UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 09-4363
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
WILLIE EDWARD BARNES, a/k/a Big Will,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern
District of West Virginia, at Martinsburg. John Preston Bailey,
Chief District Judge. (3:08-cr-00064-JPB-DJJ-1)
Submitted: December 2, 2009 Decided: December 23, 2009
Before NIEMEYER and GREGORY, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON,
Senior Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Stephen D. Herndon, Wheeling, West Virginia, for Appellant.
Sharon L. Potter, United States Attorney, Paul T. Camilletti,
Assistant United States Attorney, Martinsburg, West Virginia,
for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Willie Barnes pled guilty, pursuant to a plea
agreement, to one count of possession with intent to distribute
more than fifty grams of crack cocaine, in violation of 21
U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (2006). The district court sentenced Barnes
to 327 months’ imprisonment. Barnes now appeals, claiming that
the district court erred in denying his motions to withdraw his
guilty plea. We affirm.
Because Barnes was represented by counsel, the
district court was not required to consider Barnes’ pro se
letter filed on February 9, 2009, as a motion to withdraw his
plea. See United States v. Vampire Nation, 451 F.3d 189, 206
n.17 (3rd Cir. 2006) (holding district court is within its
authority to disregard pro se motions from a counseled party).
Further, even if the letter had been construed as a
motion to withdraw Barnes’ guilty plea, such a motion lacked
merit. “There is no absolute right to withdrawal of a guilty
plea.” United States v. Ubakanma, 215 F.3d 421, 424 (4th Cir.
2000) (citing United States v. Moore, 931 F.2d 245, 248 (4th
Cir. 1991)). The defendant bears the burden of showing a “fair
and just reason” for the withdrawal of his guilty plea. Fed. R.
Crim. P. 11(d)(2)(B). “[A] properly conducted Rule 11 guilty
plea colloquy leaves a defendant with a very limited basis upon
which to have his plea withdrawn.” United States v. Bowman, 348
2
F.3d 408, 414 (4th Cir. 2003). With these standards in mind, we
have reviewed the record on appeal and conclude that Barnes
failed to present a fair and just reason that his guilty plea
should be withdrawn.
Barnes also alleges that the district court abused its
discretion in denying his pro se, post-sentencing motion to
withdraw his plea. After a defendant has been sentenced, the
district court has no authority to grant a motion to withdraw a
guilty plea. Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(e); United States v. Battle,
499 F.3d 315, 319 (4th Cir. 2007). The only vehicles to
challenge the validity of the plea after sentencing are by
direct appeal or in a collateral attack. Id. Accordingly, the
district court did not abuse its discretion in denying this
motion.
We therefore affirm the district court’s judgment. We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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