UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 07-4119
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
JOHN JACKSON,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Greenbelt. Peter J. Messitte, Senior District
Judge. (8:06-cr-00257-PJM)
Submitted: February 29, 2008 Decided: November 20, 2009
Before WILKINSON, KING, and GREGORY, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Leonard R. Stamm, Andrea Hayduk, GOLDSTEIN & STAMM, P.A.,
Greenbelt, Maryland, for Appellant. Rod J. Rosenstein, United
States Attorney, Hollis Raphael Weisman, Assistant United States
Attorney, Greenbelt, Maryland, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
John Jackson was tried before a magistrate judge for
unsafe operation of a vehicle, driving under the influence of
alcohol, and driving under the influence of alcohol per se in
violation of 36 C.F.R. §§ 4.22, 4.23(a)(1), (a)(2) (2008). The
magistrate judge found him guilty and sentenced him to two
thirty-day periods of incarceration to be served consecutively
to the state sentence he was then serving. The district court
affirmed Jackson’s conviction and sentence on appeal.
On appeal to this court, Jackson raises two issues:
(1) whether the magistrate judge erred by allowing into evidence
the results of his blood tests; and (2) whether the magistrate
judge erred by failing to alter his sentences and impose them
concurrently, in violation of Fed. R. Crim. P. 35(a). For the
reasons that follow, we affirm.
Jackson’s first argument is precluded by our recent
decision in United States v. Washington, 498 F.3d 225 (4th Cir.
2007), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 2527 (2009). We find no grounds
under Fed. R. Crim. P. 35(a) for the magistrate judge to have
altered Jackson’s sentence. United States v. Layman, 116 F.3d
105, 108 (4th Cir. 1997) (noting a sentencing court’s authority
to correct clear error in sentencing under Rule 35 is “severely
limited”) (citation omitted). Accordingly, we affirm.
2
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before the court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED
3