UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 08-4931
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
BRIAN KEITH WATTS,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Columbia. Margaret B. Seymour, District
Judge. (3:06-cr-00452-MBS-11)
Submitted: November 17, 2009 Decided: November 19, 2009
Before WILKINSON, MICHAEL, and KING, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
W. Michael Duncan, AUSTIN & ROGERS, P.A., Columbia, South
Carolina, for Appellant. W. Walter Wilkins, United States
Attorney, Stanley D. Ragsdale, Assistant United States Attorney,
Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Brian Keith Watts appeals his conviction by a jury on
charges of conspiracy to manufacture, possess with intent to
distribute, and distribution of 50 grams or more of
methamphetamine and 500 grams or more of a mixture or substance
containing methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C.
§§ 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(A) (2006) (Count 1); manufacture and
possession with intent to distribute 500 grams or more of a
substance containing methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C.
§§ 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(A) (Count 13); possession of materials
used to manufacture a controlled substance, in violation of 21
U.S.C. §§ 843(a)(6), 843(d)(2) (2006) and 18 U.S.C. § 2 (2006)
(Count 14); and possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug
trafficking crime, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) (2006).
Watts was sentenced to a 181-month term of imprisonment.
His sole challenge on appeal is to the validity of the
search warrant used to search the residence in which Watts was
living and a shed located behind that residence, the results of
which search led to the discovery of various items that could be
used in the manufacture of methamphetamine, as well as firearms,
which evidence was used at trial against Watts. Watts moved to
suppress the evidence on the ground that the warrant was
defective because it failed to list an address, the affidavit
used to obtain the warrant listed an incorrect address, and the
2
police allegedly did not make a good faith effort to describe
with particularity the place to be searched. The district court
denied Watts’ motion to suppress.
We review a district court’s ruling on a motion to
suppress for clear error on factual findings and de novo on
legal determinations. United States v. Cain, 524 F.3d 477, 481
(4th Cir. 2008). Facts are viewed in the light most favorable
to the prevailing party, United States v. Jamison, 509 F.3d 623,
628 (4th Cir. 2007), and great deference is shown to the
district court’s findings of probable cause, Illinois v. Gates,
462 U.S. 213, 236 (1983).
We find no merit to Watts’ claims. The description of
the premises to be searched was sufficient to alert law
enforcement officers as to the proper locations which were the
subject of the search warrant, and were sufficient to meet
constitutional muster. The execution of the warrant was headed
by the lead agent, who previously had engaged in surveillance,
including aerial surveillance, of the locations to be searched.
While the Fourth Amendment 1 requires that a warrant particularly
1
Watts’ assertion that the warrant did not meet state
statutory requirements does not appear to have been argued
below. Even if it had, the Fourth Amendment provides the proper
standard by which to review the admissibility in federal court
of a search warrant and ensuing search. See United States v.
Clyburn, 24 F.3d 613, 617-18 (4th Cir. 1994).
3
describe the place to be searched, that standard is met if the
officer, can, with reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the
place to be searched. United States v. Owens, 848 F.2d 462, 463
(4th Cir. 1988); Steele v. United States, 267 U.S. 498, 503
(1925). Moreover, even where a warrant contains a technical
inaccuracy, 2 a sufficient description of the premises, especially
where the executing officer had knowledge of the particular
place to be searched, will meet the Fourth Amendment’s
particularity requirement. See, e.g., United States v.
Blackwood, 913 F.2d 139, 142 (4th Cir. 1990).
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s denial of
Watts’ motion to suppress, and affirm Watts’ conviction and
sentence. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before the court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED
2
While Watts alludes to an incorrect address being listed
in the search warrant, neither the body of the search warrant
nor the supporting affidavit contains an actual address upon
which either the magistrate issuing the warrant or the officer
executing the warrant relied.
4