UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 08-5162
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
KENDRICK OMAR HAMMOND,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of North Carolina, at Charlotte. Robert J. Conrad,
Jr., Chief District Judge. (3:06-cr-00451-RJC-1)
Submitted: November 18, 2009 Decided: November 25, 2009
Before MOTZ, KING, and GREGORY, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Denzil H. Forrester, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellant.
Edward R. Ryan, Acting United States Attorney, Adam Morris,
Assistant United States Attorney, Charlotte, North Carolina, for
Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Kendrick Omar Hammond appeals his conviction that
resulted from his guilty plea to one count of possession with
intent to distribute more than five grams of crack cocaine, in
violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B) (2006). Hammond
entered a conditional guilty plea and reserved his right to
appeal the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress
evidence. We affirm.
We review the district court’s factual findings
underlying a motion to suppress for clear error, and the
district court’s legal determinations de novo. United States v.
Grossman, 400 F.3d 212, 216 (4th Cir. 2005). When a suppression
motion has been denied, this court reviews the evidence in the
light most favorable to the Government. Id. This court grants
great deference to factual findings based on credibility
decisions. See United States v. Moses, 540 F.3d 263, 268-69
(4th Cir. 2008).
Observation of any traffic violation, no matter how
minor, gives an officer probable cause to stop the driver.
United States v. Hassan El, 5 F.3d 726, 730 (4th Cir. 1993). A
stop for a traffic violation “does not become unreasonable
merely because the officer has intuitive suspicions that the
occupants of the car are engaged in some sort of criminal
activity.” Id. A routine and lawful traffic stop permits an
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officer to detain the motorist to request a driver’s license and
vehicle registration, to run a computer check, and to issue a
citation. United States v. Branch, 537 F.3d 328, 335 (4th Cir.
2008).
Hammond argues that the stop of his vehicle was
illegal because the officers did not have reasonable suspicion
or probable cause that he was violating any law. Our review of
the record leads us to conclude, however, that the district
court correctly resolved the conflicting testimony and denied
the suppression motion.
Hammond next argues that the district court abused its
discretion in failing to view the video from the dashboard video
recorder in the patrol car. Hammond did not request that the
district court view the video prior to ruling on the motion to
suppress, or object to the court’s failure to view the video.
We therefore review this claim for plain error. “To establish
plain error, [Hammond] must show that an error occurred, that
the error was plain, and that the error affected his substantial
rights.” United States v. Muhammad, 478 F.3d 247, 249 (4th Cir.
2007). Even if Hammond satisfies these requirements,
“correction of the error remains within [the court’s]
discretion, which [the court] should not exercise . . . unless
the error seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity or public
reputation of judicial proceedings.” Id. (internal quotation
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marks and citation omitted). Our review leads us to conclude
that, even assuming that the district court erred in not
examining the video, such error did not affect Hammond’s
substantial rights, as there is nothing on the video that calls
into question the legitimacy of the stop of Hammond’s vehicle.
Finally, Hammond argues that the Government raised the
issue of race and asserts that racial profiling motivated the
officers to stop his vehicle. He does not provide any specific
facts or citations to the suppression hearing transcript to
support this assertion, and did not specifically assert this
argument in the district court. This court has recognized that,
although an officer’s “motive[] for stopping an automobile that
was violating traffic laws is irrelevant to the legitimacy of
the stop under a Fourth Amendment analysis, . . . racially
motivated law enforcement can violate the equal protection
component of the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.” United
States v. Bullock, 94 F.3d 896, 899 (4th Cir. 1996) (citation
omitted). In order to establish that he is the victim of
racially motivated law enforcement, “[t]he claimant must
demonstrate that the [enforcement policy] had a discriminatory
effect and that it was motivated by a discriminatory
purpose. . . . To establish a discriminatory effect in a race
case, the claimant must show that similarly situated individuals
of a different race were not prosecuted.” United States v.
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Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 465 (1996) (internal citation omitted).
The record contains no evidence that would satisfy either prong
of the equal protection test. This argument is therefore
without merit.
Accordingly, we affirm Hammond’s conviction. We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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