UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 09-4122
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
RYAN CRAIG BROWN,
Defendant – Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Florence. R. Bryan Harwell, District Judge.
(4:08-cr-00184-RBH-1)
Submitted: August 26, 2009 Decided: September 3, 2009
Before WILKINSON and MICHAEL, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON,
Senior Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
William F. Nettles, IV, Assistant Federal Public Defender,
Florence, South Carolina, for Appellant. Rose Mary Sheppard
Parham, Assistant United States Attorney, Florence, South
Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Ryan Craig Brown pled guilty pursuant to a Fed. R.
Crim. P. 11(c)(1)(C) plea agreement to armed bank robbery, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2113(a), (d) (2006) (“Count One”); use
of a firearm during a crime of violence, in violation of
18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A) (2006) (“Count Two”); and robbery
affecting commerce, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a) (2006)
(“Count Three”). In exchange for the Government’s agreement to
dismiss the additional counts for which Brown was indicted,
Brown agreed to a 300-month sentence in his plea agreement and
the district court imposed this sentence on Brown. Brown’s
counsel has filed a brief, pursuant to Anders v. California,
386 U.S. 738 (1967), explaining that he found no meritorious
grounds for appeal, but nonetheless suggesting that the court
review: (i) whether the district court complied with Fed. R.
Crim. P. 11 when it accepted Brown’s guilty plea; and (ii)
whether Brown’s negotiated and agreed upon twenty-five year
sentence is reasonable. Brown filed a pro se supplemental brief
in which he raises additional assignments of error, and the
Government declined to file a responsive brief. 1 Finding no
error, we affirm.
1
Brown waived his right to appeal his conviction and
sentence in his plea agreement. Because the Government failed
to assert the waiver as a bar to the appeal, however, we may
(Continued)
2
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the
record in this case and have found no meritorious issues for
review. The record reveals that the district court fully
complied with the Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 requirements during the
plea colloquy, ensuring that Brown’s plea was knowing and
voluntary, that he understood the rights he was giving up by
pleading guilty and the sentence he faced, and that he committed
the offenses to which he was pleading guilty. Brown also
attested during the hearing that he fully understood the
ramifications of his guilty plea, and that no one made promises
to him outside those made by the Government in his plea
agreement. Because no error was committed during the Rule 11
hearing, and since Brown’s plea was knowing, voluntary, and
supported by a sufficient factual basis, we affirm Brown’s
convictions.
We also affirm Brown’s sentence. After United
States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), a sentence is reviewed
for reasonableness, using an abuse of discretion standard of
review. Gall v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 586, 597 (2007). The
first step in this review requires the court to ensure that the
district court committed no significant procedural error.
undertake an Anders review. United States v. Poindexter,
492 F.3d 263, 271 (4th Cir. 2007).
3
United States v. Evans, 526 F.3d 155, 161 (4th Cir. 2008).
Assuming the district court committed no significant procedural
error, this court must next consider the substantive
reasonableness of the sentence imposed, taking into account the
totality of the circumstances. Id. at 161-62. While the court
presumes that a sentence within a properly calculated Guidelines
range is reasonable, see United States v. Allen, 491 F.3d 178,
193 (4th Cir. 2007), it may not presume that a sentence outside
the Guidelines range is unreasonable. See United States v. Abu
Ali, 528 F.3d 210, 261 (4th Cir. 2008) (“[A] sentence that
deviates from the Guidelines is reviewed under the same
deferential abuse-of-discretion standard as a sentence imposed
within the applicable guidelines range.”), cert. denied, 129 S.
Ct. 1312 (2009).
Our review of the plea agreement, Brown’s presentence
investigation report, and the sentencing hearing transcript
confirms that Brown’s sentence was both procedurally and
substantively reasonable. Even though the sentence was above
Brown’s Guidelines range, it was reasonable in light of Brown’s
Rule 11 plea agreement in which Brown agreed to the upward
departure. Moreover, because the sentence to which he agreed
was substantially less than the sentence he faced had he been
convicted of all of the crimes for which he was indicted, Brown
4
received the benefit of his bargain when the Government
dismissed the remaining counts.
Having reviewed the record in this case and finding no
meritorious issues for review, 2 we affirm the district court’s
judgment. This court requires that counsel inform Brown in
writing of his right to petition the Supreme Court of the United
States for further review. If Brown requests that a petition be
filed, but counsel believes that such a petition would be
frivolous, then counsel may motion this court for leave to
withdraw from representation. Counsel's motion must state that
a copy thereof was served on Brown. We dispense with oral
argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately
presented in the materials before the court and argument would
not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
2
We have reviewed the assignments of error raised in
Brown’s pro se supplemental brief and find them to be meritless.
5