UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 09-1535
DANIEL F. STEWART,
Plaintiff – Appellant,
v.
SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION,
Defendant – Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Greenbelt. Peter J. Messitte, Senior District
Judge. (8:09-cv-00781-PJM)
Submitted: January 25, 2010 Decided: February 10, 2010
Before WILKINSON, DUNCAN, and AGEE, Circuit Judges.
Vacated and remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Daniel F. Stewart, Appellant Pro Se.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
While an inmate at the Eastern Pre-Release Unit in
Maryland, Daniel Floyd Stewart filed a complaint on March 24,
2009, against the Social Security Administration (“SSA”). The
court directed Stewart to submit additional information because
the complaint did not make clear what decision he was
challenging and on what basis. Based on the supplemental
documentation filed by Stewart, it was discerned that an
Administrative Law Judge denied Stewart supplemental security
income payments from November 19, 2003, through June 29, 2006,
the date he was incarcerated, and that the Appeals Council
denied the appeal on December 18, 2008. The district court
dismissed the complaint as untimely filed. We vacate the
district court’s order and remand for further proceedings.
Under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (2006), an individual may
obtain review of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social
Security in federal district court by commencing a civil action
“within sixty days after the mailing to him of notice of such
decision or within such further time as the Commissioner of
Social Security may allow.” 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The
regulations clarify that a civil action must be commenced within
sixty days after the Appeals Council’s decision “is received by
the individual . . . except that this time may be extended by
the Appeals Council upon a showing of good cause.” 20 C.F.R.
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§ 422.210(c) (2009). The date of receipt of the notice is
presumed to be five days after the date of such notice, unless
there is a reasonable showing to the contrary. Id.
On its face, Stewart’s complaint, dated March 21,
2009, is clearly untimely. However, Stewart submits on appeal,
as he did below through a letter he attached to his complaint,
that the Appeals Council extended his time to file a judicial
complaint. The Council’s letter specifically states that the
Council received Stewart’s request for more time to file a civil
action and that the Council grants Stewart a forty-five day
extension of time to file a civil complaint from the date of
receipt of the Council’s letter, dated February 26, 2009.
Because the Appeals Council is authorized to extend
the time for filing a judicial complaint, Stewart received such
an extension, and his complaint is timely filed in light of the
extension, we vacate the district court’s order and remand for
the district court’s consideration of Stewart’s complaint as
timely filed. We dispense with oral argument because the facts
and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before the court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
VACATED AND REMANDED
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