an abuse of discretion. Arnold v. Kip, 123 Nev. 410, 414, 168 P.3d 1050,
1052 (2007).
On appeal, appellant contends that he complied with both of
NRCP 16.1(e)'s requirements. Specifically, he contends that a July 15,
2010, phone conversation with respondents' counsel constituted the case
conference and that a June 18, 2010, filing with the district court
constituted his case conference report. As the district court pointed out,
however, appellant's June 18 filing preceded the purported July 15
conference, which made it impossible for the June 18 filing to satisfy the
requirements of a case conference "report." See NRCP 16.1(c) (requiring a
case conference report to summarize what was discussed at the case
conference).
Moreover, even accepting appellant's above-described
argument, the district court properly determined that appellant had failed
to comply with NRCP 16.1(e)'s timing requirements.' A review of the
district court's order demonstrates that it considered the required factors
in determining that dismissal was warranted, see Arnold, 123 Nev. at 415-
16, 168 P.3d at 1053 (listing relevant factors), and we perceive no abuse of
'Specifically, even if the July 15, 2010, phone call were considered to
be a case conference, it took place more than 300 days after respondents'
first appearance in August 2009. See NRCP 16.1(e)(1) (permitting
dismissal when a case conference is not held within 180 days of a
defendant's first appearance). Likewise, even if appellant's June 18, 2010,
filing were considered to be a case conference report, it was filed nearly
300 days after respondents' first appearance. See NRCP 16.1(e)(2)
(permitting dismissal when a case conference report is not filed within 240
days of a defendant's first appearance).
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discretion in the district court's decision. Id. at 414, 168 P.3d at 1052.
Accordingly, we
ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED. 2
J.
J.
Saitta
cc: Seventh Judicial District Court Dept. 2
Ronald W. Collins
Attorney General/Carson City
White Pine County Clerk
2 Appellantalso challenges a prior order in which the district court
denied appellant's motion for summary judgment. This motion was
properly denied, as a genuine factual dispute existed with regard to
whether appellant's due process rights had been violated. Wood v.
Safeway, Inc., 121 Nev. 724, 729, 121 P.3d 1026, 1029 (2005) (indicating
that summary judgment is appropriate only when "no genuine issue as to
any material fact [remains] and. . . the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law" (quotation omitted)).
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