UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 09-4141
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
THERESA MCNEAL LANCASTER,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. W. Earl Britt, Senior
District Judge. (4:08-cr-00035-BR-1)
Submitted: August 25, 2009 Decided: September 3, 2009
Before MOTZ, GREGORY, and AGEE, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Henry C. Su, HOWREY LLP, East Palo Alto, California, for
Appellant. Anne Margaret Hayes, Assistant United States
Attorney, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Theresa McNeal Lancaster pleaded guilty to armed bank
robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a), (d) (2006), bank
robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a), and aiding and
abetting and bank robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2,
2113(a) (2006). The district court sentenced Lancaster to 109
months of imprisonment and Lancaster now appeals. Her attorney
has filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738
(1967), raising two issues but stating that there are no
meritorious issues for appeal. Lancaster was informed of her
right to file a pro se supplemental brief but did not do so. We
affirm.
In the Anders brief, counsel questions whether
Lancaster’s guilty plea was knowing and voluntary because
Lancaster did not understand the charges to which she pleaded
guilty. Prior to accepting a guilty plea, a trial court,
through colloquy with the defendant, must inform the defendant
of, and determine that she understands, the nature of the
charges to which the plea is offered, any mandatory minimum
penalty, the maximum possible penalty she faces, and the various
rights she is relinquishing by pleading guilty. Fed. R. Crim.
P. 11(b). The court also must determine whether there is a
factual basis for the plea. Id.; United States v. DeFusco, 949
F.2d 114, 120 (4th Cir. 1991). The purpose of the Rule 11
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colloquy is to ensure that the plea of guilt is entered into
knowingly and voluntarily. See United States v. Vonn, 535 U.S.
55, 58 (2002). There is a strong presumption that a defendant’s
guilty plea is binding and voluntary if the Rule 11 hearing was
adequate. United States v. Puckett, 61 F.3d 1092, 1099 (4th
Cir. 1995).
Here, the district court fully complied with the
requirements of Rule 11. Furthermore, Lancaster averred at the
Rule 11 hearing that she fully understood the charges to which
she was pleading guilty. See Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S.
63, 74 (1977) (finding that statements made during a plea
hearing “carry a strong presumption of verity”). We have
thoroughly reviewed the record and conclude that Lancaster’s
post-plea assertions that she misunderstood the charges to which
she pleaded guilty “fail to overcome the barrier of the sworn
statements made at [her] Rule 11 hearing.” United States v.
Ubakanma, 215 F.3d 421, 424 (4th Cir. 2000).
Counsel next argues that Lancaster’s trial counsel
rendered ineffective assistance at sentencing. To prove a claim
of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show
(1) “that counsel’s performance was deficient,” and (2) “that
the deficient performance prejudiced the defense.”
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). With
respect to the first prong, “the defendant must show that
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counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness.” Id. at 688. In addition, “[j]udicial scrutiny
of counsel’s performance must be highly deferential.” Id. at
689. Under the second prong of the test in the context of a
conviction following a guilty plea, a defendant can show
prejudice only by demonstrating “a reasonable probability that,
but for counsel’s errors, [she] would not have pleaded guilty
and would have insisted on going to trial.” Hill v. Lockhart,
474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985).
This court may address a claim of ineffective
assistance on direct appeal only if the lawyer’s ineffectiveness
conclusively appears from the record. United States v.
Baldovinos, 434 F.3d 233, 239 (4th Cir. 2006). We have
thoroughly reviewed the record and conclude that it does not
meet the exacting standard of Baldovinos. Accordingly, we
decline to reach on direct appeal Lancaster’s claim that her
counsel’s performance at sentencing was constitutionally
ineffective.
We have examined the entire record in accordance with
the requirements of Anders and have found no meritorious issues
for appeal. We therefore affirm the judgment of the district
court. This court requires that counsel inform Lancaster, in
writing, of the right to petition the Supreme Court of the
United States for further review. If Lancaster requests that a
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petition be filed, but counsel believes that such a petition
would be frivolous, then counsel may move in this court for
leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must
state that a copy thereof was served on Lancaster. We dispense
with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
adequately presented in the materials before the court and
argument would not aid in the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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