defendant's white Chevrolet. The lead detective testified that other co-
conspirators placed Estrada at the scene. A medical examiner testified
that the victim's injuries were a substantial factor in his death. "[lit is the
function of the jury, not the appellate court, to weigh the evidence."
Walker v. State, 91 Nev. 724, 726, 542 P.2d 438, 439 (1975). We conclude
that 'after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
prosecution,' a rational juror "could have found the essential elements of
the crime [s] beyond a reasonable doubt." McNair v. State, 108 Nev. 53,
56, 825 P.2d 571, 573 (1992) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307,
319 (1979)); NRS 193.167; NRS 199.480(1)(a),(3); NRS 200.010; NRS
200.030; NRS 200.380(1); NRS 205.060(1).
Second, Estrada argues that the district court erred by
admitting text messages sent to and from his cell phone because they were
not properly authenticated. Because Estrada did not object at trial, the
State did not attempt to show authorship other than establishing that
Estrada was the owner of the phone and was in possession of it when he
was arrested. See Rodriguez v. State, 128 Nev. „ 273 P.3d 845, 849
(2012) (holding that "when there has been an objection to admissibility of
a text message the proponent of the evidence must provide . . . sufficient
direct or circumstantial corroborating evidence of authorship in order to
authenticate" it) (internal citation omitted). Although the record here is
incomplete due to the lack of objection, testimony at trial indicates that
many of the text messages either directly referenced the crimes or were
sent around the same time, used nicknames of Estrada and co-
conspirators, contained references known only by a small number of
persons, and used terms of endearment unique to the parties involved.
See id. We conclude that the district court did not plainly err in admitting
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the text messages. See Patterson v. State, 111 Nev. 1525, 1530, 907 P.2d
984, 987 (1995) ("An error is plain if the error is so unmistakable that it
reveals itself by a casual inspection of the record." (all internal quotation
marks omitted)).
Third, Estrada argues that the district court erred by
excluding photographs of child pornography recovered from the victim's
computer in violation of Estrada's right to present a defense. Estrada
asserts that introduction of the photographs was necessary because they
established that the victim led a high risk lifestyle and therefore increased
the number of suspects. "A defendant's right to present relevant evidence
is not unlimited, being subject to reasonable restrictions." Jackson v.
State, 116 Nev. 334, 335, 997 P.2d 121, 121 (2000). The district court did
not prohibit the defense from eliciting information that the victim had
child pornography on his computer or that two of the co-conspirators in
the case were acting as child prostitutes; rather, it did not admit the
photographs because a proper foundation was not laid and the
photographs themselves were not relevant. Because we agree that the
actual photographs were irrelevant, we conclude that the district court did
not abuse its discretion in excluding them. See Collman v. State, 116 Nev.
687, 704, 7 P.3d 426, 437 (2000); see NRS 48.015.
Fourth, Estrada argues that the district court erred by
upholding the State's use of a peremptory challenge against a
venireperson who was a member of a racial minority group in violation of
Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986). After the defense contested the
State's strike, the State offered several race-neutral justifications,
including that the venireperson's father was currently incarcerated for
drug offenses, she was a double major who started school the following
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week, she had an appointment the day of trial, she felt uncomfortable
sitting on the case because she was the same age as the defendant, and
she felt that she had been falsely accused of committing a crime in the
past. Because the district court's finding that this explanation was
sufficient and the strike was not motivated by the juror's race was not
clearly erroneous, we conclude that this claim lacks merit. See Kaczmarek
v. State, 120 Nev. 314, 332, 91 P.3d 16, 29 (2004).
Fifth, Estrada argues that the district court erred in denying
his motion to strike the jury pool because it did not represent a fair cross-
section of the community. Because Estrada failed to establish that the
method of selecting jurors from the community systematically excluded
racial minorities, we conclude that this claim lacks merit. See Williams v.
State, 121 Nev. 934, 940, 125 P.3d 627, 631 (2005) (noting that to
demonstrate a "violation of the fair-cross-section requirements the
defendant must show . . . that [racial] underrepresentation is due to
systematic exclusion of the group in the jury-selection process" (emphasis
and quotation omitted)).
Having considered Estrada's contentions and concluded that
they lack merit, we
ORDER the ju ction AFFIRMED.
ibbons
DC'
Douglas
ULQ-11'Z'S' J J.
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cc: Hon. Linda Marie Bell, District Judge
Law Office of Lisa Rasmussen
Attorney General/Carson City
Clark County District Attorney
Eighth District Court Clerk
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iratEDS 410iNard fit;
.