UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 09-4376
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
REBECCA POWELL,
Defendant – Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern
District of West Virginia, at Clarksburg. Irene M. Keeley,
District Judge. (1:06-cr-00073-IMK-1)
Submitted: October 30, 2009 Decided: November 17, 2009
Before MOTZ, KING, and SHEDD, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Brian J. Kornbrath, Federal Public Defender, Clarksburg, West
Virginia, for Appellant. Sharon L. Potter, United States
Attorney, Shawn Angus Morgan, Assistant United States Attorney,
Clarksburg, West Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Rebecca Powell appeals the district court’s order
revoking her supervised release and sentencing her to twenty-
four months in prison. Powell argues that her sentence is
plainly unreasonable because it does not further the purposes of
supervised release. We affirm.
This court will affirm a sentence imposed after
revocation of supervised release if it is within the applicable
statutory maximum and is not plainly unreasonable. United
States v. Crudup, 461 F.3d 433, 437, 439-40 (4th Cir. 2006). We
first assess the sentence for reasonableness, “follow[ing]
generally the procedural and substantive considerations that we
employ in our review of original sentences, . . . with some
necessary modifications to take into account the unique nature
of supervised release revocation sentences.” Id. at 438-39; see
United States v. Finley, 531 F.3d 288, 294 (4th Cir. 2008) (“In
applying the ‘plainly unreasonable’ standard, we first
determine, using the instructions given in Gall [v. United
States, 552 U.S. 38, __, 128 S. Ct. 586, 597 (2007)], whether a
sentence is ‘unreasonable.’”).
Only if a sentence is found procedurally or
substantively unreasonable will we “decide whether the sentence
is plainly unreasonable.” Crudup, 461 F.3d at 439 (emphasis
omitted); see Finley, 531 F.3d at 294. Although the district
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court must consider the Chapter 7 policy statements and the
requirements of 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 3553(a), 3583 (West 2000 & Supp.
2009), “the [district] court ultimately has broad discretion to
revoke its previous sentence and impose a term of imprisonment
up to the statutory maximum.” Crudup, 461 F.3d at 439 (internal
quotation marks and citations omitted).
Powell argues that the district court’s sentence is
plainly unreasonable because the district court allegedly failed
to consider the Chapter 7 Policy Statements and insufficiently
analyzed the § 3553(a) factors. Powell also claims that her
sentence fails to address the underlying cause of her
violations, fails to adequately further the goals of supervised
release, and imposes a sentence greatly out of proportion to the
violations found by the district court. “In determining the
reasonableness of a sentence, we ‘give due deference to the
district court’s decision.’” Finley, 531 F.3d at 297 (quoting
Gall, 128 S. Ct. at 597). Our review of the record leaves no
doubt that the district court carefully evaluated Powell’s
failure to meaningfully cooperate with her probation officer
during her period of supervised release and reached the
reasonable conclusion that additional counseling and treatment
of Powell’s drug habit in a non-custodial setting were not
likely to prove successful. We accordingly conclude that the
sentence imposed by the district court is not plainly
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unreasonable and we affirm the district court’s judgment. We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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