UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 09-1826
MARGARETTE BUTLER, a/k/a Margarette Lafond, a/k/a
Margarette Pierre, a/k/a Margarette Pierre Butler, a/k/a
Margarette Lafond Pierre,
Petitioner,
v.
ERIC H. HOLDER, JR., Attorney General,
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration
Appeals.
Submitted: October 7, 2009 Decided: November 6, 2009
Before GREGORY and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Petition denied by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Margarette Butler, Petitioner Pro Se. Carol Federighi, Senior
Litigation Counsel, Andrew B. Insenga, Office of Immigration
Litigation, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington,
D.C., for Respondent.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Margarette Butler, a native and citizen of Haiti,
petitions for review of an order of the Board of Immigration
Appeals (“Board”) dismissing her appeal from the immigration
judge’s order denying her applications for asylum, withholding
of removal and withholding under the Convention Against Torture
(“CAT”). We deny the petition for review.
The INA authorizes the Attorney General to confer
asylum on any refugee. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a), (b) (2006). It
defines a refugee as a person unwilling or unable to return to
her native country “because of persecution or a well-founded
fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality,
membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.”
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (2006). “Persecution involves the
infliction or threat of death, torture, or injury to one’s
person or freedom, on account of one of the enumerated grounds .
. . .” Li v. Gonzales, 405 F.3d 171, 177 (4th Cir. 2005)
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
To establish eligibility for withholding of removal,
an alien must show a clear probability that, if she was removed
to her native country, her “life or freedom would be threatened”
on account of a protected ground. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A)
(2006); see Camara v. Ashcroft, 378 F.3d 361, 370 (4th Cir.
2004). A “clear probability” means that it is more likely than
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not the alien would be subject to persecution. INS v. Stevic,
467 U.S. 407, 429-30 (1984).
A determination regarding eligibility for withholding
of removal is affirmed if supported by substantial evidence on
the record considered as a whole. INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502
U.S. 478, 481 (1992). Administrative findings of fact,
including findings on credibility, are conclusive unless any
reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to decide to the
contrary. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B) (2006). Legal issues are
reviewed de novo, “affording appropriate deference to the BIA’s
interpretation of the INA and any attendant regulations.”
Lin v. Mukasey, 517 F.3d 685, 691-92 (4th Cir. 2008). This
court will reverse the Board only if “the evidence [she]
presented was so compelling that no reasonable factfinder could
fail to find the requisite fear of persecution.” Elias-
Zacarias, 502 U.S. at 483-84; see Rusu v. INS, 296 F.3d 316, 325
n.14 (4th Cir. 2002).
Credibility findings are reviewed for substantial
evidence. A trier of fact who rejects an applicant’s testimony
on credibility grounds must offer “specific, cogent reason[s]”
for doing so. Figeroa v. INS, 886 F.2d 76, 78 (4th Cir. 1989)
(internal quotation marks omitted). “Examples of specific and
cogent reasons include inconsistent statements, contradictory
evidence, and inherently improbable testimony[.]” Tewabe v.
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Gonzales, 446 F.3d 533, 538 (4th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation
marks and citations omitted).
We find substantial evidence supports the adverse
credibility finding. Butler’s statement indicating she came to
the United States after her brother was murdered was clearly
inconsistent with her testimony. Furthermore, we find the Board
did not abuse its discretion in finding this inconsistency to be
significant. We find the record does not compel a different
result with respect to the denial of withholding of removal. *
Likewise, we find substantial evidence supports the Board’s
finding that Butler did not establish entitlement to relief
under the CAT. See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(2) (2009) (to qualify
for protection under the CAT, a petitioner bears the burden of
demonstrating that “it is more likely than not that he or she
would be tortured if removed to the proposed country of
removal.”).
*
We note that the asylum application was denied in the
first instance because it was untimely. See 8 U.S.C.
§ 1158(a)(2)(B) (2006). Butler does not challenge this finding
and it will not be reviewed by this court. See Ngarurih v.
Ashcroft, 371 F.3d 182, 189 n.7 (4th Cir. 2004) (finding that
failure to raise a challenge in an opening brief results in
abandonment of that challenge); Edwards v. City of Goldsboro,
178 F.3d 231, 241 n.6 (4th Cir. 1999) (same).
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Accordingly, we deny the petition for review. We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
PETITION DENIED
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