PUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
ANDREW MAXWELL,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 08-1945
KRISTINA MAXWELL,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of North Carolina, at Charlotte.
Robert J. Conrad, Jr., Chief District Judge.
(3:08-cv-00254-RJC-CH)
Argued: September 22, 2009
Decided: November 30, 2009
Before AGEE, Circuit Judge, HAMILTON, Senior Circuit
Judge, and Margaret B. SEYMOUR, United States District
Judge for the District of South Carolina,
sitting by designation.
Affirmed by published opinion. Judge Seymour wrote the
opinion, in which Judge Agee and Senior Judge Hamilton
joined.
COUNSEL
Neil Joshua Saltzman, LAW OFFICE OF NEIL J. SALTZ-
MAN, New York, New York, for Appellant. Bradley B. Hon-
2 MAXWELL v. MAXWELL
nold, THE HONNOLD LAW FIRM, PA, Charlotte, North
Carolina, for Appellee.
OPINION
SEYMOUR, District Judge:
I. BACKGROUND
The following facts were found by the District Court subse-
quent to an evidentiary hearing held on July 31, 2008.
Andrew and Kristina Maxwell met and married in Australia
in 1999, and shortly thereafter moved to Massachusetts. On
January 18, 2004, the couple’s quadruplets were born with
developmental disabilities. The couple became estranged in
December 2005. At that time, Andrew moved back to Austra-
lia. Kristina, the quadruplets, and Kristina’s daughter from a
previous marriage, Gabi, moved to North Carolina to live
with Kristina’s mother.
In 2006, Kristina filed for divorce in North Carolina and
Andrew subsequently initiated a child custody action there as
well. In August 2007, Andrew traveled from Australia to
North Carolina for the custody hearing. During Andrew’s stay
in North Carolina, he and Kristina discussed reconciliation,
resolved their custody dispute, and decided to discontinue the
divorce action. On August 16, 2007, the parties signed a
Memorandum of Judgment ("Memorandum") issued by the
General Court of Justice in Mecklenburg County, North Caro-
lina that granted Kristina primary custody of the quadruplets.
The Memorandum was later incorporated into a Consent
Order ("Order") entered by the Superior Court of Mecklen-
burg County, North Carolina, on October 25, 2007.1
1
The Order grants Kristina "the permanent care, custody, and control"
of the quadruplets, and grants Andrew "visitation" rights. The Order
requires Kristina to "confer with [Andrew] on all decisions regarding the
health, education[,] religion and welfare of the [quadruplets]," and grants
Andrew the right of "input on all major decisions regarding the [quadru-
plets]." J.A. 645-648.
MAXWELL v. MAXWELL 3
Following the couple’s decision to reconcile, Andrew trav-
eled back to Australia, while Kristina and the children
remained in North Carolina. At the onset, both parties had
trust issues. In particular, Kristina was concerned that Andrew
was using the couple’s reconciliation as a means to gain cus-
tody of the quadruplets.2 She was also concerned that Andrew
was still seeing his girlfriend, Maryanne Land ("Maryanne").
Andrew agreed to end his relationship with Maryanne, but not
before he confirmed that Kristina had ended her relationship
with her male friend, Derek Otten.
Despite their trust issues, the couple began making arrange-
ments for Kristina and the children to move to Australia. Ini-
tially, the couple communicated frequently. Kristina began
preparing for the move to Australia by (1) collecting the infor-
mation needed to get permanent Australian residency for her
and Gabi; (2) giving Andrew permission to obtain Australian
passports for the quadruplets; (3) helping Andrew look for a
house;3 (4) helping Andrew purchase a minivan; (5) briefly
inquiring about work as a licensed practical nurse in Austra-
lia; (6) exploring information technology and bartending pro-
grams in Australia; and (7) telling friends and family that her
move was permanent.4
2
The district court determined that "Kristina credibly testified (without
rebuttal from Andrew) that her suspicions were first aroused during the
custody proceedings when Andrew mentioned that the Hague Convention
would protect [her]." J.A. 349 (internal citations omitted). According to
the district court, Kristina’s suspicions prompted her to register the Memo-
randum of Judgment and the Order with Family Court in Australia. Kris-
tina registered the Memorandum on September 9, 2007 and the Order on
December 18, 2007. The registration for the documents was finalized on
September 26, 2007 and December 18, 2007, respectively.
3
Kristina and Andrew did not purchase a home in Australia; instead,
Andrew rented a home under a six-month term lease in his name only. The
couple discussed the possibility of purchasing a home closer to Andrew’s
parents in Wallongong, Australia once the lease term expired.
4
Kristina sent several e-mail messages to friends informing them that
she and Andrew planned to reconcile and live in Australia together with
the children.
4 MAXWELL v. MAXWELL
Kristina continued to suspect that Andrew was using the
reconciliation as a means to gain custody of the quadruplets.
She also learned that Andrew was still seeing Maryanne. The
couple began to communicate less frequently and experience
financial hardship.5 Kristina considered that the move to Aus-
tralia might be temporary, so she purchased round trip tickets
with a departure date of December 4, 2007 and a return date
of March 4, 2008. She arranged for herself and the children
to travel with Australian tourist visas that placed a three-
month limit on their stay in Australia. Before leaving the
United States, Kristina sought permission from Gabi’s school
to allow Gabi to resume classes at the school in March of the
following year. Kristina also maintained the lease and insur-
ance on her car, and kept her cell phone account, bank
account, and North Carolina Medicare insurance.
Kristina and the children traveled to Australia on December
6, 2007. They brought the following items: photographs of the
family, jewelry and perfume; bedding, blankets, linen, house-
hold cutlery, dishes, pots and pans; bike helmets; portable
DVD players; one month of prescription medication for Kris-
tina; summer clothing; Andrew’s power tools and flashlights;
Gabi’s school records; the quadruplets’ and Gabi’s medical
and immunization records.
The couple experienced marital difficulties after Kristina
and the children arrived in Australia. Their trust issues per-
sisted and they argued frequently. Andrew became violent
towards Kristina and threatened to remove her from the
house. Within a few weeks of the move, Andrew asked Kris-
tina if she would continue to live in Australia if their marriage
failed. After she responded in the negative, Andrew took the
following items from Kristina to prevent her from leaving
5
Because of the couple’s financial hardship, Kristina had to sell a cher-
ished sewing machine and the children’s play set, and the couple argued
over whether Kristina should sell other items to prevent defaulting on her
car lease.
MAXWELL v. MAXWELL 5
Australia with the children: (1) the quadruplets’ passports,
which he kept at his office; (2) copies of Kristina’s and Gabi’s
passports, which he later returned; and (3) copies of the
Order.
Kristina immediately sought legal advice from a solicitor
regarding Andrew’s confiscation of the passports. Upon learn-
ing of Kristina’s actions, Andrew posed as Kristina in an e-
mail message in an attempt to have the Order lifted. He also
placed the children on the U.S. State Department’s passport
alert list, ripped out the "solicitor" section of the local Yellow
Pages, and disabled Kristina’s internet access on her com-
puter. Despite Andrew’s attempts to prevent Kristina from
leaving Australia with the children, Kristina continued to seek
legal advice. She was advised by a solicitor that she could
either ask the U.S. Embassy for interim passports or seek a
court order requiring return of the passports. However, neither
option was feasible at the time because the interim passport
application required the signature of both parents, and the pro-
cess for obtaining a court order was too expensive.
When Kristina realized that she was not going to be able to
leave Australia immediately, she filled out permanent resi-
dency applications for herself and Gabi, filled out paperwork
to enroll Gabi in school and the quadruplets in preschool and
YMCA classes,6 and began attending marital counseling with
Andrew. Kristina continued to seek legal assistance during
this time. In February 2008, just two months after Kristina
and the children arrived in Australia, the U.S. Embassy agreed
to reissue the family’s passports without Andrew’s consent.
Kristina and the children left immediately and returned to the
United States.
When Andrew noticed that Kristina and the children were
6
The parties dispute whether the children were actually enrolled in
classes. The parties do not dispute that no tuition was ever paid and the
children never attended any classes.
6 MAXWELL v. MAXWELL
not home, he obtained an ex parte restraining order from the
Family Court of Australia to prevent Kristina from removing
the quadruplets from Australia. By then Kristina and the chil-
dren had already departed. Kristina phoned Andrew the day
she arrived in the United States, and they discussed the possi-
bility of living separately in Australia and sharing custody of
the children. However, those plans soon fell through. Kristina
filed a domestic violence protection order after Andrew
threatened over the phone to kill her and left messages for the
children calling Kristina a drug addict.
On June 5, 2008, Andrew filed a petition for wrongful
removal in the United States District Court for the Western
District of North Carolina, Charlotte Division under the Inter-
national Child Abduction Remedies Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 11601
et seq., which implements the Hague Convention on the Civil
Aspects of International Child Abduction, T.I.A.S. No.
11,670, 19 I.L.M. 1501 (Oct. 25, 1980).
The district court entered an order denying Andrew’s peti-
tion on September 2, 2008. The district court made the fol-
lowing findings of fact: Kristina’s testimony should be
credited and Andrew’s testimony should not be credited;7
Andrew failed to sustain his burden of proof; Gabi’s testi-
mony corroborated her mother’s testimony; and Kristina’s
intention before and after the move was that the move to Aus-
7
The district court concluded that Kristina’s "version of the events . . .
should be credited, and [Mr. Maxwell], who has the burden of proof, has
failed to sustain that burden because his version should not be credited."
The court went on to state that Mr. Maxwell’s "credibility was undercut
by: (1) several instances in which he misrepresented facts in his Petition
or seemingly contradicted his own testimony; and (2) his singular inten-
tion, perhaps beginning as early as July 2007, to gain permanent custody
of the Children in Australia, followed by his repeated steps to prevent
Kristina from leaving Australia with the Children, demonstrated notably
by his confiscation of the Children’s passports so she could not leave."
The court also found that the testimony of Kristina’s daughter Gabi "was
convincing and corroborative of her mother’s testimony." J.A. 346-347.
MAXWELL v. MAXWELL 7
tralia would be conditional. Based on those findings of fact,
the district court held that (1) Andrew failed to prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that the habitual residence of
the children was Australia, and (2) even if the children were
habitual residents of Australia, the return of the children to the
United States was not a wrongful removal or retention in
breach of Andrew’s rights of custody under Australian law
because the Order did not grant Andrew custody rights.
Andrew timely filed his appeal from the district court’s order
and we have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 291 and 42 U.S.C.
§ 11603(a).
II. DISCUSSION
A. Issues on Appeal
On appeal, Andrew contends that the district judge erred in
his findings regarding (1) the habitual residence of the qua-
druplets immediately prior to the alleged removal from Aus-
tralia; and (2) the custody rights of the parties. First, with
regard to the quadruplets’ habitual residence, Andrew con-
tends that the district court erred in determining that the chil-
dren’s place of habitual residence at the time of their removal
from Australia was the United States; failing to determine the
parties’ last shared intention regarding what their children’s
habitual residence would be, and consequently failing to
ascribe appropriate significance to the last shared intention
when determining what the children’s place of habitual resi-
dence was at the time of their removal from Australia; and by
finding as a matter of fact that Kristina’s relocation to Austra-
lia with the children was intended to be experimental and con-
tingent, or in the alternative failing to apply the common law
principle of estoppel to prevent Kristina from denying the per-
manency of her intentions. Second, with regard to his custody
rights, Andrew argues that the district court erred in finding
that he did not enjoy custody rights in relation to the children
at the time of their removal from Australia; and by failing to
properly interpret the North Carolina custody order upon
8 MAXWELL v. MAXWELL
which it relied when it found that Andrew did not enjoy cus-
tody rights at the time of the children’s removal from Austra-
lia.
B. Standard of Review
On appeal, the district court’s findings of fact are reviewed
for clear error and its legal conclusions regarding domestic,
foreign, and international law are reviewed de novo. Ruiz v.
Ruiz, 392 F.3d 1247, 1251 (11th Cir. 2004); Silverman v.
Silverman, 338 F.3d 886, 896-97 (8th Cir. 2003) (en banc);
Mozes v. Mozes, 239 F.3d 1067, 1073 (9th Cir. 2001); Feder
v. Evans-Feder, 63 F.3d 217, 222 n.9 (3d Cir. 1995). There-
fore, we must "accept the district court’s historical or narra-
tive facts unless they are clearly erroneous, but exercise
plenary review of the court’s choice of and interpretation of
legal precepts and its application of those precepts to the
facts." Feder, 63 F.3d at 222 n.9.
C. Analysis
The Hague Convention seeks "to protect children interna-
tionally from the harmful effects of their wrongful removal or
retention and to establish procedures to ensure their prompt
return to the State of their habitual residence, as well as secure
protection for rights of access." Hague Convention, pmbl., 19
I.L.M. at 1501. To secure the return of an abducted child
under the Hague Convention, a petitioner must prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that the child has been "wrong-
fully removed." 42 U.S.C. § 11603(e)(1)(A).
Specifically, the petitioner must establish that: (1) the child
was "habitually resident" in the petitioner’s country of resi-
dence at the time of removal; (2) the removal was in breach
of the petitioner’s custody rights under the law of his home
state; and (3) that the petitioner had been exercising those
rights at the time of removal. Miller v. Miller, 240 F.3d 392,
398 (4th Cir. 2001) (citing Hague Convention, art. 3, T.I.A.S.
MAXWELL v. MAXWELL 9
No. 11,670, at 2, 19 I.L.M. at 1501). Consequently, if we
affirm the district court’s finding on the habitual residence
issue, the remaining issue regarding Andrew’s custody rights
will become moot and not require consideration by this court.
Thus, the crux of the issue on appeal is whether the district
court’s determination that the quadruplets’ habitual residence
was the United States at the time they were removed from
Australia is clearly erroneous.
The framers of The Hague Convention intentionally left
"habitual residence" undefined, and intended that the term be
defined by the unique facts in each case. See Whiting v.
Krassner, 391 F.3d 540, 546 (3d Cir. 2004). Federal courts
have developed a two-part framework to assist in the habitual
residence analysis. Under this framework, the first question is
whether the parents shared a settled intention to abandon the
former country of residence. See Mozes v. Mozes, 239 F.3d
1067, 1075 (9th Cir. 2001); Ruiz, 392 F.3d 1252 ("We sum-
marize the approach suggested in Mozes . . . and adopt it as
our own. . . . The first step towards acquiring a new habitual
residence is forming a settled intention to abandon the one left
behind. It is not necessary to have this settled intention at the
time of departure, as it could develop during the course of a
stay originally intended to be temporary.") (internal citation
omitted); Gitter v. Gitter, 396 F.3d 124, 132 (2d Cir. 2005)
("We agree [with Mozes] and conclude that courts should
begin an analysis of a child’s habitual residence by consider-
ing the relevant intentions. Focusing on intentions gives con-
tour to the objective, factual circumstances surrounding the
child’s presence in a given location. This allows an observer
to determine whether the child’s presence at a given location
is intended to be temporary rather than permanent.").
The second question under this framework is whether there
was "an actual change in geography" coupled with the "pas-
sage of an appreciable period of time, one sufficient for accli-
matization by the children to the new environment."
Papakosmas v. Papakosmas, 483 F.3d 617, 622 (9th Cir.
10 MAXWELL v. MAXWELL
2007) (quoting Mozes, 239 F.3d at 1078). These two ques-
tions are addressed separately below.
1. Shared Parental Intent
The Ninth Circuit’s opinion in Mozes v. Mozes has served
as a guide for federal courts in determining parental intentions
in Hague Convention cases. See Papakosmas, 483 F.3d at
622; Gitter, 396 F.3d at 131-32; Ruiz, 392 F.3d at 1255; Whit-
ing, 391 F.3d at 548-49; Silverman, 338 F.3d at 899. In
Mozes, the Ninth Circuit recognized that "[d]ifficulty arises,
of course, when the persons entitled to fix the child’s resi-
dence no longer agree on where it has been fixed—a situation
that, for obvious reasons, is likely to arise in cases under the
Convention." Mozes, 239 F.3d at 1076.
The Mozes court divided these cases into three broad fac-
tual categories. In the first category are cases where "the court
finds that the family as a unit has manifested a settled purpose
to change habitual residence, despite the fact that one parent
may have had qualms about the move." Id. In the second cate-
gory are those cases "where the child’s initial translocation
from an established habitual residence was clearly intended to
be of a specific, delimited period." Id. at 1077. In these cases,
courts have generally refused to find that the changed inten-
tions of one parent led to an alteration in the child’s habitual
residence. Id.
The third category of cases is comprised of "[i]n between
cases where the petitioning parent had earlier consented to let
the child stay abroad for some period of ambiguous duration."
Id. at 1076-77. Following Mozes, another category of cases
developed. In this category are those cases where courts have
refused to find a change in habitual residence because one
parent intended to move to the new country of residence on
a trial or conditional basis. See Papakosmas, 483 F.3d at 625-
26; Ruiz, 392 F.3d at 1254; Gitter, 396 F.3d at 135; McKenzie
v. McKenzie, 168 F. Supp. 2d 47, 54 (E.D.N.Y. 2001).
MAXWELL v. MAXWELL 11
In cases where there is a dispute regarding a child’s habit-
ual residence, "the representations of the parties cannot be
accepted at face value, and courts must determine [habitual
residence] from all available evidence." Gitter, 396 F.3d at
135 (considering the subjective intentions of parents to deter-
mine whether the parents shared an intent to adopt a new
country of residence for their children); Feder, 63 F.3d at 224
(same). Federal courts have considered the following factors
as evidence of parental intent: parental employment in the
new country of residence;8 the purchase of a home in the new
country and the sale of a home in the former country;9 marital
stability;10 the retention of close ties to the former country;11
8
See Holder v. Holder, 392 F.3d 1009, 1016 (9th Cir. 2004) (treating the
length of a father’s tour of military duty in Germany as evidence of the
parents’ intentions regarding their move from the United States to Ger-
many); Feder, 63 F.3d at 224 (concluding that a mother and father’s pur-
suit of employment in Australia supported finding that the parents
intended to abandon the United States as their child’s habitual residence).
9
See Papakosmas, 483 F.3d at 627 (distinguishing its facts from Feder
and concluding that a family’s failure to purchase or seek out a permanent
home in Greece supported finding that the parents did not share an intent
to abandon the United States as the children’s habitual residence); Feder,
63 F.3d at 224 (treating the purchase and renovation of a new home in
Australia as evidence that the parents intended to abandon the United
States and adopt Australia as their child’s habitual residence).
10
See Ruiz, 392 F.3d at 1255 (treating the parent’s marital problems as
objective evidence that the family’s move from the United States to Mex-
ico was intended to be conditional).
11
See id. (concluding that a mother’s retention of financial accounts and
a mailing address in the United States supported finding that her family’s
move from the United States to Mexico was intended to be conditional);
Papakosmas, 483 F.3d at 627 (concluding that a family’s ongoing hotel
business in the United States coupled with the mother’s trip from Greece
back to the United States to check on the business weighed in favor of
finding that the parents did not share an intent to abandon the United
States as their children’s habitual residence); Gitter, 396 F.3d at 135 (find-
ing that a father’s decision to close bank accounts in the United States and
open Israeli bank accounts was evidence that the father intended to aban-
don New York and adopt Israel as the family’s new residence).
12 MAXWELL v. MAXWELL
the storage and shipment of family possessions;12 the citizen-
ship status of the parents and children;13 and the stability of
the home environment in the new country of residence.14
In the case at bar, Andrew argues that Kristina’s conduct
before the move to Australia indicates that she intended that
the move would be indefinite. Specifically, Andrew points to
the following conduct: Kristina’s sale of her cherished per-
sonal items; her failure to tell her family and friends that her
move to Australia was conditional; her statement to family
and friends on the day before she departed that "[t]his is our
last night in the U.S.;" and her completion of permanent resi-
dency applications for herself and Gabi. We find that the dis-
trict court properly considered this conduct and correctly
determined that "much of this evidence is equivocal as these
actions would be appropriate even if Kristina and the Children
were planning on living in Australia temporarily, as per the
Custody Order, or on a trial basis." J.A. 363.
Andrew also places great emphasis on the letters that Gabi
received from teachers and friends with statements wishing
her good luck "on her new life in Australia," and saying
"goodbye," "good luck," and "I will miss you." The district
court also considered this evidence in its analysis and prop-
12
Gitter, 396 F.3d at 135; Silverman, 338 F.3d at 898 (both considering
the storage and/or shipment of family possessions as evidence of the
intended permanency of the move to the new country of residence).
13
Ruiz, 392 F.3d at 1255 (finding that a set of parents did not share an
intent to abandon the United States and adopt Mexico as their children’s
residence in part because the mother and children traveled to Mexico on
tourist visas and did not seek or acquire permanent Mexican residency or
citizenship); Mozes, 239 F.3d at 1082 (finding that a set of parents did not
share an intent to abandon Israel and adopt the United States as their chil-
dren’s residence in part because the father and children traveled to the
United States with temporary visas).
14
Papakosmas, 483 F.3d at 627 (citing the fact that the children’s lives
were in a "permanent state of flux" in Greece as support for concluding
that the children had not become acclimatized to Greece).
MAXWELL v. MAXWELL 13
erly concluded that the weight that Andrew places on these
letters is undermined by the fact that Kristina sought permis-
sion from Gabi’s school to allow her to miss the first portion
of the spring semester and return to school in March.
Moreover, the district court appropriately determined that
the following facts support the conclusion that Kristina
intended that the move to Australia would be conditional:
Kristina left many possessions behind in North Carolina;
Kristina reserved round trip tickets for herself and the chil-
dren; Kristina and the children traveled with Australian tourist
visas that limited their stay in Australia to three months; and
Kristina maintained her local financial accounts, North Caro-
lina Medicare insurance, and the lease and insurance on her
vehicle.
Moreover, the record supports the district court’s determi-
nation that Kristina never intended to abandon the United
States as the quadruplet’s residence after the family arrived in
Australia. This determination is supported by the fact that
Kristina sought to return to the United States just five weeks
after she arrived in Australia. Although Kristina did fill out
permanent Australian residency applications for herself and
Gabi, the district court determined to be plausible her testi-
mony that she only did so because Andrew took a number of
measures to prevent her from leaving Australia. Moreover, in
light of the district court’s determination that Kristina’s testi-
mony was credible and Andrew’s testimony was not credible,
we cannot conclude that the district court was clearly errone-
ous in its conclusion that there was no shared parental intent
to abandon the United States as the quadruplets’ habitual resi-
dence. Accordingly, the district court’s finding that there was
no shared parental intent to abandon the United States as the
quadruplets’ habitual residence is not clearly erroneous.
14 MAXWELL v. MAXWELL
2. Acclimatization
Once parental intent has been considered, federal courts
next determine the extent of the child’s acclimatization to the
new country of residence. The question here "is not simply
whether the child’s life in the new country shows some mini-
mal degree of settled purpose," but whether the "child’s rela-
tive attachments to the countries have changed to the point
where [ordering the child’s return] would now be tantamount
to taking the child out of the family and social environment
in which its life has developed." Mozes, 239 F.3d at 1081
(internal quotations and citations omitted). Federal courts
have considered school enrollment,15 participation in social
activities,16 the length of stay in the relative countries,17 and
the child’s age18 to determine the extent of a child’s acclimati-
zation to the new country of residence.
The district court determined that the quadruplets never
became acclimatized to Australia during their two-month stay.
We agree with this finding, as there are several objective fac-
tors supporting the district court’s conclusion.19 First, the qua-
15
See Ruiz, 392 F.3d at 1255; Silverman, 338 F.3d at 898-899; Feder,
63 F.3d at 224 (all considering children’s school enrollment as evidence
of acclimatization); Silvestri v. Olivia, 403 F. Supp. 2d 378 (D.N.J. 2005).
16
See Ruiz, 392 F.3d at 1255; Holder, 392 F.3d at 1020 (both consider-
ing children’s social activities as evidence of acclimatization).
17
See Ruiz, 392 F.3d at 1255; Holder, 392 F.3d at 1018; Miller v. Miller,
240 F.3d 392, 400 (4th Cir. 2001); Feder, 63 F.3d at 224 (all considering
the children’s length of stay in the countries at issue as evidence of accli-
matization).
18
See Holder, 392 F.3d at 1019 (noting that the five-year age gap
between two boys was "relevant to the acclimatization analysis" and that
therefore a separate discussion of the boys’ acclimatization was war-
ranted).
19
The district court noted that the only evidence that the quadruplets had
become settled in Australia were affidavits and testimony of Andrew’s
friends and relatives who commented that the children seemed "happy"
while attending a wedding two days after they arrived in Australia. The
MAXWELL v. MAXWELL 15
druplets were not receiving therapy for their developmental
disabilities in Australia despite the fact they were receiving
therapy when they lived in the United States. Second, the qua-
druplets did not attend school or participate in social activities
in Australia. And, finally, the quadruplets’ developmental dis-
abilities made it very unlikely that they became acclimatized
during their two-month stay in Australia.
III. CONCLUSION
We find the district court correctly determined that Andrew
failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the
quadruplets’ habitual residence was Australia. Kristina did not
intend to abandon the United States as the quadruplets’ resi-
dence and the children did not become acclimatized to Aus-
tralia. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s decision on
the issue of habitual residence and thus affirm the judgment
of the district court.20
AFFIRMED
district court correctly determined that this evidence is "insufficient," since
"[t]he function of a court applying the Convention is not to determine
whether a child is happy where it currently is, but whether one parent is
seeking unilaterally to alter the status quo with regard to the primary locus
of the child’s life." (quoting Mozes, 239 F.3d 1079 (internal citations omit-
ted)).
20
In light of our conclusion that the district court correctly determined
the children did not habitually reside in Australia, we need not consider
the remaining issues Andrew presents on appeal.