release, imposed as part of his sentence on
his conviction for possession of child pornography, in violation
of 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(5)(B) (2006). Hill claims the sentence
was plainly unreasonable because it was based on a clearly
erroneous factual finding that he required sex offender
treatment.
We will affirm a sentence imposed after revocation of
supervised release if it is within the applicable statutory
maximum and is not plainly unreasonable. See United States v.
Crudup, 461 F.3d 433, 437, 439-40 (4th Cir. 2006). We first
review the sentence for unreasonableness, “follow[ing] generally
the procedural and substantive considerations that we employ in
our review of original sentences, . . . with some necessary
modifications to take into account the unique nature of
supervised release revocation sentences.” Id. at 438-39. If we
conclude that a sentence is not unreasonable, we will affirm the
sentence. Id. at 439. Only if a sentence is found procedurally
or substantively unreasonable will we “decide whether the
sentence is plainly unreasonable.” Id.
A supervised release revocation sentence is
procedurally reasonable if the district court considered the
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Chapter Seven advisory policy statement and the 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a) factors that it is permitted to consider in a
supervised release revocation case. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e);
Crudup, 461 F.3d at 440. Such a sentence is substantively
reasonable if the district court stated a proper basis for
concluding the defendant should receive the sentence imposed, up
to the statutory maximum. Crudup, 461 F.3d at 440. A sentence
is plainly unreasonable if it is clearly or obviously
unreasonable. Id. at 439.
Addressing the § 3553(a) factors as applied to Hill’s
circumstances, the district court expressed a need for the
twenty-four month sentence, the statutory maximum sentence
applicable to Hill’s crime, to allow Hill the opportunity to
take part in sex offender treatment. We find that Hill’s
sentence was not “plainly unreasonable” because it did not
exceed the maximum term that the court could have imposed, and
the record does not contain any basis on which to conclude that
the imposed sentence is clearly or obviously unreasonable, given
Hill’s actions in violating the rules of the sex offender
program and a county ordinance restricting him, as a sex
offender, from being in a public park, together with his
admission that, within a couple of months of his release, he
purchased a computer and used it to access pornography. The
district court has broad discretion to revoke a defendant’s
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supervised release and to impose a term of imprisonment up to
the statutory maximum, Crudup, 461 F.3d at 440, and we find no
abuse of the district court’s discretion in this case.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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