UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 08-4531
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
CENTRAL A. GODBOLT,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Greenbelt. Roger W. Titus, District Judge.
(8:06-cr-00515-RWT-1)
Submitted: August 27, 2009 Decided: September 15, 2009
Before WILKINSON and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON,
Senior Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Gary E. Proctor, LAW OFFICES OF GARY E. PROCTOR, L.L.C.,
Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellant. Rod J. Rosenstein, United
States Attorney, Gina L. Simms, Jonathan Su, Assistant United
States Attorneys, Greenbelt, Maryland, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Central A. Godbolt was convicted after a jury trial of
conspiracy to defraud the Government and commit theft of
Government property, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371 (2006), and
making false statements, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001
(2006), and was sentenced to thirty-four months in prison.
Godbolt timely appealed. Finding no error, we affirm.
Godbolt first argues that the court was not permitted
to sua sponte add the two-level sentencing enhancement for
Godbolt’s leadership role in the offense, U.S. Sentencing
Guidelines Manual § 3B1.1(c) (2007), because it was not included
in the presentence report or requested by the Government.
Godbolt concedes that the evidence was sufficient for the
district court to conclude that he was the leader or organizer
and to award the two levels; however, Godbolt argues that “the
question is, rather, whether the district court should have
plucked it from thin air sua sponte.” We conclude that the
district court fulfilled its obligation at sentencing to
“correctly calculat[e] the applicable [g]uidelines range.” Gall
v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, , 128 S. Ct. 586, 596 (2007).
While the court was not required to give notice of its intent to
add the enhancement, cf. Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(h) (requiring
notice for possible sentence departure), the court recessed
sentencing and allowed the parties to provide supplemental
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briefing and prepare argument regarding the suggested
enhancement. At the reconvened sentencing proceeding, the court
heard argument from both sides and concluded that the evidence
at trial established that Godbolt was the mastermind of the
offenses. Thus, the court did not abuse its discretion in
finding the two-level enhancement appropriate.
Godbolt next argues that the district court erred by
failing to ensure that Godbolt understood his right to testify
at trial. Godbolt concedes that this court has held that “the
trial court does not have a sua sponte duty to conduct a
colloquy with the defendant at trial to determine whether the
defendant has knowingly and intelligently waived the right to
testify.” Sexton v. French, 163 F.3d 874, 881 (4th Cir. 1998).
Further, Godbolt fails to suggest that he in fact did not
understand the right, or that he would have testified if the
court had informed him of it.
Finally, Godbolt argues that the district court erred
when it refused his instruction to the jury explaining the
“reasonable doubt” standard of proof. Godbolt concedes that
this court has consistently held that a district court need not
and should not define the term, “reasonable doubt,” even at the
request of a party. United States v. Smith, 441 F.3d 254, 270-
71 (4th Cir. 2006); United States v. Williams, 152 F.3d 294, 298
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(4th Cir. 1998). We discern no basis to revisit this
established principle.
We therefore affirm the district court’s judgment. We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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