UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 09-4382
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
TARANDEEP SINGH,
Defendant – Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Baltimore. J. Frederick Motz, District Judge.
(1:08-cr-00423-JFM-1)
Submitted: January 8, 2010 Decided: February 2, 2010
Before MICHAEL, GREGORY, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.
Dismissed in part; affirmed in part by unpublished per curiam
opinion.
William A. Mitchell, Jr., Greenbelt, Maryland, for Appellant.
James G. Warwick, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY,
Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Tarandeep Singh pled guilty, pursuant to a written
plea agreement, to one count of aggravated identity theft, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(a)(1) (2006), and one count of
making a false statement in an application for a passport, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1542 (2006). The district court
sentenced Singh to two years and one day in prison. On appeal,
Singh’s counsel has filed an Anders * brief noting that there are
no meritorious issues for appeal, but questioning whether the
district court erred in accepting Singh’s guilty plea on the
aggravated identity theft count on the ground that the factual
basis supporting the plea did not provide that Singh knew that
the identity he used in obtaining the passport was that of an
actual person. The Government has moved to dismiss the appeal
based on Singh’s waiver of appellate rights. We dismiss in part
and affirm in part.
A defendant may waive the right to appeal if that
waiver is knowing and intelligent. United States v. Poindexter,
492 F.3d 263, 270 (4th Cir. 2007). Generally, if the district
court fully questions a defendant regarding the waiver of his
right to appeal during the plea colloquy performed in accordance
with Fed. R. Crim. P. 11, the waiver is both valid and
*
Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967).
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enforceable. See United States v. Johnson, 410 F.3d 137, 151
(4th Cir. 2005); United States v. Wessells, 936 F.2d 165, 167-68
(4th Cir. 1991). The question of whether a defendant validly
waived his right to appeal is a question of law that this court
reviews de novo. United States v. Blick, 408 F.3d 162, 168
(4th Cir. 2005).
Our review of the record leads us to conclude that
Singh knowingly and voluntarily waived the right to appeal his
sentence. We therefore grant the Government’s motion in part
and dismiss Singh’s appeal of his sentence. Although Singh’s
appeal waiver insulates his sentence from appellate review, the
waiver does not preclude our consideration of the claim Singh’s
counsel raises on appeal or prohibit our review of the record
pursuant to Anders. Consequently, we deny the motion to dismiss
in part.
Turning, then, to the claim raised in Singh’s
appellate brief, counsel challenges the district court’s
acceptance of Singh’s guilty plea on the aggravated identity
theft count on the ground that the factual basis supporting his
plea did not explicitly indicate that Singh knew that the
individual whose identity was used in obtaining the passport was
an actual person. The Supreme Court recently agreed that this
argument, if valid, states a viable defense. Flores-Figueroa v.
United States, 129 S. Ct. 1886 (2009). Flores-Figueroa held
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that 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(a)(1) “requires the Government to show
that the defendant knew that the means of identification at
issue belonged to another person.” Id. at 1894. Because Singh
did not move to withdraw his guilty plea in the district court,
this claim is reviewed for plain error. United States v.
Martinez, 277 F.3d 517, 524-27 (4th Cir. 2002).
In this case, Singh provided the district court with a
signed statement of facts in which he admitted that the birth
certificate and driver’s license he used to obtain a passport
belonged to an actual person. Further, the record reveals that
Singh knew that the certificate and license belonged to another
person. See United States v. DeFusco, 949 F.2d 114, 120
(4th Cir. 1991) (concluding that Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 does not
require the district court to establish through colloquy that a
factual basis exists for the plea). Because a sufficient basis
in fact exists to support Singh’s guilty plea to the aggravated
identity theft count under § 1028A(a)(1), we discern no plain
error.
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the
remainder of the record in this case and have found no
meritorious issues for appeal. We therefore affirm Singh’s
convictions and dismiss the appeal of his sentence. This court
requires that counsel inform Singh, in writing, of the right to
petition the Supreme Court of the United States for further
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review. If Singh requests that a petition be filed, but counsel
believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel
may move in this court for leave to withdraw from
representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof
was served on Singh.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before the court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
DISMISSED IN PART;
AFFIRMED IN PART
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