UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 07-5076
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
MATTHEW TROY EVANS,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Baltimore. Andre M. Davis, District Judge.
(1:05-cr-00259-AMD-1)
Submitted: December 17, 2009 Decided: January 14, 2010
Before MICHAEL and SHEDD, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
W. Warren Hamel, Alexander W. Major, VENABLE LLP, Baltimore,
Maryland, for Appellant. Rod J. Rosenstein, United States
Attorney, Jefferson M. Gray, Assistant United States Attorney,
Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
A jury convicted Matthew Evans of possession of a
firearm after having previously been convicted of a crime
punishable by more than one year, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(g)(1) (2006); possession of body armor after having
previously been convicted of a crime of violence, in violation
of 18 U.S.C. § 931(a) (2006); and possession of ammunition after
having previously been convicted of a crime punishable by more
than one year, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). The
district court sentenced Evans to a total of 235 months of
imprisonment and Evans now appeals. Finding no error, we
affirm.
Evans first challenges the district court’s admission
of evidence that he possessed scales and cellular phones at the
time of the commission of the crimes. This court reviews the
evidentiary rulings of a district court for abuse of discretion.
United States v. Kelly, 510 F.3d 433, 436 (4th Cir. 2007). An
abuse of discretion occurs only when “the [district] court acted
arbitrarily or irrationally in admitting evidence.” United
States v. Williams, 445 F.3d 724, 732 (4th Cir. 2006) (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted).
Evans argues that the district court erred in
admitting the evidence because its probative value was
substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect. A district
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court should exclude relevant evidence when “its probative value
is ‘substantially outweighed’ by the potential for undue
prejudice, confusion, delay or redundancy.” United States v.
Queen, 132 F.3d 991, 994 (4th Cir. 1997) (quoting Fed. R. Evid.
403). “Prejudice, as used in Rule 403, refers to evidence that
has an ‘undue tendency to suggest decision on an improper basis,
commonly, though not necessarily, an emotional one.’” Id.
(citations omitted). We have thoroughly reviewed the record and
conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in
admitting the evidence.
Evans next challenges the district court’s denial of
his motion for a continuance after the Government inadvertently
failed to timely provide the laboratory report of DNA found on
the body armor. This court reviews a district court’s denial of
a continuance for abuse of discretion. Williams, 445 F.3d at
739 (citations omitted). “[E]ven if such an abuse is found, the
defendant must show that the error specifically prejudiced [his]
case in order to prevail.” Id. (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted). We have thoroughly reviewed the record and
conclude that Evans has failed to demonstrate that the district
court committed error, let alone that prejudiced his case.
Evans next argues that the district court erred in
refusing to reopen the evidence after a witness who previously
refused to testify indicated his willingness to take the stand
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after the close of the evidence. This court reviews a district
court’s decision on whether to reopen a case for abuse of
discretion. United States v. Nunez, 432 F.3d 573, 579 (4th Cir.
2005) (citation omitted).
When reviewing whether or not the judge abused his
discretion in not reopening a case, we examine
(1) whether the party moving to reopen provided a
reasonable explanation for failing to present the
evidence in its case-in-chief; (2) whether the
evidence was relevant, admissible, or helpful to the
jury; and (3) whether reopening the case would have
infused the evidence with distorted importance,
prejudiced the opposing party’s case, or precluded the
opposing party from meeting the evidence.
United States v. Abbas, 74 F.3d 506, 511 (4th Cir. 1996)
(citation omitted). Our thorough review of the record persuades
us that the district court carefully and equitably balanced the
competing interests at stake in rendering its ruling.
Accordingly, we conclude that Evans has failed to demonstrate
that the district court abused its discretion in refusing his
request to reopen the evidence.
Finally, Evans challenges the sufficiency of the
evidence on his convictions for possession of a firearm and
possession of ammunition. This court reviews a district court’s
decision to deny a Fed. R. Crim. P. 29 motion for a judgment of
acquittal de novo. United States v. Smith, 451 F.3d 209, 216-17
(4th Cir. 2006). A defendant challenging the sufficiency of the
evidence faces a heavy burden. United States v. Beidler, 110
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F.3d 1064, 1067 (4th Cir. 1997). The verdict of a jury must be
sustained “if, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable
to the prosecution, the verdict is supported by ‘substantial
evidence.’” Smith, 451 F.3d at 216 (citations omitted).
Substantial evidence is “evidence that a reasonable finder of
fact could accept as adequate and sufficient to support a
conclusion of a defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.”
Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Furthermore, “[t]he jury, not the reviewing court, weighs the
credibility of the evidence and resolves any conflicts in the
evidence presented.” Beidler, 110 F.3d at 1067 (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted). “Reversal for
insufficient evidence is reserved for the rare case where the
prosecution’s failure is clear.” Id. (internal quotation marks
and citation omitted).
To establish a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), the
Government was required to prove that: (1) Evans was a convicted
felon; (2) he knowingly possessed the firearm and ammunition;
and (3) the firearm and ammunition traveled in interstate
commerce. United States v. Gallimore, 247 F.3d 134, 136 (4th
Cir. 2001). In order to prove possession under § 922(g), the
Government need not prove “actual or exclusive possession,
[rather] constructive or joint possession is sufficient.” Id.
at 136-37 (citation omitted). Moreover, “the Government may
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prove constructive possession by demonstrating that the
defendant exercised, or had the power to exercise, dominion and
control over the item.” Id. at 137 (internal quotation marks
and citation omitted). Assessed in its entirety, the record
confirms that the Government presented overwhelming evidence
from which a rational jury could reasonably conclude that Evans
possessed the firearm and the ammunition.
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district
court. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before the court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED
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