Case: 12-14571 Date Filed: 07/05/2013 Page: 1 of 9
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 12-14571
Non-Argument Calendar
________________________
Agency No. A089-941-599
JINXIAN LIN,
Petitioner,
versus
U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL,
Respondent.
________________________
Petition for Review of a Decision of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
________________________
(July 5, 2013)
Before TJOFLAT, PRYOR and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Jinxian Lin, a Chinese national, petitions for review of the Board of
Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) decision affirming the Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”)
Case: 12-14571 Date Filed: 07/05/2013 Page: 2 of 9
denial of asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the United Nations
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment (“CAT”). Lin maintains that she was persecuted based on her
Christian religion and her attendance at a small underground church in China that
consisted of approximately ten people. Chinese officials interrupted the church
meetings twice, and, after the first interruption, she was detained for one day,
slapped once, and fined. After the second disruption of the church gathering, Lin
escaped, although other congregants were arrested. Lin eventually fled to the
United States.
Lin argues that the agency erred by concluding that she had not established
past persecution because her mistreatment by the Chinese officials rose to the level
of persecution. Lin also contends that the BIA and IJ erred because she established
a well-founded fear of future persecution. Finally, she argues that the agency’s
conclusion that she could relocate within China was error. After careful review,
we deny the petition.
I.
Because the BIA expressly adopted the IJ’s opinion, we review both the IJ’s
and the BIA’s opinions. See Seck v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 663 F.3d 1356, 1364 (11th
Cir. 2011). We review legal determinations de novo, but we review administrative
fact findings for substantial evidence, a highly deferential standard. Ayala v. U.S.
2
Case: 12-14571 Date Filed: 07/05/2013 Page: 3 of 9
Att’y Gen., 605 F.3d 941, 948 (11th Cir. 2010). Under the substantial evidence
test, we will affirm the IJ’s decision “if it is supported by reasonable, substantial,
and probative evidence on the record considered as a whole.” Id. We may reverse
only when doing so is compelled by the record, and we may not reweigh the
evidence from scratch. Id. The substantial evidence test requires that we view the
evidence in the record in the light most favorable to the agency’s decision and
draw all reasonable inferences in favor of that decision. Seck, 663 F.3d at 1364.
An alien who is present in the United States may apply for asylum.
Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) § 208(a)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(1). The
government has the discretion to grant asylum if the alien establishes that she is a
“refugee.” INA § 208(b)(1)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(A). A refugee is a person
“who is unable or unwilling to return to, and is unable or unwilling to avail himself
or herself of the protection of, [her country of nationality] because of persecution
or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of . . . religion.” INA
§ 101(a)(42), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42).
Generally, an applicant for asylum must establish either (1) past persecution
on account of a protected ground, or (2) a well-founded fear of future persecution
on account of a protected ground. Sepulveda v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 401 F.3d 1226,
1230-31 (11th Cir. 2005). Persecution is an extreme concept that requires more
than a few isolated incidents of verbal harassment or intimidation, and mere
3
Case: 12-14571 Date Filed: 07/05/2013 Page: 4 of 9
harassment does not constitute persecution. Zheng v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 451 F.3d
1287, 1290-91 (11th Cir. 2006) (holding that the record did not compel a
conclusion that the petitioner experienced past persecution based on a five-day
detention during which he was forced to watch anti-Falun Gong reeducation
videos, to stand in the sun for two hours, and to sign a pledge to no longer practice
Falun Gong). We evaluate the harm that a petitioner suffered cumulatively and by
considering the totality of the circumstances on a case-by-case basis. Shi v. U.S.
Att’y Gen., 707 F.3d 1231, 1235-36 (11th Cir. 2013).
For example, in Djonda v. United States Attorney General, 514 F.3d 1168,
1171, 1174 (11th Cir. 2008), we concluded that a beating in which the petitioner
suffered only scratches and bruises during a 36-hour detention combined with
threats of a future arrest did not compel the conclusion that the petitioner had
suffered past persecution. Additionally, in Kazemzadeh v. United States Attorney
General, 577 F.3d 1341, 1352-53 (11th Cir. 2009), we held that a five-hour
interrogation and beating, coupled with the petitioner being detained for four days,
was not enough to compel the conclusion that the petitioner suffered persecution as
opposed to harassment.
By contrast, in Shi, Chinese officials interrupted a Christian church service
in the petitioner’s father’s home, arrested the petitioner, his father, and other
worshippers, and confiscated their Bibles. Id. at 1232. The officials detained the
4
Case: 12-14571 Date Filed: 07/05/2013 Page: 5 of 9
petitioner for seven days and interrogated him. Id. at 1233. Shi was slapped, told
that he had been brainwashed, and eventually handcuffed to an iron bar overnight
in the rain, which left him ill. Id. We granted Shi’s petition for review, holding
that his case was “extreme enough to compel a finding that Shi suffered past
persecution on account of practicing his religion in China.” Id. at 1236. We
emphasized: (1) the interruption of a private church service and the attempts to
coerce Shi to abandon his religious convictions; (2) the illegality of the meeting
itself; (3) the confiscation of the group’s Bibles; (4) Shi’s weeklong detention; and
(5) “the unusual nature of the authorities’ efforts to suppress Shi’s religious
practice,” including his being handcuffed to an iron bar. Id. at 1236-38. We
distinguished the case from Zheng and Djonda because Shi involved a longer
period of detention, the interruption of a private church service and confiscation of
religious materials rendered the persecution particularly invidious, and handcuffing
an individual to an iron bar overnight in the rain was a “singularly cruel” tactic. Id.
at 1239.
An asylum applicant is required to present specific and credible evidence in
support of her application. De Santamaria v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 525 F.3d 999, 1007
(11th Cir. 2008). So long as reasoned consideration is given to the petition and
adequate findings are made, we do not require the BIA and the IJ to discuss each
piece of evidence that the petitioner presented. Seck, 663 F.3d at 1364, 1367. The
5
Case: 12-14571 Date Filed: 07/05/2013 Page: 6 of 9
agency, moreover, is entitled to discount unauthenticated documents, see Yang v.
U.S. Att’y Gen., 418 F.3d 1198, 1202 n.3 (11th Cir. 2005), and may rely heavily on
the US State Department reports, Reyes-Sanchez v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 369 F.3d 1239,
1243 (11th Cir. 2004).
To qualify for withholding of removal, an applicant must establish that her
life or freedom would be threatened in the country of origin on account of a
statutorily protected ground. INA § 241(b)(3)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A). The
applicant must demonstrate that she would “more likely than not” be persecuted
upon being returned to her country of origin. Sepulveda, 401 F.3d at 1232. An
applicant who is unable to satisfy the standard for asylum generally will be unable
to meet the more stringent standard for withholding of removal. Id. at 1232-33.
Here, substantial evidence supported the agency’s conclusion that Lin did
not establish past persecution in China on the basis of her Christian beliefs because
Lin’s experiences did not rise to the level of persecution. See Kazemzadeh, 577
F.3d at 1352-53; Djonda, 514 F.3d at 1171, 1174; Zheng, 451 F.3d at 1290-91.
The facts here are more akin to the harassment in Zheng, Djonda, and Kazemzadeh
as opposed to the persecution in Shi and do “not compel the conclusion that [Lin]
experienced past persecution.” See Zheng, 451 F.3d at 1290. Lin’s testimony that
she had been detained for one day and one night and had been slapped on one
6
Case: 12-14571 Date Filed: 07/05/2013 Page: 7 of 9
occasion, and that she was then released after paying a fine, does not amount to
persecution under our prior case law.
II.
Where an asylum applicant does not demonstrate past persecution, she may
nevertheless obtain relief if she establishes a well-founded fear of future
persecution. De Santamaria, 525 F.3d at 1007. An asylum applicant must
demonstrate that there is “a reasonable possibility” of persecution if the applicant
returned to her country of origin. Chen v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 672 F.3d 961, 965 (11th
Cir. 2011). The applicant must prove that she has “(1) a subjectively genuine and
objectively reasonable fear of persecution that is (2) on account of a protected
ground.” De Santamaria, 525 F.3d at 1007. Generally, an applicant can fulfill the
subjective prong of this test by providing credible testimony that she genuinely
fears persecution. Id. The objective prong requires that the applicant establish that
she “has a good reason to fear future persecution.” Id. (quotation omitted).
Under the relevant regulations, even if an asylum applicant establishes that
she is a refugee, the agency may deny asylum if the applicant could avoid future
persecution by relocating to another part of her country of nationality and it would
be reasonable to expect the applicant to do so. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1)(i)(B),
(b)(2)(ii). If the alleged persecutor is the government, it is presumed that internal
relocation would not be reasonable, unless the government establishes by a
7
Case: 12-14571 Date Filed: 07/05/2013 Page: 8 of 9
preponderance of the evidence that it would be reasonable for the asylum applicant
to relocate. Id. § 1208.13(b)(3)(ii).
Even assuming arguendo that Lin established a well-founded fear of future
persecution, substantial evidence supported the agency’s conclusion that it would
be reasonable for Lin to relocate within China. The agency relied on the
information in the State Department reports to conclude that it was unlikely that
Lin would be persecuted if she returned to China, and the agency was entitled to
heavily rely on such reports. See Reyes-Sanchez, 369 F.3d at 1243. The State
Department report indicates that, inter alia, small churches that gathered to read
and discuss the Bible were unlikely to be targeted by government officials and that,
in various locations in China, small underground churches similar to the one that
Lin attended were tolerated by the government. Lin’s testimony, which the IJ
found “marginally credible,” and her unauthenticated corroborating documents are
not enough to compel reversal of the IJ’s finding that it would be reasonable for
Lin to relocate within China.1
1
The district court did not err by assigning her corroborating documents “very little
weight” because we have held that unauthenticated documents cannot be depended on for their
veracity. See Yang, 418 F.3d at 1202 n.3; see also Kazemzadeh, 577 F.3d at 1353 (“The [BIA]
was entitled to discount the evidence because the documents had not been authenticated.”).
8
Case: 12-14571 Date Filed: 07/05/2013 Page: 9 of 9
As Lin has failed to establish her entitlement to asylum, she cannot establish
entitlement to withholding of removal. See Sepulveda, 401 F.3d at 1232. 2
III.
Upon review of the record and consideration of the parties’ briefs, we deny
the petition.
PETITION DENIED.
2
Lin has insufficiently raised her claim for CAT relief on appeal, and thus we deem this
issue waived. However, even if we were to hold that this issue was properly raised, Lin has not
established that the record compels reversal on the CAT claim because she has not established
that “it is more likely than not that she will be subjected to pain and suffering at the hands or
acquiescence of the government.” See Lapaix v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 605 F.3d 1138, 1145 (11th Cir.
2010). The burden of proof to obtain CAT relief is higher than the burden for showing eligibility
for asylum. Id.
9