unnecessarily-suggestive-identification procedures we have examined
previously and conclude that no plain error occurred.
Second, appellant claims that the composite duplicate
surveillance videotape should not have been admitted because the copy
malfunctioned and was questionably edited. We review for constitutional
or plain error as appellant failed to object at trial. Id. at 394, 834 P.2d at
402. NRS 52.245 provides that duplicates are admissible to the same
extent as the original unless a genuine question is raised as to the
authenticity of the original or it would be unfair to admit the duplicate in
lieu of the original under the circumstances. Appellant does not challenge
the authenticity of the original video but argues that because the copy
inexplicably malfunctioned at the preliminary hearing, it was unfair to
admit the duplicate over the originals. Burrell testified that she created
the composite from the surveillance footage and identified the material on
the duplicate as being a fair and accurate copy. Appellant fails to show
any unfairness in admitting the composite duplicate surveillance
videotape; he does not suggest that relevant or exculpatory evidence was
deleted or that the duplicate was inaccurate. His bare assertion that the
tape malfunctioned and therefore its admission was clearly unfair does not
persuade us, and we discern no error by the district court in admitting the
composite duplicate surveillance videotape.
Third, appellant argues that he was prejudiced at trial by the
State's use of leading questions, particularly with Burrell. Appellant
failed to object at trial, therefore we review for constitutional or plain
error. Sterling, 108 Nev. at 394, 834 P.2d at 402. District courts have
considerable discretion as to whether to allow leading questions, and
unless the leading questions cause extreme prejudice, their use is not
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ordinarily a ground for reversal. See Leonard v. State, 117 Nev. 53, 70, 17
P.3d 397, 408 (2001); Barcus v. State, 92 Nev. 289, 291, 550 P.2d 411, 412
(1976); Anderson v. Berrum, 36 Nev. 463, 470-71, 136 P. 973, 976 (1913)).
After careful review of the record, we conclude that the leading questions
did not cause appellant any prejudice or undermine the fairness of his
trial. See Rowland v. State, 118 Nev. 31, 38, 39 P.3d 114, 118 (2002).
Fourth, appellant contends that insufficient evidence was
adduced at trial to sustain his conviction of burglary. The standard of
review for a claim of insufficient evidence is whether the evidence, when
viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, was sufficient to
establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt as determined by a rational trier
of fact. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); McNair v. State, 108
Nev. 53, 56, 825 P.2d 571, 573 (1992). What weight and credibility to give
conflicting testimony is for the jury to determine, and a reviewing court
will not disturb a verdict if it is supported by substantial evidence. Bolden
v. State, 97 Nev. 71, 73, 624 P.2d 20, 20 (1981).
Appellant claims that the State failed to establish that he had
the requisite intent to commit a larceny when he had authorization to be
in the hotel. 'As in any other case where the intent is material, the intent
need not be proved by positive or direct evidence, but may be inferred from
the conduct of the parties and the other facts and circumstances disclosed
by the evidence." Mathis v. State, 82 Nev. 402, 406, 419 P.2d 775, 777
(1966) (quoting State v. Thompson, 31 Nev. 209, 217, 101 P. 557, 560
(1909)); see also NRS 193.200 ("Intention is manifested by the
circumstances connected with the perpetration of the offense, and the
sound mind and discretion of the person accused."). The jury heard
testimony that, although appellant was not a registered guest, he had
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permission from the director of hotel security to visit the guestroom area
to briefly speak with friends who were staying at the hotel. The jury
observed appellant on videotape speaking to a hotel maid then going into a
guestroom he had no permission to enter. The jury saw appellant leaving
the area with property that was later discovered to be missing from the
guestroom. From the evidence presented, a juror could reasonably infer
that appellant had the requisite intent to commit larceny upon entering
the guestroom.
Having considered appellant's claims' and concluded that no
relief is warranted, we
ORDER the judgment of conviction AFFIRMED.
/ ,J.
cc: Hon. Abbi Silver, District Judge
Oronoz & Ericsson
Attorney General/Carson City
Clark County District Attorney
Eighth District Court Clerk
'Appellant initially raised an insufficiency-of-evidence claim with
regard to his conviction of preventing or dissuading a witness from
testifying or producing evidence but subsequently withdrew the claim.
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