UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 08-4836
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
DARREN LEON PRINGLE,
Defendant – Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Florence. Terry L. Wooten, District Judge.
(4:08-cr-00058-TLW-3)
Submitted: August 20, 2009 Decided: September 1, 2009
Before MICHAEL, SHEDD, and AGEE, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Ray Coit Yarborough, Jr., LAW OFFICE OF RAY COIT YARBOROUGH,
JR., Florence, South Carolina, for Appellant. Rose Mary
Sheppard Parham, Assistant United States Attorney, Florence,
South Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Darren Leon Pringle pled guilty to conspiracy to
distribute five grams or more of cocaine base, in violation of
21 U.S.C. § 846 (2006). The district court sentenced Pringle to
60 months’ imprisonment, the statutory mandatory minimum
sentence under 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(B) (2006).
Pringle’s counsel has filed a brief pursuant to Anders v.
California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), stating that in his view, there
are no meritorious issues for appeal. Counsel, however, asks
this Court to review the validity of Pringle’s guilty plea and
the reasonableness of his sentence. Pringle has filed a pro se
supplemental brief in which he argues that his guilty plea was
the result of ineffective assistance of counsel, and a letter in
which he states that he wishes to contest the quantity of drugs
charged. The Government has not filed a brief.
Under Rule 11(b)(1), the district court must address
the defendant in open court and inform him of the following: the
nature of the charge; any mandatory minimum sentence and the
maximum possible sentence; the applicability of the Sentencing
Guidelines; the court’s obligation to impose a special
assessment; the defendant’s right to an attorney; his right to
plead not guilty and be tried by a jury with the assistance of
counsel; his right to confront and cross-examine witnesses; his
right against self-incrimination; and his right to testify,
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present evidence, and compel the attendance of witnesses. The
defendant also must be told that a guilty plea waives any
further trial and that his answers at the proceeding may be used
against him in a prosecution for perjury. Under Rule 11(b)(2),
the court must address the defendant to determine that the plea
is voluntary. The court must require disclosure of any plea
agreement under Rule 11(c)(2) and determine a factual basis for
the plea under Rule 11(b)(3). The record reflects that the plea
colloquy was conducted in substantial compliance with Rule 11,
and that Pringle’s guilty plea was knowing and voluntary.
Our review of the record also indicates that Pringle’s
sentence, the statutory mandatory minimum, is reasonable.
A counseled guilty plea waives all antecedent
nonjurisdictional defects not logically inconsistent with the
establishment of guilt, unless the petitioner can show that his
plea was not voluntary and intelligent because the advice of
counsel “was not within the range of competence demanded of
attorneys in criminal cases.” Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S.
258, 266-67 (1973) (internal quotations and citation omitted).
Pringle’s knowing and voluntary guilty plea waives his objection
to the amount of drugs with which he was charged in the
indictment.
Finally, this Court may address on direct appeal a
claim that counsel was ineffective only if the ineffectiveness
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appears conclusively on the face of the record. United
States v. Baldovinos, 434 F.3d 233, 239 (4th Cir. 2006). There
is no evidence on the face of the record that Pringle’s counsel
was ineffective.
Accordingly, Pringle’s assertion that he did not
receive effective assistance of counsel is not cognizable in
this direct appeal; instead, it must be presented in a timely
motion for post-conviction relief.
Pringle’s pro se challenge to the drug quantity with
which he was charged is likewise without merit.
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the record
in this case and have found no meritorious issues for appeal.
We therefore affirm the district court’s judgment. This court
requires that counsel inform Pringle, in writing, of the right
to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for further
review. If Pringle requests that a petition be filed, but
counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then
counsel may move in this court for leave to withdraw from
representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof
was served on Pringle.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
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before the court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED
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