UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 09-4784
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
JAMES CURTIS SPEARS,
Defendant – Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle
District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. N. Carlton
Tilley, Jr., Senior District Judge. (1:07-cr-00372-NCT-1)
Submitted: January 22, 2010 Decided: February 25, 2010
Before NIEMEYER, MOTZ, and SHEDD, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Christopher A. Beechler, Winston-Salem, North Carolina, for
Appellant. Harry L. Hobgood, Assistant United States Attorney,
Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
James Curtis Spears pled guilty, pursuant to a plea
agreement, to one count of distribution of cocaine base, in
violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A) (2006). The
district court calculated Spears’ advisory Guidelines
imprisonment range under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual
(2008) at 262 to 327 months, but granted Spears’ request for a
downward variance and imposed a sentence of 240 months’
imprisonment, the minimum imprisonment term required by statute.
Spears now appeals. Counsel has filed a brief pursuant to
Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), stating that the
appeal is frivolous. Spears was informed of his right to file a
pro se supplemental brief but has not done so, and the
Government declined to file a brief. We affirm.
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire
record in this case and have found no meritorious issues for
review. Our review of the transcript of the plea hearing leads
us to conclude that the district court substantially complied
with the mandates of Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 in accepting Spears’
guilty plea and that Spears’ substantial rights were not
infringed. Critically, the transcript reveals that the district
court ensured that the plea was supported by an independent
factual basis and that Spears entered the plea knowingly and
voluntarily with an understanding of the attendant consequences.
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See United States v. DeFusco, 949 F.2d 114, 116, 119-20
(4th Cir. 1991).
Turning to Spears’ sentence, we review it for
reasonableness, applying an abuse-of-discretion standard.
Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). In conducting
this review, we first examine the sentence for “significant
procedural error, such as failing to calculate (or improperly
calculating) the Guidelines range, treating the Guidelines as
mandatory, failing to consider the [18 U.S.C.] § 3553(a)
[(2006)] factors, selecting a sentence based on clearly
erroneous facts, or failing to adequately explain the chosen
sentence.” Id. When “rendering a sentence, the district court
must make an individualized assessment based on the facts
presented,” applying the “relevant § 3553(a) factors to the
specific circumstances” of the case and the defendant, and “must
state in open court the particular reasons supporting its chosen
sentence.” United States v. Carter, 564 F.3d 325, 328
(4th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and emphasis omitted).
If the sentence is free from procedural error, we then
consider the substantive reasonableness of the sentence. Gall,
552 U.S. at 51; United States v. Evans, 526 F.3d 155, 161
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 476 (2008). “Substantive
reasonableness review entails taking into account the ‘totality
of the circumstances, including the extent of any variance from
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the Guidelines range.’” United States v. Pauley, 511 F.3d 468,
473 (4th Cir. 2007) (quoting Gall, 552 U.S. at 51). Even if we
would have imposed a different sentence, “this fact alone is
insufficient to justify reversal of the district court.” Id. at
474 (internal quotation marks omitted). Further, “[a]
statutorily required sentence . . . is per se reasonable.”
United States v. Farrior, 535 F.3d 210, 224 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 129 S. Ct. 743 (2008).
Here, the district court correctly calculated the
advisory Guidelines range and heard argument from the parties on
the appropriate sentence and allocution from Spears. The court
considered relevant § 3553(a) factors, addressing on the record
the nature and circumstances of the offense, Spears’ history and
characteristics, and the need for the sentence to reflect the
seriousness of Spears’ offense, promote respect for the law, and
deter Spears. In granting Spears’ request for a downward
variance, the court explained that it considered the need to
provide just punishment for Spears. Based on these factors, the
court concluded that a sentence of 240 months’ imprisonment, the
minimum imprisonment term required by statute, was sufficient,
but not greater than necessary, to achieve the purposes of
sentencing. We conclude that the district court adequately
explained its rationale for imposing the variant sentence and
that the reasons relied upon by the district court are valid
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considerations under § 3553(a) and justify the sentence imposed.
See Pauley, 511 F.3d at 473-76. Further, the 240-month prison
term was the minimum term required by statute, and a
statutorily-required prison term is always reasonable. See
Farrior, 535 F.3d at 224. Thus, we conclude that the district
court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing Spears.
We therefore affirm the district court’s judgment.
This court requires that counsel inform Spears, in writing, of
the right to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for
further review. If Spears requests that a petition be filed,
but counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous,
then counsel may move in this court for leave to withdraw from
representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof
was served on Spears. We dispense with oral argument because
the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the
materials before the court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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