UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 09-1062
DOROTHY V. REED,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
AIRTRAN AIRWAYS, INCORPORATED,
Defendant - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Baltimore. J. Frederick Motz, District Judge.
(1:07-cv-02170-JFM)
Submitted: October 22, 2009 Decided: November 13, 2009
Before MICHAEL, KING, and AGEE, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
James C. Strouse, Ph.D., J.D., STROUSE LEGAL SERVICES, Columbia,
Maryland, for Appellant. Susan Stobbart Shapiro, COUNCIL,
BARADEL, KOSMERL & NOLAN, P.A., Annapolis, Maryland, for
Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Dorothy V. Reed appeals the district court’s order
granting summary judgment for AirTran Airways, Inc. (“AirTran”),
and dismissing her complaint alleging race discrimination and
retaliation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as
amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (2006) (“Title VII”).
After conducting de novo review of the district court’s grant of
summary judgment, see Nader v. Blair, 549 F.3d 953, 958 (4th
Cir. 2008), we find no reversible error. Accordingly, we
affirm.
Reed argues that her African-American supervisors
treated her and other white employees unfairly, causing Reed to
resign from employment with AirTran. To establish a claim of
hostile work environment on account of race, Reed was required
to establish she was subjected to: (1) unwelcome harassment;
(2) based on her race; (3) “sufficiently severe or pervasive to
alter the conditions of her employment”; and (4) imputable to
her employer. See Pueschel v. Peters, 577 F.3d 558, 564-65 (4th
Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). In
determining whether a hostile work environment exists, courts
view the totality of the circumstances, including “the frequency
of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is
physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive
utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an
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employee’s work performance.” Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc.,
510 U.S. 17, 23 (1993). A plaintiff must show both that she
subjectively perceived her workplace environment as hostile and
that it would be objectively perceived by a reasonable person as
hostile or abusive. Id. at 21-22. We agree with the district
court that no genuine issue of material fact precluded entry of
judgment for AirTran on this claim.
Reed also contends that the district court erred in
dismissing her retaliation claim. To establish a prima facie
case of retaliation, Reed must prove that she engaged in a
protected act, an adverse employment action was taken against
her, and there is a causal connection between the act and the
adverse action. See Price v. Thompson, 380 F.3d 209, 212 (4th
Cir. 2004). Protected activity within the meaning of Title VII
includes opposing an unlawful employment practice or
participating in any manner in a Title VII investigation,
proceeding, or hearing. Kubicko v. Ogden Logistics Services,
181 F.3d 544, 551 (4th Cir. 1999). “Unlawful employment
practices” that an employee may oppose “include practices that
discriminate against an individual with respect to h[er]
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment.”
Jordan v. Alternative Resources Corp., 458 F.3d 332, 339 (4th
Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Such a practice need not be an ultimate employment decision, but
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must be “materially adverse,” meaning “it might well have
dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge
of discrimination.” Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White,
548 U.S. 53, 68 (2006) (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted). Moreover, to state a claim of retaliation, a
plaintiff need not be complaining of a hostile work environment
or discrimination that is actually unlawful under Title VII, but
she must reasonably believe that she was complaining of behavior
prohibited by Title VII. Jordan, 458 F.3d at 338-39. Again, we
agree with the district court that no genuine issue of fact
prevented entry of summary judgment for AirTran as to this
claim.
Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the district
court. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before the court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED
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