UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 08-5242
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
KINYA LAVETTE GATLING,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Charleston. Patrick Michael Duffy, District
Judge. (2:08-cr-00573-PMD-1)
Submitted: November 13, 2009 Decided: December 11, 2009
Before NIEMEYER, MOTZ, and GREGORY, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
J. Robert Haley, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Charleston,
South Carolina, for Appellant. Eric John Klumb, Assistant
United States Attorney, Charleston, South Carolina, for
Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Kinya Lavette Gatling
pled guilty to aggravated identity theft, in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 1028A(1)(A) (2006). The district court sentenced
Gatling to twenty-four months in prison. Gatling appeals her
conviction and sentence. Her attorney has filed a brief
pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), finding
no meritorious grounds for appeal but challenging the adequacy
of the Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 hearing and questioning whether the
sentence imposed by the district court was reasonable. Gatling
was advised of her right to file a pro se supplemental brief,
but she did not file one. We affirm.
Because Gatling did not move in the district court to
withdraw her guilty plea, any error in the Rule 11 hearing is
reviewed for plain error. United States v. Martinez, 277 F.3d
517, 525 (4th Cir. 2002) (discussing standard). Our careful
review of the record convinces us that the district court
substantially complied with the mandates of Rule 11 in accepting
Gatling’s guilty plea and ensured that Gatling entered her plea
knowingly and voluntarily and that the plea was supported by an
independent factual basis. See United States v. DeFusco, 949
F.2d 114, 116, 119-20 (4th Cir. 1991).
Turning to Gatling’s sentencing challenge, § 1028A
prescribes a mandatory two-year penalty for aggravated identity
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theft. The district court possessed no discretion to sentence
below the statutory mandatory sentence. Cf. United States v.
Robinson, 404 F.3d 850, 862 (4th Cir. 2005) (holding that, even
after United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), “judges
cannot depart below a statutorily provided minimum sentence”).
“A statutorily required sentence . . . is per se reasonable.”
United States v. Farrior, 535 F.3d 210, 224 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 129 S. Ct. 743 (2008). We conclude that the
statutorily-prescribed sentence imposed by the district court is
reasonable.
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire
record for any meritorious issues and have found none.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment. This
court requires that counsel inform his client, in writing, of
her right to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for
further review. If the client requests that a petition be
filed, but counsel believes that such a petition would be
frivolous, then counsel may move in this court for leave to
withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must state that
a copy thereof was served on the client. We dispense with oral
argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately
presented in the materials before the court and argument would
not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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