UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 08-5234
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
LUIS GONZALEZ,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Greenbelt. Deborah K. Chasanow, District Judge.
(8:07-cr-00326-DKC-1)
Submitted: October 15, 2009 Decided: October 19, 2009
Before SHEDD, DUNCAN, and AGEE, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Elita C. Amato, LAW OFFICE OF ELITA C. AMATO, Arlington,
Virginia, for Appellant. Rod J. Rosenstein, United States
Attorney, Peter M. Nothstein, Assistant United States Attorney,
Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Luis Gonzalez pled guilty to knowingly possessing a
short-barreled shotgun, in violation of 26 U.S.C. §§ 5841,
5861(d), 5871 (2006) (Count One), and knowingly distributing 5
grams or more of cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C.
§ 841(a)(1) (2006) (Count Three). The district court sentenced
Gonzalez to 120 months’ imprisonment on Count One and 126
months’ imprisonment on Count Three, to run concurrently. On
appeal, Gonzalez challenges the Government’s exercise of
discretion in failing to move for an additional one level
reduction of his offense level pursuant to U.S. Sentencing
Guidelines Manual § 3E1.1(b), and claims his sentence was
procedurally unreasonable.
The discretion for making the § 3E1.1 motion was with
the Government in this case, pursuant to the terms of the plea
agreement, and the decision whether or not to award an
acceptance of responsibility adjustment is committed to the
sentencing court’s broad discretion. See USSG § 3E1.1, cmt.
n.5. Here, where Gonzalez wrote letters informing prison
inmates about the identity of an informant, we find no error in
the district court’s conclusion that such action constitutes
obstruction of justice such that the Government did not breach
the plea agreement in refusing to move for a USSG § 3E1.1
reduction.
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This court reviews a sentence imposed by a district
court under a deferential abuse of discretion standard,
reviewing both the procedural and substantive reasonableness of
the sentence. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, ___, 128 S.
Ct. 586, 597 (2007); United States v. Evans, 526 F.3d 155, 161
(4th Cir. 2008). On appeal, a sentence within the properly
calculated guideline range is considered to be presumptively
reasonable. United States v. Allen, 491 F.3d 178, 193 (4th Cir.
2007).
Our review of the record reveals that the district
court made an individualized assessment based on the facts
presented during sentence and stated in open court its reasons
supporting its chosen sentence. See United States v. Carter,
564 F.3d 325, 328 (4th Cir. 2009). Specifically, the district
court discussed the nature and circumstances of the offense,
Gonzalez’ characteristics, intelligence, close ties to his
family, and desire to do good works in his community, and stated
that it was imposing a sentence it felt was necessary to
sufficiently punish Gonzalez for his criminal conduct, to
address the danger Gonzalez posed to the community, to address
his prior recidivism, and stated that the sentence would provide
Gonzalez with an opportunity to reflect on his crimes, would
protect the public, and would help him become a productive
member of the community upon his release. The district court
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properly considered the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006) factors, and
we find no procedural sentencing infirmity nor any no abuse of
discretion.
Accordingly, we affirm Gonzalez’ conviction and
sentence. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before the court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED
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