UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 08-5058
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
GEORGE WAYNE REID,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Newport News. Henry Coke Morgan, Jr.,
Senior District Judge. (4:08-cr-00014-HCM-FBS-1)
Submitted: September 29, 2009 Decided: October 9, 2009
Before WILKINSON and KING, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Stephen J. Weisbrod, WEISBROD & PHILLIPS, P.C., Hampton,
Virginia, for Appellant. Dana J. Boente, United States
Attorney, Jessica M. Norris, Special Assistant United States
Attorney, Scott Upright, Third Year Law Student, Newport News,
Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
A jury convicted George Wayne Reid of possession of a
firearm after having previously been convicted of a crime
punishable by more than one year, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(g)(1) (2006), and possession of marijuana, in violation of
21 U.S.C. § 844 (2006). The district court sentenced Reid to a
total of forty-five months of imprisonment and he now appeals.
Finding no error, we affirm.
Reid first challenges the district court’s exclusion
of evidence of a witness’ prior convictions. We review a
district court’s determination of the admissibility of evidence
for abuse of discretion. United States v. Hedgepeth, 418 F.3d
411, 418-19 (4th Cir. 2005). “An abuse of discretion occurs
only when a trial court has acted ‘arbitrarily’ or
‘irrationally’ in admitting evidence, when a court has failed to
consider ‘judicially recognized factors constraining its
exercise’ of discretion, or when it has relied on ‘erroneous
factual or legal premises.’” Id. at 419 (quoting United
States v. Simpson, 910 F.2d 154, 157 (4th Cir. 1990); James v.
Jacobson, 6 F.3d 233, 239 (4th Cir. 1993)). In addition,
“‘[a]ny error in [the] admission or exclusion [of evidence] is
subject to the harmless error test.’” United States v. Loayza,
107 F.3d 257, 263 (4th Cir. 1997) (quoting United States v.
Francisco, 35 F.3d 116, 118 (4th Cir. 1994)).
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Reid argues that the district court erred in granting
the Government’s motion to exclude evidence of a witness’
misdemeanor convictions that occurred more than ten years prior
to trial. Reid also argues that the court erred in ruling that
Reid could not question the witness about her prior statements
regarding her prior convictions. We have thoroughly reviewed
the record and conclude that the district court did not abuse
its discretion in excluding this evidence. Even assuming error,
however, we would conclude without difficulty that the error was
harmless.
Reid next challenges the sufficiency of the evidence.
We review a district court’s decision to deny a Fed. R. Crim. P.
29 motion for a judgment of acquittal de novo. United States v.
Smith, 451 F.3d 209, 216-17 (4th Cir. 2006). A defendant
challenging the sufficiency of the evidence faces a heavy
burden. United States v. Beidler, 110 F.3d 1064, 1067 (4th Cir.
1997). The verdict of a jury must be sustained “if, viewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, the
verdict is supported by ‘substantial evidence.’” Smith, 451
F.3d at 216 (citations omitted). Substantial evidence is
“evidence that a reasonable finder of fact could accept as
adequate and sufficient to support a conclusion of a defendant’s
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. (internal quotation marks
and citation omitted). Furthermore, “[t]he jury, not the
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reviewing court, weighs the credibility of the evidence and
resolves any conflicts in the evidence presented.” Beidler, 110
F.3d at 1067 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
“Reversal for insufficient evidence is reserved for the rare
case where the prosecution’s failure is clear.” Id. (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted).
Reid argues that there was insufficient evidence to
demonstrate that he possessed the firearm. Reid also argues
that the district court erred in denying his Rule 29 motion by
weighing the credibility of the witnesses. We have thoroughly
reviewed the record and conclude that there is substantial
evidence to support the jury’s verdict. Moreover, the district
court did not improperly weigh the credibility of the witnesses,
but rather correctly stated that credibility determinations are
left to the jury. See Beidler, 110 F.3d at 1067.
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district
court. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before the court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED
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