State, 112 Nev. 980, 988, 923 P.2d 1102, 1107 (1996). Both components of
the inquiry must be shown. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 697
(1984).
First, appellant claimed that counsel was ineffective for
advising him that he had stipulated in the plea agreement to a 50-year
sentence rather than a life sentence. Appellant failed to demonstrate that
his counsel's performance was deficient or that he was prejudiced. At the
plea canvass, the district court advised appellant that the plea agreement
stipulated to the life sentence and appellant acknowledged that was an
accurate statement of the agreement. Appellant failed to demonstrate a
reasonable probability that he would have refused to plead guilty and
would have insisted on trial had counsel further explained to him that he
agreed to a life sentence. Therefore, the district court did not err in
denying this claim.
Second, appellant claimed that counsel refused to file motions.
Appellant failed to demonstrate deficiency or that he was prejudiced
because he did not identify any motions that counsel refused to file. See
Hargrove v. State, 100 Nev. 498, 502, 686 P.2d 222, 225 (1984). Therefore,
the district court did not err in denying this claim.
Third, appellant claimed that counsel failed to properly
communicate with, inform, or advise him. Appellant also claimed that
counsel did not discuss, pursue, or investigate defense strategy. Appellant
failed to demonstrate that his counsel's performance was deficient or that
he was prejudiced. Appellant acknowledged in the guilty plea agreement
and at the plea canvass that he had discussed the charges and possible
defense strategies with his attorney. Appellant failed to demonstrate that
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he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial
had counsel and he had further discussions. Therefore, the district court
did not err in denying this claim.
Fourth, appellant claimed that counsel did not acknowledge
his assertions of innocence. Appellant failed to demonstrate that his
counsel's performance was deficient or that he was prejudiced. Appellant
confessed to both the murder and to child abuse of the respective child
victims. Appellant failed to demonstrate he would not have pleaded guilty
and would have insisted on going to trial had counsel acknowledged his
assertions of innocence. Therefore, the district court did not err in
denying this claim.
Fifth, appellant claimed that counsel did not inform him of the
possible minimum and maximum sentences, and misinformed him about
parole eligibility. Appellant failed to demonstrate that his counsel's
performance was deficient or that he was prejudiced. At the plea canvass,
the district court informed appellant about the possible minimum and
maximum sentences. In addition, appellant was correctly informed about
parole eligibility in the guilty plea agreement and at the plea canvass.
Appellant failed to demonstrate he would not have pleaded guilty and
would have insisted on going to trial had counsel explained these issues in
more detail. Therefore, the district court did not err in denying this claim.
Sixth, appellant claimed that his counsel was conflicted.
However, appellant provided no facts regarding this claim and bare claims
are insufficient to demonstrate that appellant was entitled to relief. See
Hargrove, 100 Nev. at 502, 686 P.2d at 225. Accordingly, appellant failed
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11.41
to meet his burden to establish that his counsel was conflicted. Therefore,
the district court did not err in denying this claim.
Seventh, appellant claimed that his counsel coerced his guilty
plea. Appellant failed to demonstrate that his counsel's performance was
deficient or that he was prejudiced. Appellant acknowledged in the guilty
plea agreement and at the plea canvass that he entered his guilty plea
voluntarily and did not act under duress or coercion. Therefore, the
district court did not err in denying this claim.
Eighth, appellant claimed that his counsel convinced him to
commit perjury. Appellant failed to demonstrate that his counsel's
performance was deficient or that he was prejudiced. Appellant did not
identify any statements he made which were untrue and made only a bare
claim regarding this issue, which was insufficient to demonstrate he was
entitled to relief. See id. Therefore, the district court did not err in
denying this claim.
Ninth, appellant claimed that his counsel waived his right to a
preliminary hearing without his consent and that both the State and his
counsel committed perjury. These claims were not based on an allegation
that his plea was involuntarily or unknowingly entered or that his plea
was entered without effective assistance of counsel, and therefore, were
not permissible in a post-conviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus
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stemming from a guilty plea. See NRS 34.810(1)(a). Therefore, the
district court did not err in denying these claims. 2
Having concluded that appellant is not entitled to relief, we
ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED.
Hardesty
"p2....‘X
4
Parraguirre
J.
cc: Hon. Michelle Leavitt, District Judge
Jesse Parsons
Attorney General/Carson City
Clark County District Attorney
Eighth District Court Clerk
2As a separate and independent ground for denying appellant's
claim that his counsel waived his preliminary hearing without his consent,
this claim is belied by the record. Appellant personally stated at the
hearing that he understood he had a right to a preliminary hearing and
agreed to waive his right to that hearing.
5
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