UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 13-1127
SUNDERSINGH BALA,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA DEPARTMENT OF CONSERVATION AND
RECREATION,
Defendant - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Richmond. Henry E. Hudson, District
Judge. (3:12-cv-00748-HEH)
Submitted: June 28, 2013 Decided: July 5, 2013
Before MOTZ, SHEDD, and WYNN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded by unpublished
per curiam opinion.
Sundersingh Bala, Appellant Pro Se. Nicholas Foris Simopoulos,
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF VIRGINIA, Richmond, Virginia,
for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Sundersingh Bala appeals the district court’s order
dismissing, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), his action
alleging violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, as amended (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17
(West 2003 & Supp. 2013). Bala, an East Indian and naturalized
United States citizen, alleged that his employer, the
Commonwealth of Virginia Department of Conservation and
Recreation (“DCR”), discriminated and retaliated against him in
violation of Title VII by laying him off and subsequently
failing to select him for an interview for an open position.
Bala’s complaint also asserted that DCR conspired to violate his
civil rights. In granting DCR’s motion to dismiss, the district
court held that Bala’s discrimination and retaliation claims
failed to allege facts sufficient to survive analysis under the
framework set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411
U.S. 792, 802 (1973). The court also concluded that Bala failed
to allege facts sufficient to establish a conspiracy claim. For
the reasons that follow, we affirm in part, vacate in part, and
remand.
This court reviews de novo a district court’s order
dismissing a complaint for failure to state a claim, assuming
that all well-pleaded nonconclusory factual allegations in the
complaint are true. Aziz v. Alcolac, Inc., 658 F.3d 388, 391
2
(4th Cir. 2011). A Rule 12(b)(6) motion challenges the legal
sufficiency of the complaint. Francis v. Giacomelli, 588 F.3d
186, 192 (4th Cir. 2009).
“To survive a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule
12(b)(6), plaintiff’s ‘[f]actual allegations must be enough to
raise a right to relief above the speculative level,’ thereby
‘nudg[ing] their claims across the line from conceivable to
plausible.’” Aziz, 658 F.3d at 391 (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). While a court must accept
the material facts alleged in the complaint as true, Edwards v.
City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 244 (4th Cir. 1999), statements
of bare legal conclusions “are not entitled to the assumption of
truth” and are insufficient to state a claim. Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). “Although the Supreme Court
has made clear that the factual allegations in a complaint must
make entitlement to relief plausible and not merely possible,
what Rule 12(b)(6) does not countenance are dismissals based on
a judge’s disbelief of a complaint's factual allegations.”
McLean v. United States, 566 F.3d 391, 399 (4th Cir. 2009)
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Moreover, if
a claim lacks merit, it “may be dealt with through summary
judgment under Rule 56.” Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S.
506, 514 (2002). Finally, a pro se complaint “is to be
liberally construed, . . . and . . . must be held to less
3
stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.”
Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (internal quotation
marks and citations omitted).
In reviewing the dismissal of a complaint under Rule
12(b)(6), we “may consider documents attached to the complaint
. . . as well as those attached to the motion to dismiss, so
long as they are integral to the complaint and authentic.”
Sec’y of State for Defence v. Trimble Navigation Ltd., 484 F.3d
700, 705 (4th Cir. 2007). The district court may go beyond the
complaint and attached documents, which constitute “the
pleadings,” in a Rule 12(b)(6) proceeding if the court converts
the proceeding to one for summary judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(d). But, conversion of a motion to dismiss to one for
summary judgment requires that “[a]ll parties must be given a
reasonable opportunity to present all the material that is
pertinent to the motion.” Id.
The district court analyzed Bala’s discrimination and
retaliation claims under the burden-shifting framework adopted
by the Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas, requiring Bala at a
minimum to allege a prima facie case as to each of his claims.
In the employment discrimination context, however, a plaintiff
need not establish a prima facie case under McDonnell Douglas in
order to survive a motion to dismiss. Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at
510-11 (concluding that “the prima facie case . . . is an
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evidentiary standard, not a pleading requirement.”). “This
Court has never indicated that the requirements for establishing
a prima facie case under McDonnell Douglas also apply to the
pleading standard that plaintiffs must satisfy in order to
survive a motion to dismiss.” Id. at 511. Complaints in such
cases therefore “must satisfy only the simple requirements of
Rule 8(a).” Id. at 513.
On appeal, Bala challenges the district court’s
disposition of his discrimination and retaliation claims. 1 Bala
does not specifically argue that the district court erred in
analyzing his claims under McDonnell Douglas. As a pro se
litigant, however, Bala is entitled to liberal construction of
his pleadings. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972).
We therefore construe Bala’s informal brief to advance the
alternative argument that the district court erred in dismissing
his claims based solely on his failure to survive the McDonnell
Douglas analysis.
The Supreme Court in Swierkiewicz held that a
plaintiff had sufficiently pleaded a complaint of national-
origin discrimination when his complaint alleged a violation of
Title VII and “detailed the events leading to his termination,
1
Bala concedes on appeal that his claim alleging that DCR
conspired to violate his civil rights was insufficient to
survive the motion to dismiss.
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provided relevant dates, and included the . . . nationalities of
at least some of the relevant persons involved with his
termination.” 534 U.S. at 514.
Bala’s complaint first alleged a discrimination claim
against DCR arising from his layoff (Claim One). Bala provided
details and the relevant dates of his employment and of the
events leading to the termination of his position. However, he
did not provide the nationalities of any of the relevant persons
involved with DCR’s decision to lay him off or otherwise allege
facts supporting his assertion that the decision was influenced
by his national origin or race. Taking these allegations as
true, as is required in consideration of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion,
we nonetheless conclude that this claim is insufficient to
survive DCR’s motion to dismiss. Accordingly, we affirm the
portion of the district court’s order dismissing Bala’s
discrimination claim arising from his layoff.
Bala’s complaint next alleged that DCR discriminated
against him on the basis of national origin and race in
declining to select him for an interview (Claim Two). Rather
than consider the face of Bala’s complaint, the district court
allowed DCR to dispute Bala’s discrimination claim by asserting
that Bala had limited experience, received unfavorable
performance reviews, and engaged in prior misconduct. The
district court then dismissed this claim on the bases offered by
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DCR. 2 By allowing DCR to raise facts outside the pleadings, and
relying on those facts to dismiss Bala’s discrimination claim,
the district court permitted DCR to demonstrate that it acted on
a legitimate, nondiscriminatory basis. Because the district
court considered DCR’s proffered legitimate nondiscriminatory
reasons at a procedurally improper time, within the context of a
Rule 12(b)(6) motion, we conclude that the court erred.
Bala’s discrimination claim arising from DCR’s failure
to select him for an interview alleged that DCR’s failure to
interview him for the position was discriminatory based on his
national origin and race, and Bala set forth his qualifications
for the position. He alleged that less qualified applicants
were selected for the interview and that the screening panel for
the position consisted of only one Caucasian male. Taking these
allegations as true, we conclude that the district court erred
in finding Bala’s complaint insufficiently pleaded to state a
claim of race or national origin discrimination sufficient to
survive a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, particularly in light of
Bala’s pro se status.
2
The district court’s order dismissed Bala’s entire action
without prejudice, so the dismissal is immediately reviewable.
See Chaov Rivendell Woods, Inc., 415 F.3d 342, 345 (4th Cir.
2005).
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Likewise, in dismissing Bala’s retaliation claim
arising from DCR’s decision to lay him off (Claim Three), the
district court relied on the assertions contained in DCR’s
motion. By allowing DCR to establish a nondiscriminatory reason
for its conduct, and further concluding that Bala failed to
allege that the stated justification was pretextual, the
district court went outside of the pleadings. By doing so at a
procedurally improper time, the district court erred.
Bala alleged that DCR laid him off as of December 31,
2009, because of his previously filed internal grievances and
EEOC complaints. Bala provided the dates and details of his
protected activities, and attached a number of the grievances to
his complaint. Taking these allegations as true, as we must at
this stage, we conclude that the district court erred in finding
them insufficient to state a claim of retaliation sufficient to
survive a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, particularly in light of
Bala’s pro se status.
Finally, Bala alleged a retaliation claim against DCR
for failing to select him for an interview for a grants
accounting position (Claim Four). He alleged that DCR declined
to interview him in retaliation for his previously filed
internal grievances and EEOC complaints. Bala also provided the
dates and details of his protected activities, and he attached a
number of the grievances to his complaint. Bala set forth his
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qualifications for the position, including his education and
experience working for DCR, and asserted that ten less qualified
applicants were selected to interview for the position. Taking
these allegations as true, as we must, we conclude that the
district court erred in finding them insufficient to state a
claim of retaliation at the Rule 12(b)(6) stage.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district
court’s dismissal of Bala’s discrimination claim arising from
his layoff. However, we hold that Bala’s claims under Title VII
for discrimination relating to DCR’s failure to select him for
an interview and for retaliation relating to DCR’s decision to
lay him off and failure to select him for an interview are
sufficient to withstand Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal. Accordingly,
we vacate the judgment dismissing those claims and remand for
further proceedings.
In holding that these claims survive a motion to
dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), we express no opinion on the
ultimate merits of these claims. On remand and after discovery,
the district court must determine whether issues of triable fact
exist on the elements of Bala’s claims. We dispense with oral
argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately
9
presented in the materials before this court and argument would
not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED IN PART,
VACATED IN PART, AND REMANDED
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