UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 08-5208
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
TERRANCE DEVON MACK,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle
District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. N. Carlton
Tilley, Jr., Senior District Judge. (1:07-cr-00296-NCT-1)
Submitted: August 26, 2009 Decided: September 4, 2009
Before GREGORY and AGEE, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Louis C. Allen, III, Federal Public Defender, Eric D. Placke,
Assistant Federal Public Defender, Greensboro, North Carolina,
for Appellant. Anna Mills Wagoner, United States Attorney,
Michael A. DeFranco, Assistant United States Attorney,
Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Terrance Devon Mack appeals the district court’s
judgment entered pursuant to his guilty plea to possession of a
firearm by a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(g)(1) (2006), in which Mack reserved the right to appeal
the denial of his motion to suppress evidence. He was sentenced
to seventy-two months’ imprisonment and filed a timely notice of
appeal. Mack argues that his arrest was not supported by
probable cause because it was based upon an anonymous telephone
call and there was not sufficient evidence to connect him,
rather than the other suspects at the scene, to the firearm. He
contends the statements he made after his arrest should have
been suppressed because they resulted from an illegal arrest,
and the statement he made after being given a Miranda * warning
should have been suppressed because the warning did not cure the
taint of the illegal arrest or inform Mack that his earlier
voluntary statements were not admissible as evidence against
him.
We review the district court’s factual findings
underlying the denial of a motion to suppress for clear error
and its legal conclusions de novo. United States v. Grossman,
400 F.3d 212, 216 (4th Cir. 2005). When a suppression motion
*
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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has been denied, we construe the evidence in the light most
favorable to the government. United States v. Seidman, 156 F.3d
542, 547 (4th Cir. 1998).
“[O]nly the probability, and not a prima facie
showing, of criminal activity is the standard of probable
cause.” Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 235 (1983) (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted). The district court
correctly found that Mack’s arrest was supported by probable
cause. He was discovered in an apartment into which a suspect
had fled following a call that reported an intended retaliatory
shooting at the location where he was first observed, he matched
the description of the individual reported to be in possession
of a firearm, he exited a bedroom in which the firearm and other
contraband were discovered, and he was known to be a convicted
felon. The evidence established a high probability that Mack
was, at the least, a felon in possession of a firearm, the
offense for which he was ultimately charged.
A statement is voluntary if it is “the product of an
essentially free and unconstrained choice by its maker.”
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 225 (1973). An
analysis of the voluntariness of a statement is derived from the
totality of the circumstances. Id. at 226. The relevant
determination regarding voluntariness is whether government
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agents have overborne the defendant’s will or left his “capacity
for self-determination critically impaired.” Id. at 225.
Taking the evidence in the light most favorable to the
Government, the district court did not clearly err in finding
that the police officers did nothing to elicit Mack’s voluntary
statements claiming ownership of the firearm after his arrest.
The fact that he may have seen the police remove the firearm
from the apartment while he was detained does not, without more,
establish circumstances under which he should have felt
compelled to make a statement regarding his ownership of the
weapon. Accordingly, the district court did not err in denying
the motion to suppress.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district
court’s judgment. We dispense with oral argument because the
facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the
materials before the court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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