UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 09-4318
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
CHRISTINE MCLAMB,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Florence. R. Bryan Harwell, District Judge.
(4:08-cr-00173-RBH-1)
Submitted: October 22, 2009 Decided: November 16, 2009
Before NIEMEYER and AGEE, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Michael A. Meetze, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Florence,
South Carolina, for Appellant. William E. Day, II, Assistant
United States Attorney, Florence, South Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Christine McLamb pled guilty, pursuant to a plea
agreement, to embezzlement, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 656
(2006), and aggravated identity theft, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 1028A(a)(1) (2006). She was sentenced to a total of seventy-
five months’ imprisonment. In her appeal, she contends that the
district court committed both procedural and substantive error
when imposing her sentence. The Government has filed a motion
to dismiss, invoking the appeal waiver contained in McLamb’s
plea agreement. Because McLamb’s appeal is barred by her
waiver, we grant the Government’s motion to dismiss.
Whether a defendant effectively waived her right to
appeal pursuant to a plea bargain is an issue of law that is
reviewed de novo. United States v. Blick, 408 F.3d 162, 168
(4th Cir. 2005). Where the government seeks to enforce an
appeal waiver and the appellant does not contend that the
government is in breach of its plea agreement, a waiver will be
enforced if the record shows the waiver is valid and the
challenged issue falls within the scope of the waiver. Id. An
appeal waiver is valid if it is “the result of a knowing and
intelligent decision to forgo the right to appeal.” United
States v. Broughton-Jones, 71 F.3d 1143, 1146 (4th Cir. 1995)
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted). To decide
whether a defendant’s waiver results from a knowing and
2
intelligent decision, we examine “‘the particular facts and
circumstances surrounding that case, including the background,
experience and conduct of the accused.’” United States v.
Davis, 954 F.2d 182, 186 (4th Cir. 1992) (quoting Johnson v.
Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938)). Generally, if the district
court fully questions a defendant at her Fed. R. Crim. P. 11
proceeding regarding the waiver of her right to appeal, the
waiver is both valid and enforceable. See United States v.
Johnson, 410 F.3d 137, 151 (4th Cir. 2005).
As McLamb’s counsel concedes, McLamb’s waiver of her
right to appeal was knowingly and intelligently entered. The
district court conducted a thorough plea colloquy in accordance
with Fed. R. Crim. P. 11, ensuring that McLamb understood she
was pleading guilty, and the rights she would relinquish in
doing so. The judge verified that McLamb had finished the
twelfth grade, as well as some business school, had never been
treated for alcohol or drug abuse or mental illness, and had not
taken any drugs, alcohol, or medication that would affect her
ability to understand the proceedings. The judge further
confirmed that McLamb was satisfied with her attorney and was
aware of the rights she would be giving up by pleading guilty,
as well as the possible penalties she faced by pleading guilty.
McLamb affirmed that she was pleading guilty freely and
voluntarily and had not been forced to do so. The Government
3
summarized the conditions of McLamb’s plea agreement aloud,
including that she had waived her right to appeal. The judge
then reiterated that McLamb was waiving her right to appeal, and
verified that she wished to do so freely and voluntarily after
consulting with her lawyer. Accordingly, because McLamb
knowingly and voluntarily entered the plea agreement, the appeal
waiver is valid, and will bar any appeals that fall within its
scope.
On appeal, McLamb asserts that her sentence was both
procedurally and substantively unreasonable. However, as these
alleged errors fall within the scope of her waiver of appeal, we
find that review of these issues is barred by the waiver.
Accordingly, we grant the Government’s motion to dismiss. We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately expressed in the materials before the
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
DISMISSED
4