UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 08-4743
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
SHAWN SADLER, a/k/a Tangulifu M. Barber, a/k/a Carlos Watts,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Columbia. Cameron McGowan Currie, District
Judge. (3:04-cr-00330-CMC-5)
Submitted: June 24, 2009 Decided: September 9, 2009
Before TRAXLER, Chief Judge, and WILKINSON and MICHAEL, Circuit
Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
William W. Watkins, Sr., Columbia, South Carolina, for
Appellant. W. Walter Wilkins, United States Attorney, Nancy C.
Wicker, Assistant United States Attorney, Columbia, South
Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
A jury convicted Shawn Sadler of conspiracy to possess
with intent to distribute and to distribute five kilograms or
more of cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 (2006), and the
district court sentenced Sadler to 240 months’ imprisonment. On
appeal, Sadler’s counsel contends that the district court erred
in denying the motion to suppress currency seized from the
vehicle Sadler was driving and all other evidence, including
Sadler’s statements, obtained by law enforcement officers after
the vehicle search. Finding no error, we affirm.
We review the factual findings underlying the denial
of a motion to suppress for clear error and the court’s legal
conclusions de novo. United States v. Branch, 537 F.3d 328, 337
(4th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 943 (2009). The
evidence is construed in the light most favorable to the
prevailing party below. United States v. Uzenski, 434 F.3d 690,
704 (4th Cir. 2006).
“[T]he protections of the Fourth Amendment do not bear
on every encounter between a police officer and a member of the
public; it is only when a ‘search’ or a ‘seizure’ has occurred
that the Fourth Amendment comes into play.” United States v.
McCoy, 513 F.3d 405, 411 (4th Cir.) (citation omitted), cert.
denied, 128 S. Ct. 2492 (2008). Thus, when the deputy
approached Sadler, identified himself, and inquired why Sadler
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was in the neighborhood, a seizure had not yet occurred. See
id. (“If all that is involved is the officer approaching a
person, announcing that he is an officer, and asking if the
person would be willing to answer some questions, then no
reasonable suspicion is required because no seizure has
occurred.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted));
see also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 n.16 (1968) (stating a
seizure implicating the Fourth Amendment does not occur until an
“officer, by means of physical force or show of authority, has
in some way restrained the liberty of” the individual).
Moreover, “the police can stop and briefly detain a
person for investigative purposes if the officer has a
reasonable suspicion supported by articulable facts that
criminal activity ‘may be afoot,’ even if the officer lacks
probable cause.” United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989)
(quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 30). Based on the totality of the
circumstances, the deputy had a reasonable suspicion to continue
his inquiry beyond the initial encounter with Sadler. See
United States v. Perkins, 363 F.3d 317, 321 (4th Cir. 2004)
(considering the totality of the circumstances, “giv[ing] due
weight to common sense judgments reached by officers in light of
their experience and training” in assessing Terry stop).
Finally, the search was proper as Sadler voluntarily gave his
consent. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219
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(1973) (“[O]ne of the specifically established exceptions to the
requirements of both a warrant and probable cause is a search
that is conducted pursuant to consent.”). Therefore, we
conclude the district court properly denied the motion to
suppress.
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district
court. We deny Sadler’s motion to file a pro se supplemental
brief. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before the court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED
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