Snyder v. Phelps

Certiorari granted, March 8, 2010
Affirmed by Supreme Court, March 2, 2011

PUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

ALBERT SNYDER, 
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
FRED W. PHELPS, SR.; WESTBORO
BAPTIST CHURCH, INCORPORATED;
REBEKAH A. PHELPS-DAVIS; SHIRLEY
L. PHELPS-ROPER,
Defendants-Appellants,
and
JANE DOE; JOHN DOE, JR.,
Defendants.  No. 08-1026

THOMAS JEFFERSON CENTER FOR THE
PROTECTION OF FREE EXPRESSION;
AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION;
AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES
UNION OF MARYLAND,
Amici Supporting Appellants,
and
JEFFREY IRA SHULMAN,
Amicus Supporting Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Maryland, at Baltimore.
Richard D. Bennett, District Judge.
(1:06-cv-01389-RDB)
2 SNYDER v. PHELPS
Argued: December 2, 2008

Decided: September 24, 2009

Before KING, SHEDD, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.

Judgment reversed and bonds discharged by published opin-
ion. Judge King wrote the opinion, in which Judge Duncan
joined. Judge Shedd wrote a separate opinion concurring in
the judgment.

COUNSEL

ARGUED: Margie Jean Phelps, Topeka, Kansas, for Appel-
lants. Sean E. Summers, BARLEY & SNYDER, L.L.C.,
York, Pennsylvania, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Craig T. Tre-
bilcock, SHUMAKER WILLIAMS, P.C., York, Pennsylva-
nia, for Appellee. J. Joshua Wheeler, THE THOMAS
JEFFERSON CENTER FOR THE PROTECTION OF FREE
EXPRESSION, Charlottesville, Virginia, for The Thomas Jef-
ferson Center for the Protection of Free Expression, Amicus
Supporting Appellants. Joel Kleinman, David Schur, Ranga
Sourirajan, DICKSTEIN SHAPIRO, L.L.P., Washington,
D.C., for American Civil Liberties Union and American Civil
Liberties Union of Maryland; Steven R. Shapiro, AMERI-
CAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION FOUNDATION, New
York, New York, for American Civil Liberties Union; Debo-
rah A. Jeon, ACLU FOUNDATION OF MARYLAND, Balti-
more, Maryland, for American Civil Liberties Union of
Maryland, Amici Supporting Appellants. Jeffrey I. Shulman,
GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY LAW CENTER, Washing-
ton, D.C., Amicus Supporting Appellee.
 SNYDER v. PHELPS 3
OPINION

KING, Circuit Judge:

In June 2006, Albert Snyder instituted this diversity action
in the District of Maryland against Westboro Baptist Church,
Incorporated (the "Church"), and several of its members (col-
lectively, the "Defendants"). Snyder’s lawsuit is predicated on
two related events: a protest the Defendants conducted in
Maryland near the funeral of Snyder’s son Matthew (an
enlisted Marine who tragically died in Iraq in March 2006),
and a self-styled written "epic" (the "Epic") that the Defen-
dants posted on the Internet several weeks after Matthew’s
funeral. Snyder’s complaint alleged five state law tort claims,
three of which are implicated in this appeal: invasion of pri-
vacy by intrusion upon seclusion, intentional infliction of
emotional distress ("IIED"), and civil conspiracy. After a trial
in October 2007, the jury found the Defendants liable for $2.9
million in compensatory damages and a total of $8 million in
punitive damages. Although the district court remitted the
aggregate punitive award to $2.1 million, it otherwise denied
the post-trial motions. See Snyder v. Phelps, 533 F. Supp. 2d
567 (D. Md. 2008) (the "Post-Trial Opinion"). The Defen-
dants have appealed, contending that the judgment contra-
venes the First Amendment of the Constitution. As explained
below, we reverse on that basis.

I.

A.

The facts of this case as presented at trial are largely undis-
puted, and they are detailed in the district court’s Post-Trial
Opinion:

On March 3, 2006, Marine Lance Corporal Matthew
A. Snyder was killed in Iraq in the line of duty.
Shortly thereafter, two United States Marines came
4 SNYDER v. PHELPS
to the home of the Plaintiff, Albert Snyder, and told
him that his son had died. As Matthew Snyder had
lived in Westminster, Maryland, and graduated from
Westminster High School, St. John’s Catholic
Church in Westminster was selected as the site for
his funeral, which was scheduled for March 10,
2006. Obituary notices were placed in local newspa-
pers providing notice of the time and location of the
funeral.

Defendant Fred W. Phelps, Sr., founded Defen-
dant Westboro Baptist Church, Inc. in Topeka, Kan-
sas, in 1955. For fifty-two years, he has been the
only pastor of the church, which has approximately
sixty or seventy members, fifty of whom are his chil-
dren, grandchildren, or in-laws. Among these family
members are Defendants Shirley L. Phelps-Roper
and Rebekah A. Phelps-Davis. There are approxi-
mately ten to twenty members of the church who are
not related to Phelps by blood or marriage. Accord-
ing to the testimony of Defendants’ expert, the mem-
bers of this church practice a "fire and brimstone"
fundamentalist religious faith. Among their religious
beliefs is that God hates homosexuality and hates
and punishes America for its tolerance of homosexu-
ality, particularly in the United States military.
Members of the church have increasingly picketed
funerals to assert these beliefs. Defendants have
also established a website identified as
www.godhatesfags.com in order to publicize their
religious viewpoint.

Defendants’ testimony at trial established that
their picketing efforts gained increased attention
when they began to picket funerals of soldiers killed
in recent years. Members of the Phelps family pre-
pare signs at an on-site sign shop at their Kansas
church to take with them in their travels. They also
 SNYDER v. PHELPS 5
utilize an on-site production facility to produce vid-
eos displayed on the church’s website.

Phelps testified that members of the Westboro
Baptist Church learned of Lance Cpl. Snyder’s
funeral and issued a news release on March 8, 2006,
announcing that members of the Phelps family
intended to come to Westminster, Maryland, and
picket the funeral. On March 10, 2006, Phelps, his
daughters Phelps-Roper and Phelps-Davis, and four
of his grandchildren arrived in Westminster, Mary-
land, to picket Matthew Snyder’s funeral. None of
the Defendants ever met any members of the Snyder
family.

Defendants’ rationale was quite simple. They trav-
eled to Matthew Snyder’s funeral in order to publi-
cize their message of God’s hatred of America for its
tolerance of homosexuality. In Plaintiff’s eyes,
Defendants turned the funeral for his son into a
"media circus for their benefit." By notifying police
officials in advance, Defendants recognized that
there would be a reaction in the community. They
carried signs which expressed general messages such
as "God Hates the USA," "America is doomed,"
"Pope in hell," and "Fag troops." The signs also car-
ried more specific messages, to wit: "You’re going
to hell," "God hates you," "Semper fi fags," and
"Thank God for dead soldiers." Phelps testified that
it was Defendants’ "duty" to deliver the message
"whether they want to hear it or not." Lance Cpl.
Snyder’s funeral was thus utilized by Defendants as
the vehicle for this message.

It was undisputed at trial that Defendants com-
plied with local ordinances and police directions
with respect to being a certain distance from the
church. Furthermore, it was established at trial that
6 SNYDER v. PHELPS
Snyder did not actually see the signs until he saw a
television program later that day with footage of the
Phelps family at his son’s funeral.

Defendants’ utilization of Matthew Snyder’s
funeral to publicize their message continued after the
actual funeral on March 10, 2006. After returning to
Kansas, Phelps-Roper published an "epic" on the
church’s website, www.godhatesfags.com. In "The
Burden of Marine Lance Cpl. Matthew Snyder,"
Phelps-Roper stated that Albert Snyder and his ex-
wife "taught Matthew to defy his creator," "raised
him for the devil," and "taught him that God was a
liar." In the aftermath of his son’s funeral, Snyder
learned that there was reference to his son on the
Internet after running a search on Google. Through
the use of that search engine, he read Phelps-Roper’s
"epic" on the church’s website.

Snyder v. Phelps, 533 F. Supp. 2d 567, 571-72 (D. Md. 2008)
(internal citation omitted).1

B.

1.

When Albert Snyder filed his complaint in June 2006, he
sued Fred W. Phelps, Sr., and the Church, later adding its
1
The Defendants have a substantial history of protesting at venues other
than soldiers’ funerals. For example, on the day of Matthew Snyder’s
funeral, they also protested in Annapolis at the Maryland State House and
at the Naval Academy. The Defendants have also been involved in litiga-
tion throughout the country relating to their protests. See, e.g., Phelps-
Roper v. Nixon, 545 F.3d 685 (8th Cir. 2008); Phelps-Roper v. Strickland,
539 F.3d 356 (6th Cir. 2008). As a result of such activities, approximately
forty states and the federal government have enacted legislation address-
ing funeral picketing. See Stephen R. McAllister, Funeral Picketing Laws
and Free Speech, 55 U. Kan. L. Rev. 575, 576 (2007).
 SNYDER v. PHELPS 7
members Shirley L. Phelps-Roper and Rebekah A. Phelps-
Davis as defendants. The complaint alleged five state law tort
claims: defamation, intrusion upon seclusion, publicity given
to private life, IIED, and civil conspiracy. The Defendants
moved for summary judgment on those claims, contending,
inter alia, that their challenged words "constitute[ ] expres-
sions of opinion, which are not actionable." J.A. 239.2 They
asserted that their words "are clearly rhetorical, hypothetical,
religious and laced with opinion," and that "it is impossible to
prove or disprove these things, particularly given that doctri-
nal viewpoints drive the opinions." Id.

On October 15, 2007, the district court granted summary
judgment to the Defendants on two of the five tort claims:
defamation and publicity given to private life.3 The court
awarded summary judgment on the defamation claim because
the Defendants’ speech was "essentially . . . religious opinion"
and "would not realistically tend to expose Snyder to public
hatred or scorn." Snyder, 533 F. Supp. 2d at 572-73. On the
publicity given to private life claim, the court awarded sum-
mary judgment because the Defendants had not made public
any private information. In so ruling, the court explained that
the Defendants had published only information gleaned from
a newspaper obituary and that such publication would not be
highly offensive to a reasonable person, because the informa-
tion was already a matter of public record.

In October 2007, the parties proceeded to trial on the
remaining three claims of the complaint: intrusion upon seclu-
sion, IIED, and civil conspiracy. At trial, Snyder testified, "re-
count[ing] fond memories of his son . . . and the traumatic
2
Citations herein to "J.A. __" refer to the contents of the Joint Appendix
filed by the parties in this appeal.
3
Snyder has not cross-appealed the district court’s summary judgment
awards to the Defendants on his tort claims for defamation and publicity
given to private life. Thus, whether the court erred in making those rulings
is not implicated in this appeal.
8 SNYDER v. PHELPS
news of his passing." Snyder, 533 F. Supp. 2d at 588. In its
Post-Trial Opinion, the district court summarized Snyder’s
testimony:

He described the severity of his emotional injury,
stating that he is often tearful and angry, and that he
becomes so sick to his stomach that he actually
physically vomits. He testified that Defendants
placed a "bug" in his head, such that he is unable to
separate thoughts of his son from the [Defendants’]
actions: "there are nights that I just, you know, I try
to think of my son at times and every time I think of
my son or pass his picture hanging on the wall or see
the medals hanging on the wall that he received from
the [M]arine [C]orps, I see those signs." He testified
also that "I want so badly to remember all the good
stuff and so far, I remember the good stuff, but it
always turns into the bad."

Plaintiff also testified as to the permanency of the
emotional injury. He testified that "I think about the
sign [i.e., Thank God for dead soldiers] every day of
my life. . . . I see that sign when I lay in bed at
nights. I [had] one chance to bury my son and they
took the dignity away from it. I cannot re-bury my
son. And for the rest of my life, I will remember
what they did to me and it has tarnished the memory
of my son’s last hour on earth." He stated also that
"somebody could have stabbed me in the arm or in
the back and the wound would have healed. But I
don’t think this will heal."

Throughout trial, Plaintiff demonstrated signifi-
cant emotion, appearing visibly shaken and dis-
tressed, and was often reduced to tears. On occasion
during the trial, Plaintiff requested and was granted
leave from the courtroom to compose himself. The
jury witnessed firsthand Plaintiff’s anguish and the
 SNYDER v. PHELPS 9
unresolved grief he harbors because of the failure to
conduct a normal burial.

Id. at 588-89 (second and third alterations in original) (inter-
nal citations omitted).

Snyder called several expert witnesses to testify concerning
the injuries the Defendants had caused him, including the
worsening of his diabetes and severe depression. Snyder’s
treating physician confirmed that the Defendants’ actions had
exacerbated Snyder’s depression, thereby preventing him
from going through the normal grieving process. See Snyder,
533 F. Supp. 2d at 588. Snyder’s psychologist testified "that
the demonstration and the things that [Plaintiff] talked about
[seeing] in the website . . . have made the depression worse
and lengthened it." Id. (alterations in original).

During the summary judgment proceedings and the trial,
the Defendants repeatedly contended that the First Amend-
ment protects their actions.4 In that regard, the district court
recognized that certain signs carried by the Defendants —
such as "America Is Doomed" and "God Hates America" —
"express[ed] general points of view" that may have merited
First Amendment protection. Snyder, 533 F. Supp. 2d at 578.
But the court ruled that certain other signs — such as "Thank
God for Dead Soldiers," "Semper Fi Fags," "You’re Going to
Hell," and "God Hates You" — created issues of fact for the
jury because they "could be interpreted as being directed at
the Snyder family." Id. Likewise, the court concluded that
statements published in the Epic on the Church website "cre-
ated similar issues to be addressed by the finder of fact." Id.
4
The Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment specifically guaran-
tees that "Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of
speech." U.S. Const. amend. I. The Free Speech Clause applies to the vari-
ous states as a result of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Stromberg v. Cal-
ifornia, 283 U.S. 359, 368 (1931).
10 SNYDER v. PHELPS
At trial, the Defendants challenged the propriety of the pro-
posed jury instructions regarding the First Amendment.5 Dur-
ing a hearing on jury instructions, the Defendants specifically
objected to Instruction No. 21, which provided in full as fol-
lows:

The Defendants in this case claim that their
actions were protected by the First Amendment of
the United States Constitution, which provides that
Congress shall make no law . . . prohibiting the free
exercise [of religion]; or abridging the freedom of
speech. The Defendants have a right under the First
Amendment to engage in picketing, and to publish
their religious message, no matter how much you
may disagree with that message. The First Amend-
ment applies to action at the state and local level
through the Fourteenth Amendment.

As a general matter, the fact that society may find
speech offensive is not a sufficient reason for sup-
pressing it. Speech that is called hateful, or speech
that is unpopular, or speech with which you strongly
disagree, may still be protected speech. The govern-
ment, including the courts, can place reasonable
time, place, and manner restrictions on how pro-
tected speech may be expressed. These restrictions
must be narrowly tailored, and should balance the
interests of all the people involved. Speech that is
vulgar, offensive, and shocking . . . is not entitled to
absolute constitutional protection under all circum-
stances.

The United States Supreme Court has long recog-
5
In objecting to a proposed instruction on the intrusion upon seclusion
claim, the Defendants sought to limit the jury’s consideration to three spe-
cific signs. The trial court, however, authorized the jury to consider all of
the signs as well as the Epic.
 SNYDER v. PHELPS 11
nized that not all speech is of equal First Amend-
ment protection. When speech gives rise to civil tort
liability, the level of First Amendment protection
varies depending on the nature and subject matter of
the speech.

As to the particular subject matter of the speech,
a distinction has been drawn between matters of pub-
lic and private concern. Where the speech is directed
at private people and matters of private concern, the
Supreme Court has held that the First Amendment
interest in protecting particular types of speech must
be balanced against a state’s interest in protecting its
residents from wrongful injury. You must balance
the Defendants’ expression of religious belief with
another citizen’s right to privacy and his or her right
to be free from intentional, reckless, or extreme and
outrageous conduct causing him or her severe emo-
tional distress. As I have previously indicated to you
at the start of this case, you as the judges of the facts
in this case must determine whether the Defendants’
actions were directed specifically at the Snyder fam-
ily. If you do so determine, you must then determine
whether those actions would be highly offensive to
a reasonable person, whether they were extreme and
outrageous and whether these actions were so offen-
sive and shocking as to not be entitled to First
Amendment protection.

J.A. 3113-14 (alteration and omissions in original) (internal
quotation marks omitted). In objecting to Instruction No. 21,
the Defendants asserted that "the First Amendment has more
of a heavy balance even in civil cases than just anybody not
wanting to be offended." Id. at 2883. Phelps-Roper, who was
defending herself on a pro se basis, further objected, stating:
"I just want to say that . . . it has never been clear in the record
or to me what of our words are actionable and . . . [the court
has] not limited the evidence to those words that you would
12 SNYDER v. PHELPS
say were directed to a specific family." Id. at 2884. The court
overruled the objections to Instruction No. 21, observed that
the constitutional issues were preserved, and gave the instruc-
tion to the jury.

2.

On October 31, 2007, the jury found for Snyder on the
three tort claims, awarding him $2.9 million in compensatory
damages and a total of $8 million in punitive damages. After
the district court entered judgment on November 5, 2007, the
Defendants filed post-trial motions seeking judgment as a
matter of law, judgment notwithstanding the verdict, recon-
sideration and rehearing, a new trial, relief from judgment,
and relief of law and equity. The district court denied each of
these motions by its Post-Trial Opinion. The Defendants also
moved for a remittitur, contending that the verdict was grossly
excessive.

In its Post-Trial Opinion of February 4, 2008, the district
court disposed of the Defendants’ various legal challenges.
The Post-Trial Opinion explained that this case "involves bal-
ancing [the Defendants’ First Amendment rights of religious
expression] with the rights of other private citizens to avoid
being verbally assaulted by outrageous speech and comment
during a time of bereavement." Snyder, 533 F. Supp. 2d at
579. As to the "content of the signs," the court was satisfied
that it had "instructed the jury on the First Amendment, spe-
cifically the balance between Defendants’ First Amendment
rights and Maryland’s interest in protecting its citizens," such
that there "was sufficient evidence in the trial record for a rea-
sonable jury to conclude that Defendants’ conduct was so
extreme and outrageous as to cause Plaintiff’s injury." Id. at
581. The court also rejected the Defendants’ post-trial conten-
tion that the court "should have held as a matter of law that
[the Defendants] were entitled to First Amendment protec-
tion." Id. at 582. The court emphasized that it had permitted
the jury to decide if the Defendants’ conduct was sufficient to
 SNYDER v. PHELPS 13
hold them liable on the three Maryland tort claims, and the
jury had found the Defendants liable. See id. at 580-82.

Finally, by its Post-Trial Opinion, the district court upheld
the compensatory damages award but remitted the punitive
damages award to a total of $2.1 million, resulting in an
aggregate judgment of $5 million. The Defendants have now
appealed, and we possess jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291.6

II.

The Defendants’ primary appellate contention is that the
judgment contravenes the First Amendment. In addition to
their First Amendment contentions, the Defendants raise the
following other issues: that the district court lacked personal
and subject matter jurisdiction; that Snyder had no privacy
right in Matthew’s funeral; that the punitive damages award
contravenes due process; that the jury was impermissibly
biased; that the district court made prejudicial evidentiary
errors at trial; that the civil conspiracy verdict is inconsistent
with state law; and that Maryland’s statutory cap on compen-
satory damages applies to the damages award. We are content
to reject each of these non-First Amendment contentions
without further discussion because they are all plainly without
merit.7
6
Each of the Defendants requested a stay of execution of judgment
pending appeal, which the district court conditionally granted. Phelps and
the Church were then required to post property bonds, and Phelps-Roper
and Phelps-Davis had to post substantial cash bonds. On May 19, 2008,
we denied the requests of Phelps-Roper and Phelps-Davis to stay the judg-
ment without bond pending appeal.
7
The Defendants also assert on appeal that we improperly denied the
requests of Phelps-Roper and Phelps-Davis to stay the judgment without
bond pending appeal. As explained below, we discharge the various bonds
as a corollary to reversing the judgment.
14 SNYDER v. PHELPS
Notably, the Defendants do not challenge the sufficiency of
the evidence, although an amicus brief seeks to raise that
issue. Our good colleague Judge Shedd would reverse the
judgment against the Defendants on the issue of evidence suf-
ficiency that is asserted only by the amicus submission. In
that respect, we agree that, although the Defendants properly
raised the sufficiency issue in the district court, they have
abandoned that contention on appeal. Thus, the Defendants
and their counsel have exercised their discretion and voluntar-
ily waived the sufficiency issue. Notwithstanding such
waiver, however, Judge Shedd would reverse the judgment
because he agrees with the amicus that the supporting evi-
dence was insufficient.

We respectfully reject our good friend’s reliance on the
amicus contention, because the evidentiary issue has plainly
been waived by the only party entitled to pursue it. As a
result, the First Amendment contention must be addressed.
Put simply, our Court and our sister circuits have consistently
been wary, even prohibitive, of addressing an issue raised
solely by an amicus. See United States v. Buculei, 262 F.3d
322, 333 n.11 (4th Cir. 2001) ("‘An issue waived by appellant
cannot be raised by amicus curiae.’" (quoting Christopher M.
v. Corpus Christi Indep. Sch. Dist., 933 F.2d 1285, 1293 (5th
Cir. 1991)); Cavallo v. Star Enter., 100 F.3d 1150, 1152 n.2
(4th Cir. 1996) (declining to address issue not raised in open-
ing brief, as it would be "unfair to the appellee and would risk
an improvident or ill-advised opinion on the legal issues"
(internal quotation marks omitted)). Indeed, "‘[a]n appellant
and an amicus may not split up the issues and expect the court
to consider that they have all been raised on appeal.’" Buculei,
262 F.3d at 333 n.11 (quoting Amoco Oil Co. v. United States,
234 F.3d 1374, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2000)). But see Spicer v. Hil-
ton, 618 F.2d 232, 240 (3d Cir. 1980) (concluding that consti-
tutional issues should yield to nonconstitutional ones, even
where nonconstitutional issues were not raised by parties). As
the Federal Circuit has aptly described such a situation, "[i]t
is the appellant’s case, not a joint appeal by the appellant and
 SNYDER v. PHELPS 15
amicus. Appellant must raise in its opening brief all the issues
it wishes the court to address." Amoco Oil, 234 F.3d at 1378.

On the other hand, we acknowledge that the Supreme Court
has seen fit, in narrow and circumscribed circumstances of its
own choosing, to address and dispose of an issue raised solely
by an amicus. See Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 300 (1989)
(addressing retroactivity issue on appeal because "th[e] ques-
tion is not foreign to the parties," who addressed retroactivity
with respect to another claim); see also Davis v. United
States, 512 U.S. 452, 457 n.* (1994) (recognizing that
Supreme Court may assess contentions raised only in amicus
brief, but declining to do so). With all respect to the Supreme
Court’s treatment of the waiver issue in Teague and Davis,
this situation does not warrant an exception to our post-
Teague circuit precedent.8 Because the Defendants have vol-
untarily waived any contention that the evidence is insuffi-
cient to support the verdict, we are obligated to grapple with
and resolve the First Amendment issues presented by the judg-
ment.9

III.

With respect to the First Amendment issue, the Defendants
maintain that they were entitled to judgment as a matter of
8
In this regard, we further observe that recognition of the right of an
amicus to present an issue that the parties have no desire to further litigate
would constitute judicial recognition of a lawyer relief rule — inviting
lawyers and nonparties otherwise without standing to seek out and engage
in mischief that would readily be likened to barratry, champerty, or main-
tenance.
9
Because the sufficiency of the evidence issue was waived, the Ash-
wander principle — that a court should not "decide questions of a consti-
tutional nature unless absolutely necessary" — is inapplicable here. See
Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936) (Brandeis, J.,
concurring) (internal quotation marks omitted). The resolution of the First
Amendment issues is absolutely necessary, as it is the sole appropriate
means for disposing of this appeal.
16 SNYDER v. PHELPS
law because the First Amendment fully protects their speech
at the Maryland protest and in the written Epic they published
on the Internet. We will first address the Defendants’ asser-
tion that the court erroneously permitted the jury to decide
legal issues reserved to the court. Such an error would garner
the Defendants a new trial, but there is no need for a new trial
if the Defendants were entitled to prevail under the First
Amendment. Thus, after describing the general legal frame-
work applicable here, we specifically address the application
of that legal framework to the Defendants’ various protest
signs and their written Epic.

A.

It is well established that tort liability under state law, even
in the context of litigation between private parties, is circum-
scribed by the First Amendment. See New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 264-65 (1964).10 Although the
Supreme Court in New York Times specifically addressed the
common law tort of defamation, the Court explained that its
reasoning did not turn on the precise "form in which state
power has been applied." Id. at 265. Accordingly, the Court
later applied the First Amendment to other torts not involving
reputational damages, see Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell,
485 U.S. 46, 53 (1988) (IIED), and we have applied the
Court’s controlling principles to other state law torts, see
Food Lion v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 194 F.3d 505, 511, 522
(4th Cir. 1999) (fraud, breach of duty of loyalty, and trespass).
Thus, regardless of the specific tort being employed, the First
Amendment applies when a plaintiff seeks damages for
10
The district court properly distinguished these proceedings, where the
Defendants contend that the First Amendment immunizes them from tort
liability, from other decisions relied on by the Defendants addressing the
constitutionality of statutory prohibitions affecting funeral pickets. See
Snyder v. Phelps, 533 F. Supp. 2d 567, 578-79 (D. Md. 2008) (distinguish-
ing certain "successful attacks by the [Defendants] upon statutory restric-
tions" that have not met constitutional muster).
 SNYDER v. PHELPS 17
reputational, mental, or emotional injury allegedly resulting
from the defendant’s speech. See id. at 523.11

Where, as here, the First Amendment is implicated by the
assertion of tort claims arising from speech, we have the obli-
gation "to ‘make an independent examination of the whole
record’ in order to make sure that ‘the judgment does not con-
stitute a forbidden intrusion on the field of free expression.’"
Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485,
499 (1984) (quoting New York Times, 376 U.S. at 284-86);
see also Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 21
(1990) (referring to the review required by Bose Corp. as "en-
hanced appellate review"). We review de novo a district
court’s conclusions of law with respect to a First Amendment
issue. See United States v. Bly, 510 F.3d 453, 457 (4th Cir.
2007).

In its New York Times decision, the Supreme Court estab-
lished a rule barring public officials from recovering damages
for the common law tort of defamation unless the allegedly
defamatory statement was made with "actual malice," and the
Court defined such malice as knowing falsity or reckless dis-
regard for the truth. 376 U.S. at 279-80. The Court later
expanded that constitutional standard to speech concerning
"public figures" as well as "public officials," Curtis Publ’g
Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 164 (1967) (Warren, C.J., concur-
ring in the result), but stopped short of extending its protec-
tive rule to speech targeting private figures, see Gertz v.
Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 344-46 (1974).

Nevertheless, in a distinct but related line of decisions, the
11
The Supreme Court has deemed the First Amendment defense inappli-
cable to a state law tort claim only when the plaintiff seeks damages for
actual pecuniary loss, as opposed to injury to reputation or state of mind.
See Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 671 (1991) (concluding
that First Amendment did not bar economic damages resulting from defen-
dant’s tortious breach of promise).
18 SNYDER v. PHELPS
Court has recognized that there are constitutional limits on the
type of speech to which state tort liability may attach. See
Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 16; Hustler Magazine, 485 U.S. at 50;
see also Deupree v. Iliff, 860 F.2d 300, 304-05 (8th Cir. 1988)
(recognizing that certain types of speech are protected regard-
less of plaintiff’s status as private or public figure). Thus,
although there is no categorical constitutional defense for
statements of "opinion," the First Amendment will fully pro-
tect "statements that cannot ‘reasonably [be] interpreted as
stating actual facts’ about an individual." Milkovich, 497 U.S.
at 20 (alteration in original) (quoting Hustler Magazine, 485
U.S. at 50).12

In Milkovich, which is a crucial precedent in our disposition
of this appeal, the Supreme Court declined to adopt an artifi-
cial dichotomy between "opinion" and "fact," and it specifi-
cally eschewed the multifactor tests that several lower courts
(including this Court) had utilized to categorize speech. See
497 U.S. at 19; see also Biospherics, Inc. v. Forbes, Inc., 151
F.3d 180, 183-84 (4th Cir. 1998) (explaining that Milkovich
rejected our multifactor test). In Milkovich, the Court assessed
whether a newspaper enjoyed First Amendment protection for
a column that referred to a wrestling coach as a "liar," based
on his allegedly deceitful testimony before a state athletics
council. 497 U.S. at 4-5 & n.2. The newspaper maintained
that the column merely stated its author’s opinion, and was
thus subject to categorical First Amendment protection. Id. at
17-18. The Court rejected this contention, ruling instead that
the "dispositive question" was "whether a reasonable fact-
finder could conclude that the statements in the [newspaper]
column imply an assertion that [the coach] perjured himself
in a judicial proceeding." Id. at 21. Concluding that the col-
umn’s assertions were "susceptible of being proved true or
12
There is no suggestion that the speech at issue falls within one of the
categorical exclusions from First Amendment protection, such as those for
obscenity or "fighting words." See, e.g., Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15,
20 (1973); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942).
 SNYDER v. PHELPS 19
false," the Court determined that they were not protected by
the First Amendment. Id.

In light of Milkovich, and as carefully explained by Judge
Motz in our Biospherics decision, we are obliged to assess
how an objective, reasonable reader would understand a chal-
lenged statement by focusing on the plain language of the
statement and the context and general tenor of its message.
See Biospherics, 151 F.3d at 184. And we must emphasize the
"verifiability of the statement," because a statement not sub-
ject to objective verification is not likely to assert actual facts.
Chapin v. Knight-Ridder, Inc., 993 F.2d 1087, 1093 (4th Cir.
1993); see also Haynes v. Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 8 F.3d 1222,
1227 (7th Cir. 1993) ("[I]f it is plain that the speaker is
expressing a subjective view, an interpretation, a theory, con-
jecture, or surmise, rather than claiming to be in possession of
objectively verifiable facts, the statement is not actionable.").

There are two subcategories of speech that cannot reason-
ably be interpreted as stating actual facts about an individual,
and that thus constitute speech that is constitutionally pro-
tected. First, the First Amendment serves to protect statements
on matters of public concern that fail to contain a "provably
false factual connotation." Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 20.13 We
13
Neither the Supreme Court nor this Court has specifically addressed
the question of whether the constitutional protections afforded to state-
ments not provably false should apply with equal force to both media and
nonmedia defendants. See Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 20 n.6. The Second and
Eighth Circuits, however, have rejected any media/nonmedia distinction.
See Flamm v. Am. Ass’n of Univ. Women, 201 F.3d 144, 149 (2d Cir.
2000); In re IBP Confidential Bus. Documents Litig., 797 F.2d 632, 642
(8th Cir. 1986); see also Foretich v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 37 F.3d
1541, 1563 n.39 (4th Cir. 1994) (implying in dicta that Milkovich applies
equally to media and nonmedia defendants). Like those two circuits, we
believe that the First Amendment protects nonmedia speech on matters of
public concern that does not contain provably false factual assertions. Any
effort to justify a media/nonmedia distinction rests on unstable ground,
given the difficulty of defining with precision who belongs to the "media."
20 SNYDER v. PHELPS
assess as a matter of law whether challenged speech involves
a matter of public concern by examining the content, form,
and context of such speech, as revealed by the whole record.
See Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472
U.S. 749, 761 (1985). "Speech involves a matter of public
concern when it involves an issue of social, political, or other
interest to a community." Kirby v. City of Elizabeth City,
N.C., 388 F.3d 440, 446 (4th Cir. 2004).14 In order to be
treated as speech involving a matter of public concern, the
interested community need not be especially large nor the rel-
evant concern of "paramount importance or national scope."
Levinsky’s, Inc. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 127 F.3d 122, 132
(1st Cir. 1997).

Second, rhetorical statements employing "loose, figurative,
or hyperbolic language" are entitled to First Amendment pro-
tection to ensure that "public debate will not suffer for lack of
‘imaginative expression’ or the ‘rhetorical hyperbole’ which
has traditionally added much to the discourse of our Nation."
Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 20-21. The general tenor of rhetorical
speech, as well as the use of "loose, figurative, or hyperbolic
language" sufficiently negates any impression that the speaker
is asserting actual facts. Id. at 21; see also Letter Carriers v.
Austin, 418 U.S. 264, 284-86 (1974) (concluding that refer-
ence to worker who crossed picket line as "traitor" was not

And, more importantly, the Supreme Court has concluded that the "inher-
ent worth of speech . . . does not depend upon the identity of its source,
whether corporation, association, union, or individual." First Nat’l Bank
of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 777 (1978). Thus, for our purposes, the
status of the Defendants as media or nonmedia is immaterial.
14
In our Kirby decision, we assessed whether the words at issue
involved a matter of public concern in the context of a public employment
retaliation action. See 388 F.3d at 444. Both the Supreme Court and the
courts of appeals have borrowed from that context for purposes of analyz-
ing tort liability under the First Amendment. See, e.g., Dun & Bradstreet,
472 U.S. at 759; Levinsky’s, Inc. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 127 F.3d 122,
132 (1st Cir. 1997).
 SNYDER v. PHELPS 21
actionable); Greenbelt Coop. Publ’g Ass’n v. Bresler, 398
U.S. 6, 13-14 (1970) (treating description of negotiating posi-
tion as "blackmail" as epithet not conveying commission of
actual crime). We assess as a matter of law whether speech
contains rhetorical hyperbole protected by the First Amend-
ment. See CACI Premier Tech., Inc. v. Rhodes, 536 F.3d 280,
294 (4th Cir. 2008).

We had occasion to apply these legal principles just last
year in our CACI decision. See 536 F.3d at 293. CACI was
a civilian defense contractor that performed interrogation ser-
vices for the military at Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq. CACI
claimed that it had been defamed by a talk radio host who had
made on-air statements blaming CACI for the mistreatment of
detainees at the prison and criticizing the use of wartime con-
tractors in general. See id. at 288-92. Judge Michael’s opinion
affirmed the summary judgment award to the radio host,
based in part on the determination that her statements were
protected by the First Amendment because they "did not state
actual facts about CACI." Id. at 304.15

The radio host, for example, had claimed that CACI and
other defense contractors employed "[m]ercenaries all over
the country, killing people," and she had characterized CACI
and other contractors as "hired killers." CACI, 536 F.3d at 301
(alteration in original). Judge Michael explained that no rea-
sonable listener would understand the challenged statements
to assert actual facts about CACI, but rather would understand
them as "exaggerated rhetoric intended to spark the debate
about the wisdom of the use of contractors in Iraq." Id. at 301-
02. The radio host had twice mentioned that certain individu-
als working for contractors in Iraq fought for apartheid in
15
The CACI opinion also concluded that other statements made by the
radio host were protected by the First Amendment because they were not
made with "actual malice," as defined in the New York Times decision,
i.e., those statements had not been made with knowing falsity or reckless
disregard for the truth. See CACI, 536 F.3d at 294-300.
22 SNYDER v. PHELPS
South Africa. See id. at 302. Those statements also could not
reasonably be interpreted as stating actual facts about CACI:
they were properly understood as referring to individual
employees of the contractors, as opposed to the contractors
themselves, and the host had simply used "loose and hyper-
bolic terms" to press her case against the government’s use of
military contractors. Id.

B.

In this proceeding, Snyder was awarded judgment against
the Defendants on three of the tort claims asserted in the
Amended Complaint: intrusion upon seclusion, IIED, and
civil conspiracy. By these claims, Snyder sought damages for
injuries to his state of mind only, and not for pecuniary loss.
Thus, the verdict in favor of Snyder can only be sustained if
it is consistent with the Defendants’ First Amendment guaran-
tees. See Food Lion, 194 F.3d at 522 (foreclosing any attempt
to recover damages under "non-reputational tort claims, with-
out satisfying the stricter (First Amendment) standards of a
defamation claim"). As explained below, the Defendants cor-
rectly contend that the district court erred in permitting the
jury to decide legal issues reserved to the court, and then by
denying the Defendants’ request for judgment as a matter of
law.

1.

Assuming that the district court otherwise applied the
proper legal standards to its analysis of the Defendants’ First
Amendment contentions, it fatally erred by allowing the jury
to decide relevant legal issues. Instruction No. 21, to which
Defendants carefully objected at trial, explained to the jury
that certain speech, including that which is "vulgar, offensive,
and shocking," is not entitled to "absolute constitutional pro-
tection." J.A. 3113. It also explained that the protections
accorded under the First Amendment vary with the "nature
and subject matter of the speech," and the instruction sug-
 SNYDER v. PHELPS 23
gested that, when speech on matters of private concern is
directed at private figures, the First Amendment "must be bal-
anced against" the state’s interest in protecting its citizens. Id.
at 3114.

The district court thus decided that it was for the jury —
not the court — to assess the preliminary issue of the nature
of the speech involved, and to then decide whether such
speech was protected by the Free Speech Clause. Thus, the
jury was erroneously tasked with deciding whether the Defen-
dants’ speech was "directed specifically at the Snyder fam-
ily," and, if so, whether it was so "offensive and shocking as
to not be entitled to First Amendment protection." J.A. 3114;
see also id. ("You must balance the Defendants’ expression of
religious belief with another citizen’s right to privacy and his
or her right to be free from intentional, reckless, or extreme
and outrageous conduct causing him or her severe emotional
distress."). At the least, therefore, the judgment must be
vacated and a new trial awarded, in that Instruction No. 21
authorized the jury to determine a purely legal issue, namely,
the scope of protection afforded to speech under the First
Amendment.16

As previously noted, however, a new trial is unnecessary if
the Defendants can prevail as a matter of law after our inde-
pendent examination of the whole record. See Milkovich, 497
U.S. at 17. We are thus obliged to apply the applicable legal
framework to the Defendants’ various protest signs and writ-
16
The Post-Trial Opinion confirms that the jury assessed legal issues
that were reserved to the court. See Snyder, 533 F. Supp. 2d at 578
("While signs expressing general points of view are afforded First Amend-
ment protection, [certain] additional signs, which could be interpreted as
being directed at the Snyder family, created issues for the finder of fact.").
Thus, the district court permitted the jury to determine the nature of the
speech (i.e., as containing assertions of actual fact specifically directed at
and concerning the Snyders), and indicated that the jury should decide
whether the signs should be afforded First Amendment protection.
24 SNYDER v. PHELPS
ten Epic, and decide if the Defendants are entitled to judg-
ment as a matter of law.

2.

The district court also erred when it utilized an incorrect
legal standard in its Post-Trial Opinion. In assessing the
Defendants’ First Amendment contentions, the court focused
almost exclusively on the Supreme Court’s opinion in Gertz,
which it read to limit the First Amendment’s protections for
"speech directed by private individuals against other private
individuals." Snyder v. Phelps, 533 F. Supp. 2d 567, 577 (D.
Md. 2008). The court therefore assessed whether Snyder was
a "public figure" under Gertz and whether Matthew’s funeral
was a "public event." See id.17

The Supreme Court has created a separate line of First
Amendment precedent that is specifically concerned with the
constitutional protections afforded to certain types of speech,
and that does not depend upon the public or private status of
the speech’s target. See Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 16; Hustler
Magazine, 485 U.S. at 50. Thus, even if the district court (as
opposed to the jury) concluded that Snyder and his son were
not "public figures," such a conclusion alone did not dispose
of the Defendants’ First Amendment contentions. In focusing
solely on the status of the Snyders and the funeral, and not on
the legal issue concerning the nature of the speech at issue,
the court failed to assess whether the pertinent statements
could reasonably be interpreted as asserting "actual facts"
about an individual, or whether they instead merely contained
rhetorical hyperbole. See Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 20; CACI,
536 F.3d at 293. Whether a statement can reasonably be inter-
17
The district court failed to distinguish between Snyder and his
deceased son for purposes of the "public figure" analysis. See Snyder, 533
F. Supp. 2d at 577. Because the speech at issue cannot reasonably be inter-
preted as stating actual facts about any individual, we need not decide
whether the court should have drawn a distinction.
 SNYDER v. PHELPS 25
preted as stating actual facts about an individual is a question
of law for the court, see CACI, 546 F.3d at 293-94, and the
district court failed to consider that issue in its Post-Trial
Opinion. Consequently, we must assess the content of the
Defendants’ protest signs as well as the Epic, and determine
whether such speech is entitled to constitutional protection.

a.

The following signs displayed by the Defendants, which
are similar in both their message and syntax, can readily be
assessed together: "America is Doomed," "God Hates the
USA/Thank God for 9/11," "Pope in Hell," "Fag Troops,"
"Semper Fi Fags," "Thank God for Dead Soldiers," "Don’t
Pray for the USA," "Thank God for IEDs," "Priests Rape
Boys," and "God Hates Fags."18 As a threshold matter, as
utterly distasteful as these signs are, they involve matters of
public concern, including the issue of homosexuals in the mil-
itary, the sex-abuse scandal within the Catholic Church, and
the political and moral conduct of the United States and its
citizens. Such issues are not subjects of "purely private con-
cern," Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at 759, but rather are
issues of social, political, or other interest to the community,
see, e.g., Acanfora v. Bd. of Educ. of Montgomery County,
491 F.2d 498, 500-01 (4th Cir. 1974) (holding that speech
concerning homosexuality was matter of public concern). As
explained in one of the amicus submissions, for example, a
public firestorm erupted in 2001 after two prominent religious
figures, Jerry Falwell and Pat Robertson, alleged that the Sep-
tember 11th terrorist attacks represented God’s punishment
for our country’s attitudes regarding homosexuality and abor-
18
The district court did not specifically discuss four of these signs
("Don’t Pray for the USA," "Thank God for IEDs," "Priests Rape Boys,"
and "God Hates Fags") in its Post-Trial Opinion. It also did not mention
other signs displayed at the funeral — those reading "Maryland Taliban,"
"Fags Doom Nations," and "Not Blessed Just Cursed" — that further sup-
port our conclusion that the signs contained generally directed rhetorical
hyperbole, and not actual, provable facts about Snyder or his son.
26 SNYDER v. PHELPS
tion. See John F. Harris, "God Gave U.S. ‘What We Deserve,’
Falwell Says," Wash. Post, Sept. 14, 2001, at C3.

Additionally, no reasonable reader could interpret any of
these signs as asserting actual and objectively verifiable facts
about Snyder or his son. The signs reading "God Hates the
USA/Thank God for 9/11" and "Don’t Pray for the USA," for
example, are not concerned with any individual, but rather
with the nation as a whole. Other signs (those referring to
"fags," "troops," and "dead soldiers") use the plural form,
which would lead a reasonable reader to conclude that the
speaker is referring to a group rather than an individual. Addi-
tional signs are concerned with individuals, such as the Pope,
who are entirely distinct from Snyder and his son, or with
groups, such as priests, to which neither Snyder nor his son
belong. Finally, those signs stating "Thank God for Dead Sol-
diers" and "Thank God for IEDs" only constitute a reference
to Snyder’s son if the reader makes the assumption that their
only object is Matthew Snyder and not the thousands of other
soldiers who have died in Iraq and Afghanistan, often as a
result of IEDs.

Even if the language of these signs could reasonably be
read to imply an assertion about Snyder or his son, the state-
ments are protected by the Constitution for two additional rea-
sons: they do not assert provable facts about an individual,
and they clearly contain imaginative and hyperbolic rhetoric
intended to spark debate about issues with which the Defen-
dants are concerned. See CACI, 536 F.3d at 301. Whether
"God hates" the United States or a particular group, or
whether America is "doomed," are matters of purely subjec-
tive opinion that cannot be put to objective verification. The
statement "Thank God," whether taken as an imperative
phrase or an exclamatory expression, is similarly incapable of
objective verification. And, as heretofore explained, a reason-
able reader would not interpret the signs that could be per-
ceived as including verifiable facts, such as "Fag Troops" and
"Priests Rape Boys," as asserting actual facts about Snyder or
 SNYDER v. PHELPS 27
his son. To the contrary, these latter statements, as well as
others in this category, consist of offensive and hyperbolic
rhetoric designed to spark controversy and debate. By
employing God, the strong verb "hate," and graphic refer-
ences to terrorist attacks, the Defendants used the sort of
"loose, figurative, or hyperbolic language" that seriously
negates any impression that the speaker is asserting actual
facts about an individual. Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 21. Accord-
ingly, we are constrained to agree that these signs — "Amer-
ica is Doomed," "God Hates the USA/Thank God for 9/11,"
"Pope in Hell," "Fag Troops," "Semper Fi Fags," "Thank God
for Dead Soldiers," "Don’t Pray for the USA," "Thank God
for IEDs," "Priests Rape Boys," and "God Hates Fags" — are
entitled to First Amendment protection.

b.

The reasonable reader’s reaction to two other signs —
"You’re Going to Hell" and "God Hates You" — also must
be specifically addressed, as these two signs present a closer
question. We must conclude, however, that these two signs
cannot reasonably be interpreted as stating actual facts about
any individual. The meaning of these signs is ambiguous
because the pronoun "you" can be used to indicate either the
second person singular or plural form.19 A reasonable reader
could interpret these signs, therefore, as referring to Snyder or
his son only, or, on the other hand, to a collective audience
(or even the nation as a whole).

We need not resolve this question of usage, however,
because a reasonable reader would not interpret the statements
on these two signs as asserting actual and provable facts.
Whether an individual is "Going to Hell" or whether God
approves of someone’s character could not possibly be subject
19
Historically, the pronoun "you" was used only in the plural form; the
word "thou" was used to refer to a single person. See Webster’s Third New
International Dictionary 2380-81 (1976).
28 SNYDER v. PHELPS
to objective verification. Thus, even if the reasonable reader
understood the "you" in these signs to refer to Snyder or his
son, no such reader would understand those statements
("You’re Going to Hell" and "God Hates You") to assert
provable facts about either of them.

Additionally, as with the other signs, both of these signs
contain strong elements of rhetorical hyperbole and figurative
expression. As we have recognized, the "context and tenor" of
the speech at issue, as well as the speaker’s use of "irreverent
and indefinite language," can serve to negate any impression
that he is asserting actual facts about an individual.
Biospherics, 151 F.3d at 184-85. The general context of the
speech in this proceeding is one of impassioned (and highly
offensive) protest, with the speech at issue conveyed on hand-
held placards. A distasteful protest sign regarding hotly
debated matters of public concern, such as homosexuality or
religion, is not the medium through which a reasonable reader
would expect a speaker to communicate objectively verifiable
facts. In addition, the words on these signs were rude, figura-
tive, and incapable of being objectively proven or disproven.
Given the context and tenor of these two signs, a reasonable
reader would not interpret them as asserting actual facts about
either Snyder or his son.

c.

Finally, the written Epic published on the website of the
Church is also protected by the First Amendment, in that a
reasonable reader would understand it to contain rhetorical
hyperbole, and not actual, provable facts about Snyder and his
son. The First Amendment issue concerning the Epic presents
a somewhat more difficult question, however, because it is
entitled "The Burden of Marine Lance Cpl. Matthew A. Sny-
der." J.A. 3788. Such a title could lead a reasonable reader to
initially conclude that the Epic asserts facts about this particu-
lar soldier. The Epic’s subtitle, however, immediately con-
nects its contents to the Defendants’ protest and the various
 SNYDER v. PHELPS 29
signs displayed there: "The Visit of Westboro Baptist Church
to Help the Inhabitants of Maryland Connect the Dots! This
Epic Adventure Took Place on Friday, March 10, 2006." Id.
The Epic has a photograph of the funeral protest immediately
below its title, followed by nearly two pages of verbatim
Bible verses. Id. at 3788-89.

The Epic then discusses Matthew’s life: "Twenty years ago,
little Matthew Snyder came into the world. . . . God created
him and loaned/entrusted him to Albert and Julie Snyder."
J.A. 3790. The Epic states that the Snyders "had a DUTY to
prepare that child to serve the LORD his GOD — PERIOD!
You did JUST THE OPPOSITE — you raised him for the
devil. You taught him that God was a liar." Id. at 3791. The
Epic also focuses on Matthew’s upbringing, asserting that
"Albert and Julie . . . taught Matthew to defy his Creator, to
divorce, and to commit adultery. They taught him how to sup-
port the largest pedophile machine in the history of the entire
world, the Roman Catholic monstrosity. . . . They also, in sup-
porting satanic Catholicism, taught Matthew to be an idola-
ter." Id. After interspersing additional excerpts from the Bible,
the Epic refers to Matthew’s service in the military, noting
that he fought for

the United States of Sodom, a filthy country that is
in lock step with his evil, wicked[,] and sinful man-
ner of life, putting him in the cross hairs of a God
that is so mad He has smoke coming from his nos-
trils and fire from his mouth! How dumb was that?

Id. The Epic then links Matthew’s death to the Defendants’
protest activities, stating:

God rose up Matthew for the very purpose of strik-
ing him down, so that God’s name might be declared
throughout all the earth. He killed Matthew so that
His servants would have an opportunity to preach
His words to the U.S. Naval Academy at Annapolis,
30 SNYDER v. PHELPS
the Maryland Legislature, and the whorehouse called
St. John Catholic Church at Westminster where Mat-
thew Snyder fulfilled his calling.

Id. at 3973.

Notwithstanding the foregoing, the Epic cannot be divorced
from the general context of the funeral protest. Indeed, it is
patterned after the hyperbolic and figurative language used on
the various signs. Again, in assessing the First Amendment
issue, we must evaluate a reasonable reader’s reaction to the
Epic, in light of its context and general tenor. See Biospherics,
151 F.3d at 184-85. In context, the Epic is a recap of the pro-
test and was distributed through the Church website, which
would not lead the reasonable reader to expect actual facts
about Snyder or his son to be asserted therein.

The general tenor of the Epic also serves to negate any
impression that it was the source of any actual facts. In pre-
paring it, the Defendants interspersed strong, figurative lan-
guage with verses from the Bible. They utilized distasteful
and offensive words, atypical capitalization, and exaggerated
punctuation, all of which suggest the work of a hysterical
protestor rather than an objective reporter of facts. Despite
referring to the Snyder family by name, the Epic is primarily
concerned with the Defendants’ strongly held views on mat-
ters of public concern. Indeed, the Epic explains that Mat-
thew’s death in Iraq gave the Defendants the "opportunity to
preach [God’s] words to the U.S. Naval Academy at Annapo-
lis [and] the Maryland Legislature," J.A. 3973, where they
protested on the very day of Matthew’s funeral. Finally, the
Defendants’ extensive funeral picketing activities predated
Matthew’s funeral and continue to this day throughout the
country, with many of the signs displayed at Matthew’s
funeral also being displayed in other protests.

Thus, even when the Snyders are mentioned in the Epic, a
reasonable reader would understand its contents to be primar-
 SNYDER v. PHELPS 31
ily focused on the more general message to which their pro-
tests are directed. The Defendants assert in the Epic, for
example, that the Snyders had incurred God’s wrath by rais-
ing Matthew as a Catholic and allowing him to serve in the
military — assertions a reasonable reader would take as
focused on the Defendants’ concerns with the policies and
activities of the Roman Catholic Church and the military. Fur-
thermore, a reasonable reader would take as rhetorically
hyperbolic a text describing the "United States of Sodom" as
a "filthy" country, labelling the Catholic Church as a "pe-
dophile machine," and equating the Maryland Legislature
with the Taliban. In that context, the reasonable reader would
understand the other assertions of the Epic — that the Snyders
raised their son "for the devil," and taught him to "defy his
Creator, to divorce, and to commit adultery" — as simply
"loose, figurative, or hyperbolic language" not connoting
actual facts about Matthew or his parents. Milkovich, 497 U.S.
at 21. Thus, a reasonable reader would not understand the
Epic to assert actual facts about either Snyder or his son.20

C.

Notwithstanding the distasteful and repugnant nature of the
words being challenged in these proceedings, we are con-
strained to conclude that the Defendants’ signs and Epic are
constitutionally protected. To paraphrase our distinguished
colleague Judge Hall, judges defending the Constitution
"must sometimes share [their] foxhole with scoundrels of
every sort, but to abandon the post because of the poor com-
pany is to sell freedom cheaply. It is a fair summary of history
to say that the safeguards of liberty have often been forged in
controversies involving not very nice people." Kopf v. Skyrm,
20
The district court recognized the nonfactual basis of the Epic when it
dismissed Snyder’s defamation claim. In so ruling, the court observed that
the statements found therein were "essentially [the Defendants’] religious
opinion and would not realistically tend to expose Snyder to public hatred
or scorn." Snyder, 533 F. Supp. 2d at 572-73.
32 SNYDER v. PHELPS
993 F.2d 374, 380 (4th Cir. 1993) (internal quotation marks
omitted).

Nonetheless, the various states and localities, as well as
grieving families, may yet protect the sanctity of solemn occa-
sions such as funerals and memorials. Indeed, governmental
bodies are entitled to place reasonable and content-neutral
time, place, and manner restrictions on activities that are oth-
erwise constitutionally protected. Some "breathing space" for
contentious speech is essential, however, under the Free
Speech Clause. See New York Times, 376 U.S. at 272. As the
Court long ago emphasized:

To persuade others to his own point of view, the
pleader, as we know, at times, resorts to exaggera-
tion, to vilification of men who have been, or are,
prominent in church or state, and even to false state-
ment. But the people of this nation have ordained in
the light of history, that, in spite of the probability of
excesses and abuses, these liberties are, in the long
view, essential to enlightened opinion and right con-
duct on the part of citizens of a democracy.

Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 310 (1940). Because
the judgment attaches tort liability to constitutionally pro-
tected speech, the district court erred in declining to award
judgment as a matter of law.

IV.

Pursuant to the foregoing, the judgment of the district court
is reversed and the various appeal bonds are hereby dis-
charged.

JUDGMENT REVERSED
AND BONDS DISCHARGED
 SNYDER v. PHELPS 33
SHEDD, Circuit Judge, concurring in the judgment:

Although I agree with the majority that the judgment below
must be reversed, I would do so on different grounds. As I
explain below, I would hold that Snyder failed to prove at trial
sufficient evidence to support the jury verdict on any of his
tort claims. Because the appeal can be decided on this non-
constitutional basis, I would not reach the First Amendment
issue addressed by the majority.

I.

A.

Under the doctrine of constitutional avoidance, we are to
avoid constitutional determinations when other grounds exist
for the disposition of the case. See Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley
Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring) ("It
is not the habit of the court to decide questions of a constitu-
tional nature unless absolutely necessary to a decision of the
case.") (internal citation and quotations marks omitted); see
also Bell Atl. Md., Inc. v. Prince George’s County, 212 F.3d
863, 866 (4th Cir. 2000) (holding that "by deciding the consti-
tutional question of preemption in advance of considering the
state law questions upon which the case might have been dis-
posed of, the district court committed reversible error").
Because the viability vel non of the state torts is dispositive
as a nonconstitutional ground on which to decide this case, I
would proceed to consider that issue in the first instance. To
do otherwise would turn the principle of constitutional avoid-
ance on its head; rather than avoiding unnecessary constitu-
tional issues, we allow the parties to structure the case in
order to force us to reach constitutional issues.

Neither the Phelps nor Snyder argue on appeal that the torts
are deficient as a matter of law. Ordinarily, where a party fails
to raise an issue in its opening brief, we deem the issue to be
waived. See Cavallo v. Star Enterprise, 100 F.3d 1150, 1152
34 SNYDER v. PHELPS
n.2 (4th Cir. 1996). Moreover, where an issue is raised only
in an amicus brief, we generally decline to consider it. See
United States v. Buculei, 262 F.3d 322, 333 n.11 (4th Cir.
2001). However, that rule is not absolute, and I believe it is
within our authority to consider an issue not raised by the par-
ties.

Our judicial power to decide a case is not limited by the
arguments and actions of the parties. Moreover, while we
"normally" decline to decide an issue not raised by the parties,
"normally" necessarily implies that we are not precluded from
doing so under certain circumstances. See Carter v. Lee, 283
F.3d 240, 252 (4th Cir. 2002) (noting that "this Court nor-
mally views contentions not raised in an opening brief to be
waived") (emphasis added); see also Cousin v. Trans Union
Corp., 246 F.3d 359, 373 n. 22 (5th Cir. 2001) (noting that
although issues not raised in initial brief are normally waived,
the court has discretion to decide the issue); Bridges v. City
of Bossier, 92 F.3d 329, 335 n. 8 (5th Cir. 1996) (electing to
examine purely legal issue not raised by party in opening
brief, but raised by amicus curiae in its initial brief); Estate of
Lisle v. C.I.R., 341 F.3d 364, 384 (5th Cir. 2003) (holding that
"[w]hile we may in our discretion decline to consider issues
not raised in an initial brief, we choose to address the issue
here"). Indeed, the Supreme Court has approved this practice.
See Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 300 (1989) (plurality opin-
ion); see also Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 457 n.1
(1994).

A case from the United States Court of Appeals for the Dis-
trict of Columbia Circuit is instructive on this point. See Inde-
pendent Ins. Agents of America, Inc. v. Clarke, 955 F.2d 731
(D.C. Cir. 1992) (disposing of a case on a basis not advanced
by the parties), rev’d on other grounds sub nom. U.S. Nat.
Bank of Oregon v. Independent Ins. Agents of America, Inc.,
508 U.S. 439, 445-47 (1993). In denying rehearing en banc,
a judge of that court noted
 SNYDER v. PHELPS 35
Our colleagues question the "judicial power" of a
federal court to decide an issue of law concededly
dispositive of the case where parties have not raised
the issue. I think it most apparent that federal courts
do possess this power. The alternative is that the
parties could force a federal court to render an advi-
sory opinion. What the dissenters in effect argue is
that the parties can stipulate to the state of underly-
ing law; frame a law suit, assuming that stipulation;
and obtain from the court a ruling as to what the oth-
erwise dispositive law would be if the stipulated case
were in fact the law. Indeed, that is precisely what
would have occurred in this case had the panel not,
sua sponte, raised the question . . . .

Independent Ins. Agents of America, Inc. v. Clarke, 965 F.2d
1077, 1078 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (Sentelle, J., concur-
ring)(emphasis added). Following the denial of rehearing en
banc, the Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari and spe-
cifically noted that the circuit court did have the authority to
raise and decide an issue not raised by the parties. See Inde-
pendent Ins. Agents of America, 508 U.S. at 447 (noting that
"[t]he contrary conclusion would permit litigants, by agreeing
on the legal issue presented, to extract the opinion of a court
on hypothetical Acts of Congress or dubious constitutional
principles, an opinion that would be difficult to characterize
as anything but advisory"). Thus, I believe we have the power
to decide issues not raised by the parties and should exercise
that power under certain circumstances.

Here, moreover, the dispositive nonconstitutional ground is
already before us as the Thomas Jefferson Center for the Pro-
tection for Free Expression ("the Center"), which we permit-
ted to file an amicus curiae brief, argues that the underlying
state law torts are legally deficient. See Brief of the Thomas
Jefferson Center for the Protection of Free Expression, at 15-
30. Specifically, the Center contends that Snyder failed to
36 SNYDER v. PHELPS
establish that the Phelps intruded upon his seclusion or that
the Phelps’ activities are outrageous under Maryland law.

Thus, I am persuaded that we should consider the issues
raised by the Center for several reasons. First, the Phelps
clearly challenged the legal sufficiency of the state law torts
in the district court by way of a motion for summary judg-
ment and later in their post-trial motions. Second, Snyder has
directly responded in this appeal to the issues that the Center
raises. Third, and most importantly, the principle of constitu-
tional avoidance requires us to avoid constitutional determina-
tions when other grounds exist for the disposition of the case.
Here, because the state law torts are not supported by the evi-
dence presented at trial, I would reverse under state law and
not under the First Amendment.

B.

Under Count One, the jury found the Phelps liable for the
state law tort of "invasion of privacy by intrusion upon seclu-
sion" because the Phelps invaded Albert Snyder’s privacy
during his time of bereavement. The jury was instructed that
the elements of this claim are: "(1) An intentional (2) intru-
sion or prying upon (3) something which is and is entitled to
be private (4) in a manner which is highly offensive to a rea-
sonable person." J.A. 3110. Snyder apparently claims an
intrusion upon seclusion occurred because of the Phelps’
funeral protest and the television coverage thereof, and
because of the "epic" which he found on the Internet several
weeks after the funeral.

Under Maryland law, an "intrusion" occurs when there has
been some act that interferes "into a private place or the inva-
sion of a private seclusion that the plaintiff has thrown about
his person or affairs." Furman v. Sheppard, 744 A.2d 583,
586 (Md. Spec. App. 2000) (internal citation and quotation
marks omitted). Expounding on the types of "intrusion"
 SNYDER v. PHELPS 37
Maryland law recognizes, the Maryland Court of Appeals has
stated:

[this tort] consists of intrusion upon the plaintiff’s
physical solitude or seclusion, as by invading his
home or other quarters, or an illegal search of his
shopping bag in a store. The principle has, however,
been carried beyond such physical intrusion, and
extended to eavesdropping upon private conversa-
tions by means of wire tapping and microphones;
and there are decisions indicating that it is to be
applied to peering into the windows of a home, as
well as persistent and unwanted telephone calls. The
tort has been found in the case of unauthorized pry-
ing into the plaintiff’s bank account, and the same
principle has been used to invalidate a blanket sub-
poena duces tecum requiring the production of all his
books and documents, and an illegal compulsory
blood test.

It is clear, however, that there must be something in
the nature of prying or intrusion . . . .

Hollander v. Lubow, 351 A.2d 421, 425-26 (Md. 1976) (inter-
nal citations and quotation marks omitted). Several cases
illustrate the type of conduct which constitutes an "intrusion
upon seclusion" under Maryland law.

In Furman, a private club member who had been a plaintiff
in an earlier lawsuit in which he claimed to be injured,
brought suit against a private investigator who worked for the
defense counsel in that lawsuit and who trespassed into a pri-
vate club to videotape the plaintiff sailing on his yacht. Fur-
man, 744 A.2d at 585. The club was surrounded by a security
fence with conspicuously posted "Trespassers will be Prose-
cuted" signs. Id. The Maryland Court of Special Appeals held
that "[t]here is no liability for observing [the plaintiff] in pub-
lic places since he is not then in seclusion." Id. at 586. Even
38 SNYDER v. PHELPS
though he was in a private club, the court concluded that the
plaintiff was in public because he was exposed to "public
view by his neighbors and passers by." Id. at 587. Accord-
ingly, the court ruled that there was no intrusion into his
seclusion. Id.

In Hollander, the plaintiff sued several individuals and a
bank for their revealing the fact that the plaintiff was a partner
in a mortgage firm. Hollander, 351 A.2d at 422. For this, the
plaintiff brought a claim for invasion of privacy by intrusion
upon seclusion, among other claims. Id. The Maryland Court
of Appeals held that there were no private facts revealed and,
therefore, there was no intrusion upon seclusion. Id. at 426.
The court elaborated:

[t]he plaintiff cannot complain when an occupation
in which he publicly engages is called to public
attention, or when publicity is given to matters such
as the date of his birth or marriage, or his military
service record, which are a matter of public record,
and open to public inspection. It seems to be gener-
ally agreed that anything visible in a public place can
be recorded and given circulation by means of a pho-
tograph, to the same extent as by a written descrip-
tion, since this amounts to nothing more than giving
publicity to what is already public and what anyone
present would be free to see. The contention that
when an individual is thus singled out from the pub-
lic scene and undue attention is focused upon him,
there is an invasion of his private rights, has not
been borne out by the decisions. On the other hand,
it is clear that when a picture is taken without the
plaintiff’s consent in a private place, or one already
made is stolen, or obtained by bribery or other
inducement of breach of trust, the plaintiff’s appear-
ance which is thus made public is still a private
thing, and there is an invasion of a private right, for
which an action will lie.
 SNYDER v. PHELPS 39
Id. (internal citation and quotation marks omitted) (emphasis
added).

Additionally, where Maryland courts have recognized this
cause of action, I find nothing analogous to Snyder’s claim.
For example, in Mitchell v. Baltimore Sun Co., 883 A.2d 1008
(Md. Spec. App. 2005), a former congressman brought a
cause of action for invasion of privacy by intrusion upon
seclusion. His claim was based on two newspaper reporters
who came to his nursing home room uninvited to purportedly
investigate some of his unpaid bills. Id. at 1012. The reporters
were aware that Mitchell was elderly and in failing health,
and the nursing home had a sign that stated "NO TRESPASS-
ING NO SOLICITING." Id. The reporters asked him a series
of questions, and when he asked them repeatedly to leave,
they refused. Id. at 1012. Finally, the congressman asserted
"that one of the reporters looked through some files that he
had in a filing cabinet, box, or on a desk near his bed." Id.
1012-13. In deciding to reverse summary judgment, the court
held that these actions could constitute an intrusion upon
seclusion under Maryland law. Id. at 1023-24.

In Pemberton v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 502 A.2d 1101
(Md. Spec. App. 1986), a local union president filed suit for
intrusion upon seclusion based upon various types of surveil-
lance the defendants conducted on him. The Maryland Court
of Special Appeals held that placing a surveillance micro-
phone on a hotel door in order to hear private conversations
inside a hotel room may be actionable as an intrusion upon
seclusion. However, the court further stated that other surveil-
lance, such as watching the plaintiff’s home from the street is
not actionable as an intrusion upon seclusion because "there
is no liability for observing [a person] in public places, since
he is not then in seclusion." Id. at 1116-17 (internal quotation
marks omitted).

In light of these cases, it is clear that there was no type of
"intrusion" under any of the bases that Snyder asserts. First,
40 SNYDER v. PHELPS
as to the funeral protest itself, the Phelps did not "intrude" or
"pry" upon any private seclusion. The Phelps never intruded
upon a private place because their protest occurred at all times
in a public place that was designated by the police and located
approximately 1,000 feet from the funeral. Further, the Phelps
never confronted Snyder, and Snyder admits he could not see
the protest. Finally, there was no intrusion because the evi-
dence is undisputed that the church service was never dis-
rupted. The Phelps never entered the church, and they stopped
protesting when the church service began. In sum, I would
hold the funeral protest did not intrude upon Snyder’s seclusion.1

Likewise, I would hold that the Phelps’ posting of the
"epic" on their church Internet website is not, as a matter of
law, an intrusion upon Albert Snyder’s seclusion under Mary-
land law. In posting the "epic," the Phelps did not do anything
to direct it to Snyder’s attention, such as email or transmit it
to him. Cf. Hollander, 351 A.2d at 426 (noting that repeated
phone calls may give rise to an intrusion upon seclusion
claim). Instead, Snyder learned of the "epic" during an Inter-
net search, and upon finding it he chose to read it. By doing
so, any interference with Snyder’s purported interest in seclu-
sion was caused by Snyder himself rather than the Phelps.

In short, I conclude that the verdict on Count One cannot
stand. The evidence is insufficient under Maryland law for the
jury to have found that the Phelps committed any act that
intruded upon Snyder’s right to seclusion.
1
To the extent Snyder’s claim is based on his viewing the Phelps’ pro-
test on television, I would find that television coverage of a public protest
that occurred in a public area is not an "intrusion." Cf. Hollander, 351
A.2d at 426 (noting that "[i]t seems to be generally agreed that anything
visible in a public place can be recorded and given circulation by means
of a photograph, to the same extent as by a written description, since this
amounts to nothing more than giving publicity to what is already public
and what anyone present would be free to see").
 SNYDER v. PHELPS 41
C.

Under Count Two, the Phelps were held liable for inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress. As charged to the jury,
the elements for this tort are: (1) the Phelps’ conduct was
intentional or reckless; (2) the conduct was extreme and out-
rageous; (3) the conduct caused emotional distress to Snyder;
and (4) the emotional distress was severe. J.A. 3111.

Under Maryland law, the second element requires conduct
"so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of
decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolera-
ble in a civilized community." Pemberton, 502 A.2d at 1115
(internal citation and quotation marks omitted). The Maryland
Court of Special Appeals has held that "[t]he tort of inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress is rarely viable, and is
to be used sparingly and only for opprobrious behavior that
includes truly outrageous conduct." Bagwell v. Peninsula
Regional Medical Center, 665 A.2d 297, 319 (Md. Spec. App.
1995) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).2 A
review of Maryland cases illustrates the exacting burden of
this element.

In Figueiredo-Torres v. Nickel, 584 A.2d 69 (Md. 1991),
the Maryland Court of Appeals upheld a claim for intentional
infliction of emotional distress by a plaintiff whose psycholo-
gist had sexual relations with the plaintiff’s wife. The court
concluded that there was evidence of extreme and outrageous
conduct "where a psychologist who is retained to improve a
marital relationship implements a course of extreme conduct
which is injurious to the patient and designed to facilitate a
romantic, sexual relationship between the therapist and the
patient’s spouse." Id. at 75.
2
A 1997 case of the Maryland Court of Special Appeals noted that the
tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress had been upheld on only
three occasions since Maryland began recognizing the tort in 1977. See
Penhollow v. Cecil County, 695 A.2d 1268, 1285 (Md. Spec. App. 1997).
42 SNYDER v. PHELPS
In B.N. v. K.K., 538 A.2d 1175, 1177 (Md. 1988), the
Maryland Court of Appeals upheld a claim for intentional
infliction of emotional distress where the defendant failed to
disclose to the plaintiff that he had a sexually transmitted dis-
ease prior to having sexual relations with her. The plaintiff
thereafter contracted this disease. Id. The court noted that the
element of extreme and outrageous conduct was supported
because of the risks and side effects of the disease the plaintiff
contracted from the defendant. Id. at 1180.

In a final case where the Maryland Court of Appeals has
upheld a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress,
the plaintiff had suffered physical and emotional trauma from
being assaulted at work. See Young v. Hartford Accident &
Indem. Co., 492 A.2d 1270, 1271 (Md. 1985). After making
disability payments, the defendant refused to pay certain doc-
tor’s bills and insisted the plaintiff undergo another psycho-
logical evaluation despite a doctor’s warning of her fragile
condition. Id. The court held that "[i]f [the plaintiff] proves
that the sole purpose of [the psychologist’s] examination was
to harass the Plaintiff into abandoning her claim, or into com-
mitting suicide," the behavior would be extreme and outra-
geous. Id. at 1278 (internal quotation marks omitted).

On the other hand, Maryland has refused to uphold the tort
in the context of other types of egregious conduct. In Mitchell,
the two reporters entered a former congressman’s nursing
home room uninvited, and looked through his files without
permission. See 883 A.2d at 1012-13. Even though the con-
gressman was in failing health and the reporters had been
asked to leave, the court held that these facts did not show
extreme and outrageous conduct and stated that "[w]e are not
persuaded that the reporters’ questioning of Mitchell, even if
conducted while trespassing, exceeded all possible bounds of
decency, as to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable
in a civilized society." Id. at 1025 (internal citation and quota-
tion marks omitted).
 SNYDER v. PHELPS 43
In Batson v. Shiflett, 602 A.2d 1191 (Md. 1992), the presi-
dent of a local union was continually harassed by the defen-
dants in an attempt to remove him from local office and to
undermine his position. The plaintiff alleged that the defen-
dants defamed him and committed the tort of intentional
infliction of emotional distress. Id. at 1195. The court upheld
the defamation claim but held that even though the defen-
dant’s conduct was defamatory, it "in no way satisfies our
exacting standard for ‘extreme and outrageous conduct.’" Id.
at 1217.

In this case, Snyder asserts that the protest was extreme and
outrageous because the funeral was disrupted by having the
procession re-routed; his grieving process was disrupted by
his having to worry about his daughters observing the Phelps’
protest; and the Phelps’ messages on their protest signs were
focused on his family. As earlier noted, the protest was con-
fined to a public area under supervision and regulation of
local law enforcement and did not disrupt the church service.
Although reasonable people may disagree about the appropri-
ateness of the Phelps’ protest, this conduct simply does not
satisfy the heavy burden required for the tort of intentional
infliction of emotional distress under Maryland law. Further,
to the extent Snyder asserts the "epic" as a basis for this tort,
I would find the "epic," which the district court found to be
non-defamatory as a matter of law, is not sufficient to support
a finding of extreme and outrageous conduct. Therefore, I
believe the verdict on Count Two must be reversed.3
3
The Phelps were also held liable for civil conspiracy under Count
Three. Because the unlawful activity required for this count was the sub-
stantive offense of Count 1 or Count 2, this count must also be reversed.
See Green v. Washington Suburban Sanitary Commission, 269 A.2d 815,
824 (Md. 1970) (noting that "[a] civil conspiracy is a combination of two
or more persons by an agreement or understanding to accomplish an
unlawful act").
44 SNYDER v. PHELPS
II.

In sum, I find the evidence cannot support the state torts at
issue in this appeal and, therefore, I would not reach the First
Amendment analysis the majority implores. Accordingly, I
concur only in the result the majority reaches — the reversal
of the judgment below.