UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 09-4070
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
HUGH EPPS,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Richmond. James R. Spencer, Chief
District Judge. (3:07-cr-00420-JRS-1)
Submitted: July 29, 2009 Decided: August 31, 2009
Before MOTZ, KING, and AGEE, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Timothy V. Anderson, ANDERSON & ASSOCIATES, Virginia Beach,
Virginia, for Appellant. Dana J. Boente, Acting United States
Attorney, Michael C. Moore, Assistant United States Attorney,
Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
After a jury trial, Appellant Hugh Epps was convicted
of one count of possession with intent to distribute five grams
or more of cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1)
(2006), and one count of conspiracy to distribute five kilograms
or more of cocaine hydrochloride and fifty grams or more of
cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 (2006), as
enhanced by 21 U.S.C. § 851 (2006). Pursuant to Fed. R. Crim.
P. 32.2(b), the district court entered an order of forfeiture
directing that a judgment in the amount of $100,000 be included
as part of the sentence, in accordance with 21 U.S.C. § 853(p)
(2006). Epps challenges the court’s denial of his motion to
dismiss the indictment due to an alleged violation of the Speedy
Trial Act, 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 3161-3174 (West 2000 & Supp. 2009),
and the entry of the order of forfeiture. Finding no error, we
affirm.
We review de novo the district court’s legal
interpretation of the Speedy Trial Act and review factual
findings for clear error. See United States v. Bush, 404 F.3d
263, 272 (4th Cir. 2005). The Speedy Trial Act provides, in
relevant part, that “[i]n any case in which a plea of not guilty
is entered, the trial of a defendant charged in an information
or indictment with the commission of an offense shall commence
within seventy days from the filing date . . . of the
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information or indictment, or from the date the defendant has
appeared before a judicial officer . . . whichever date last
occurs.” 18 U.S.C.A. § 3161(c)(1) (2006). The Act excludes
from the seventy-day calculation any “delay resulting from any
proceeding, including any examinations to determine the mental
competency or physical capacity of the defendant.” 18 U.S.C.A.
§ 3161(h)(1)(A). Also not counted under the Act is “delay
resulting from any pretrial motion, from the filing of the
motion through the conclusion of the hearing on, or other prompt
disposition of, such motion.” 18 U.S.C.A. § 3161(h)(1)(D).
Furthermore, excluded is all the time from filing the motion
until a hearing on the motion, even if the delay in holding a
hearing was not reasonably necessary. Henderson v. United
States, 476 U.S. 328, 330 (1986).
We have reviewed the record and Epps’ arguments on
appeal concerning the Speedy Trial Act and find there is no
reversible error. The time from which Epps filed his motion for
a continuance and a competency evaluation and hearing until the
time the court held the competency hearing was excludable.
There was also no plain error with respect to the court’s
decision to grant the Government’s unopposed motion and count as
excludable from the seventy-day clock, the period between the
competency hearing and the trial date.
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Epps argues that the district court erroneously
entered an order of forfeiture without considering the assets he
held at sentencing. This claim is without merit. There are no
statutory or maximum limits to the amount of forfeiture. United
States v. Alamoudi, 452 F.3d 310, 314 (4th Cir. 2006). Criminal
forfeiture is “concerned not with how much an individual has but
with how much he received in connection with the commission of
the crime.” United States v. Vampire Nation, 451 F.3d 189, 201
(3d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Accordingly, we affirm the convictions and sentence.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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