necessary "[t]o correct manifest injustice." NRS 176.165. "A guilty plea
entered on advice of counsel may be rendered invalid by showing a
manifest injustice through ineffective assistance of counsel. Manifest
injustice may also be demonstrated by a failure to adequately inform a
defendant of the consequences of his plea." Rubio v. State, 124 Nev. 1032,
1039, 194 P.3d 1224, 1228-29 (2008) (footnote and internal quotation
marks omitted). "[Web will not overturn the district court's determination
on manifest injustice absent a clear showing of an abuse of discretion." Id.
at 1039, 194 P.3d at 1229.
"We apply the Strickland v. Washington two-prong test to
determine if counsel has provided effective assistance." Id. (footnote
omitted). To state a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel sufficient to
invalidate a guilty plea, a defendant must demonstrate (a) that counsel's
performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and (b)
resulted in prejudice. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58-59 (1985);
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984); Kirksey v. State, 112
Nev. 980, 987-88, 923 P.2d 1102, 1107 (1996). We need not address both
prongs of the inquiry if the defendant makes an insufficient showing on
either one. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697. When reviewing the district
court's resolution of ineffective-assistance claims, we give deference to the
court's factual findings if they are supported by substantial evidence and
not clearly erroneous but review the court's application of the law to those
facts de novo. Lader v. Warden, 121 Nev. 682, 686, 120 P.3d 1164, 1166
(2005).
The district court heard argument on Reyes' motion, found
that defense counsel adequately informed Reyes of the immigration
consequences of his plea, and concluded that there was no manifest
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injustice to correct. The district court did not expressly address Reyes'
ineffective-assistance claim, but we conclude that defense counsel was not
ineffective. At the time of Reyes' plea negotiations, Nevada law provided
that immigration issues are collateral consequences of a guilty plea and
defense counsel's failure to advise a defendant of the collateral
consequences of a guilty plea was not objectively unreasonable and did not
rise to ineffective assistance of counsel. Rubio, 124 Nev. at 1040, 194 P.3d
at 1229-30; Barajas v. State, 115 Nev. 440, 442, 991 P.2d 474, 475-76
(1999). After Reyes' judgment of conviction became fina1, 2 the Supreme
Court ruled that the Sixth Amendment requires defense counsel to inform
his or her client about the risk of deportation arising from a guilty plea,
but left open the question of whether it was announcing a new rule.
Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. „ , 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1486 (2010).
The Supreme Court has since ruled that Padilla announced a new rule
and defendants whose convictions became final before Padilla was decided
cannot benefit from its holding. Chaidez v. United States, No. 11-820,
2013 WL 610201, at *10 (U.S. Feb. 20, 2013). Reyes has not shown that
defense counsel's performance was deficient under the preexisting law or
demonstrated that the district court abused its discretion by determining
"A conviction becomes final when judgment has been entered, the
2
availability of appeal has been exhausted, and a petition for certiorari to
the Supreme Court has been denied or the time for such a petition has
expired." Colwell v. State, 118 Nev. 807, 820, 59 P.3d 463, 472 (2002).
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,5ZETEEMIIIIIIMTW I IUSE, azewnimmirm-,:'
there was no manifest injustice. Accordingly, we
ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED.
Gibbons
,J.
Douglas Saitta
cc: Hon. Jessie Elizabeth Walsh, District Judge
Law Offices of Anthony D. Guenther, Esq.
Attorney General/Carson City
Clark County District Attorney
Eighth District Court Clerk
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