On appeal, appellants argue that the district court erred in
granting summary judgment on their negligence claim on NRS 414.110
immunity grounds. Having reviewed the parties' briefs and appendices,
we affirm the district court's grant of summary judgment. NRS 414.110(1)
creates absolute governmental immunity for "activities relating to
emergency management." In ASAP Storage, Inc. v. City of Sparks, this
court held that emergency management activities include both
preparation activities and response activities. 123 Nev. 639, 654, 173 P.3d
734, 744 (2007). And "[w]hether a pre-emergency act is immune turns
solely on whether it was undertaken by the government in preparing for
an emergency." Id. at 654-55, 173 P.3d at 744-45 (recognizing that NRS
414.110(1) provided immunity for emergency planning activities and
emergency functions related to a flood); see also NRS 414.035 (defining
emergency management as preparation for all emergency functions to
minimize injury and repair damage from emergencies or disasters caused
by floods, fires, and other disasters).
Based on our review of the record on appeal, we conclude that
the district court correctly held that Carson City's construction of the
catchment road fell within the scope of activities covered by NRS
414.110(1) immunity. See ASAP Storage, 123 Nev. at 654, 173 P.3d at 744
(providing that "NRS 414.110(1) creates governmental immunity for
emergency preparation activities as well as emergency responses"). Thus,
given that appellants' complaint alleged only that Carson City was
negligent in constructing the catchment road and did not include claims
for gross negligence, willful misconduct, or bad faith, the district court did
not err in granting Carson City summary judgment on appellants'
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negligence claims on NRS 414.110(1) immunity grounds. 3 ASAP Storage,
123 Nev. at 654-55, 173 P.3d at 744-45; see also Wood v. Safeway, Inc., 121
Nev. 724, 729, 121 P.3d 1026, 1029 (2005) (explaining that summary
judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine issue of material fact
and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law).
Accordingly, we
ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED. 4
, J.
Hardesty
J.
Parraguirre
J.
3Although appellants also argue that granting summary judgment
to respondent before any discovery was conducted was improper, we reject
this contention. Notably, our review of the record provides no indication
that appellants ever made a proper motion for a continuance to allow
further discovery under NRCP 56(f). See Choy v. Ameristar Casinos, Inc.,
127 Nev. „ 265 P.3d 698, 700 (2011) (concluding that the mere
inclusion of a request for a continuance in an opposition to a summary
judgment motion without an accompanying affidavit explaining why the
continuance is being sought does not constitute an adequate request for
further discovery under NRCP 56(1)); Aviation Ventures, Inc. v. Joan
Morris, Inc., 121 Nev. 113, 118, 110 P.3d 59, 62 (2005) (requiring that a
motion for a continuance under NRCP 56(f) provide an explanation of how
further discovery will lead to the creation of a genuine issue of material
fact).
4We have considered appellants' remaining appellate contentions
and conclude that they lack merit.
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cc: Hon. James E. Wilson, District Judge
Laurie A. Yott, Settlement Judge
Scarpello & Huss, Ltd.
Watson Rounds
Carson City Clerk
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