UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 09-4260
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
PERREN LAMONTE LANE,
Defendant – Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle
District of North Carolina, at Durham. James A. Beaty, Jr.,
Chief District Judge. (1:07-cr-00427-JAB-1)
Submitted: October 20, 2009 Decided: November 12, 2009
Before MICHAEL and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Louis C. Allen, III, Federal Public Defender, Gregory Davis,
Senior Litigator, Winston-Salem, North Carolina, for Appellant.
Lisa Blue Boggs, Angela Hewlett Miller, Assistant United States
Attorneys, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Perren Lamonte Lane pled guilty pursuant to a plea
agreement to possession with intent to distribute cocaine base,
in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A) (2006), and
was sentenced to 262 months in prison. Counsel has filed a
brief in accordance with Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738
(1967), stating that after a review of the record, he has found
no meritorious issues for appeal. The Anders brief nonetheless
argues that the 100-to-one crack to powder cocaine sentencing
disparity is unconstitutional and that Congress’s failure to
eliminate that ratio evinces purposeful discrimination. Lane
has not filed a pro se supplemental brief despite receiving
notice that he may do so, and the Government declined to file a
responsive brief. Finding no error, we affirm.
In the absence of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea,
we review the adequacy of the guilty plea pursuant to Fed. R.
Crim. P. 11 for plain error. United States v. Martinez,
277 F.3d 517, 525 (4th Cir. 2002). A review of Lane’s Rule 11
hearing reveals that the district court complied with Rule 11’s
requirements. Lane’s plea was knowingly, voluntarily, and
intelligently made, with full knowledge of the consequences
attendant to his guilty plea. We therefore find that no plain
error occurred and affirm Lane’s conviction.
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We also affirm Lane’s sentence. Lane’s presentence
investigation report properly placed him in a category VI
criminal history and attributed him with a total offense level
of thirty-four, yielding a Guidelines range of 262-327 months.
Moreover, at sentencing, the district court appropriately heard
counsel’s argument regarding the weight that should be afforded
the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006) factors, allowed Lane an
opportunity to allocute, and thoroughly considered the § 3553(a)
factors before imposing Lane’s sentence. We find that the
district court adequately explained its rationale for imposing
Lane’s sentence, the sentence was “selected pursuant to a
reasoned process in accordance with law,” and the reasons relied
upon by the district court are plausible and justify the
sentence imposed. See United States v. Pauley, 511 F.3d 468,
473-76 (4th Cir. 2007); see also United States v. Carter,
564 F.3d 325, 330 (4th Cir. 2009) (recognizing that the district
court must “place on the record an individualized assessment
based on the particular facts of the case before it” and that
the “individualized assessment . . . must provide a rationale
tailored to the particular case at hand and [be] adequate to
permit meaningful appellate review”).
Lane’s challenge to the constitutionality of the
crack-to-powder cocaine sentencing disparity is without merit.
This court has repeatedly rejected claims that the sentencing
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disparity between powder cocaine and crack offenses violates
either equal protection or due process. See United States v.
Perkins, 108 F.3d 512, 518 (4th Cir. 1997); United States v.
Burgos, 94 F.3d 849, 876-77 (4th Cir. 1996); United States v.
Fisher, 58 F.3d 96, 99-100 (4th Cir. 1995). To the extent that
Lane seeks to have this court reconsider these decisions, a
panel of this court cannot overrule the decision of a prior
panel. United States v. Collins, 415 F.3d 304, 311 (4th Cir.
2005).
Furthermore, the 2007 amendments to the Sentencing
Guidelines have no effect on the constitutionality or
applicability of the statutory mandatory minimum sentences for
crack offenses. Although Lane refers to the Supreme Court’s
decision in Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, __, 128 S.
Ct. 558, 575 (2007), to bolster his equal protection argument,
this reference is misplaced; Kimbrough’s holding that district
courts may consider the crack/cocaine sentencing ratio as a
possible basis for variance from the Guidelines is unrelated to
the constitutionality of the sentencing disparity. In fact, the
Supreme Court explicitly held in Kimbrough that even after the
2007 amendments, “sentencing courts remain bound by the
mandatory minimum sentences prescribed [by statute].” Id. at
573. We thus affirm Lane’s within-Guidelines sentence. See
United States v. Allen, 491 F.3d 178, 193 (4th Cir. 2007)
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(recognizing that this court applies an appellate presumption of
reasonableness to a within-Guidelines sentence).
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the record
in this case and have found no meritorious issues for appeal.
We therefore affirm Lane’s conviction and sentence. This court
requires that counsel inform Lane, in writing, of the right to
petition the Supreme Court of the United States for further
review. If Lane requests that a petition be filed, but counsel
believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel
may move in this court for leave to withdraw from
representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof
was served on Lane. We dispense with oral argument because the
facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the
materials before the court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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