Manitowoc County v. Samuel J. H.

2013 WI 68

SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN
CASE NO.: 2012AP665
COMPLETE TITLE: In the matter of the mental commitment
of Samuel J. H.:

Manitowoc County,
Petitioner-Respondent,
v.
Samuel J. H.,
Respondent-Appellant.

ON CERTIFICATION FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS

OPINION FILED: July 11, 2013
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS:
ORAL ARGUMENT: February 26, 2013

SOURCE OF APPEAL:
COURT: Circuit
COUNTY: Manitowoc
JUDGE: Jerome L. Fox

JUSTICES:
CONCURRED: ABRAHAMSON, C.J., concurs. (Opinion filed.)
DISSENTED:
NOT PARTICIPATING:

ATTORNEYS:
For the respondent-appellant, there were briefs by Donald
T. Lang, assistant state public defender, and oral argument by
Donald T. Lang.

For the petitioner-respondent, there was a brief by Ryan
O’Rourke, assistant corporation counsel, and Manitowoc County,
and oral argument by Ryan O’Rourke.
 2013 WI 68
NOTICE
This opinion is subject to further
editing and modification. The final
version will appear in the bound
volume of the official reports.
No. 2012AP665
(L.C. No. 2003ME63)

STATE OF WISCONSIN : IN SUPREME COURT

In the matter of the mental commitment of
Samuel J.H.:

Manitowoc County,
FILED
Petitioner-Respondent, JUL 11, 2013

v. Diane M. Fremgen
Clerk of Supreme Court

Samuel J.H.,

Respondent-Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Manitowoc County Circuit Court,

Jerome L. Fox, Judge. Affirmed.

¶1 ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER, J. This appeal is before

the court on certification by the court of appeals, pursuant to

Wis. Stat. § 809.61 (2011-12).1 On May 31, 2011, Samuel J.H.

(Samuel) was committed to the care and custody of the Manitowoc

County Human Services Department (the Department). Samuel was

1
All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to
the 2011-12 version unless otherwise indicated.
 No. 2012AP665

initially placed in outpatient care. On September 22, 2011, the

Department transferred Samuel to an inpatient facility because

of erratic and delusional behavior.

¶2 Samuel petitioned the Manitowoc County Circuit Court

for a review of his transfer, arguing that he was entitled to a

hearing within ten days of his transfer to the inpatient

facility under Wis. Stat. § 51.35(1)(e) and under Fond du Lac

Cnty. v. Elizabeth M.P., 2003 WI App 232, 267 Wis. 2d 739, 672

N.W.2d 88. He also petitioned for a transfer back to outpatient

status, arguing that was the proper remedy for failure to hold

the review hearing within ten days of his transfer. The circuit

court held a hearing on Samuel's petitions, and it denied

Samuel's petition to transfer back to outpatient status. The

circuit court concluded that a patient is entitled to a hearing

within ten days of his transfer to a more restrictive placement

under § 51.35(1)(e)3. only when the transfer is based on a

violation of treatment conditions. The court denied Samuel's

petition to transfer, finding that his transfer to the inpatient

facility was not based on a violation of his treatment

conditions, but rather was based on reasonable medical and

clinical judgment.

¶3 Samuel appealed, and the court of appeals certified

the case to this court to clarify whether Wis. Stat.

§ 51.35(1)(e) requires a hearing within ten days for all

transfers to a more restrictive placement. The court of appeals

stated that language in Elizabeth M.P.——that "[t]ransfers

pursuant to § 51.35(1)(e) require a hearing within ten days"——is
2
 No. 2012AP665

arguably contrary to a plain interpretation of the statute,

which differentiates between transfers made for reasonable

medical and clinical judgment under § 51.35(1)(e)1., and

transfers made for "an alleged violation of a condition of a

transfer to less restrictive treatment" under § 51.35(1)(e)2.-3.

Elizabeth M.P., 267 Wis. 2d 739, ¶26. However, the court of

appeals was without power to overrule, modify, or withdraw

language from Elizabeth M.P.

¶4 We granted the court of appeals' certification and now

affirm the order of the circuit court.

¶5 We hold that Wis. Stat. § 51.35(1)(e) does not require

a hearing to be conducted within ten days of a transfer when the

transfer is based on reasonable medical and clinical judgment

under § 51.35(1)(e)1. We withdraw any language from Elizabeth

M.P. to the contrary.2 We further hold that a hearing must be

2
Because two statements in the Elizabeth M.P. decision are
contrary to the plain language of Wis. Stat. § 51.35(1)(e),
stare decisis does not require that we adhere to that precedent.
Thus, we withdraw the following language from Elizabeth M.P.:
"Transfers pursuant to § 51.35(1)(e) require a hearing within
ten days," 267 Wis. 2d 739, ¶26, and "Wisconsin Stat.
§ 51.35(1)(e) mandates that a patient transferred to a more
restrictive environment receive a hearing within ten days of
said transfer," id., ¶28.

3
 No. 2012AP665

conducted within ten days of a transfer when (1) the transfer

"results in a greater restriction of personal freedom for the

patient for a period of more than 5 days" or is "from outpatient

to inpatient status for a period of more than 5 days" and (2)

the transfer is based on "an alleged violation of a condition of

a transfer to less restrictive treatment" under § 51.35(1)(e)2.-

3.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL POSTURE

¶6 On May 31, 2011, Samuel was committed to the care and

custody of the Department.3 Samuel was initially placed at an

outpatient facility, Newport Group Home in Manitowoc, Wisconsin.

On September 22, 2011, the Department transferred Samuel from an

outpatient to an inpatient facility. The transfer form stated

the reason for the transfer:

Specifically, the doctrine of stare decisis applies to
published court of appeals opinions and requires this court "to
follow court of appeals precedent unless a compelling reason
exists to overrule it." Wenke v. Gehl Co., 2004 WI 103, ¶21,
274 Wis. 2d 220, 682 N.W.2d 405 (citing State v. Douangmala,
2002 WI 62, ¶42, 253 Wis. 2d 173, 646 N.W.2d 1). See also Wis.
Stat. § 752.41(2) (published court of appeals opinions "have
statewide precedential effect"). Here, a compelling reason
exists to withdraw the language in Elizabeth M.P. that directly
conflicts with the plain language of the statute. In so doing,
we are not acting contrary to the principle of stare decisis
because stare decisis does not require us "to adhere to
interpretations of statutes that are objectively wrong." Wenke,
274 Wis. 2d 220, ¶21 (citing Douangmala, 253 Wis. 2d 173, ¶42).
The portions of Elizabeth M.P. that do not comport with the
plain language of Wis. Stat. § 51.35(1)(e) are withdrawn because
they are objectively wrong.
3
The record in this appeal does not contain documents
relating to Samuel's underlying mental health commitment.

4
 No. 2012AP665

Samuel has been presenting as increasingly
delusional. Today he was 'chanting' and then punched
his wall and door, putting a hole in the door. Samuel
is the subject of a Mental Health Commitment and is
being transferred inpatient. Samuel is presenting as
delusional. His thoughts are confused and he is
agitated. He repeatedly stated he put a hole in the
door because 'someone was shot down and should be
taken care of.' Sam states he is at [Holy Family
Medical Center] because he is a 'person of interest.'
On September 22, 2011, Samuel was transferred to Nicolet

Psychiatric Center, and he was subsequently transferred to

Trempealeau County Health Care Center, both of which are
inpatient facilities.

¶7 On September 22, 2011, the same day he was

transferred, Samuel was provided with a form entitled "Written

Notice of Wis. Stat. § 51.35(1)(e)1. Rights." The form

reflected that Samuel was being transferred from outpatient to

inpatient status. The form stated that the Department must

inform Samuel orally and in writing of his rights under

§ 51.35(1)(e)1. The form listed those rights: "[t]he right to

contact an attorney and a member of Subject's immediate family,"

"[t]he right to have counsel provided at public expense . . . if

Subject is a child or is indigent," and "the right to petition a

court in the county in which the patient is located or the

committing court for a review of the transfer." A Department

employee signed the form and thus certified that she read Samuel

his rights and provided him a written copy of the form at the

time of transfer. The form contained contact information for

the Manitowoc County Public Defender's office.

5
 No. 2012AP665

¶8 On November 7, 2011, Samuel wrote Judge Jerome L. Fox

of the Manitowoc County Circuit Court a letter that stated "I am

disturbed that my outpatient status was changed to inpatient

without due procedure." On November 14, 2011, the judge sent a

copy of Samuel's letter to the Manitowoc County Corporation

Counsel office. The judge's cover letter to the County stated

that "I assume this triggers a hearing under § 51.35(1)(e)."

¶9 On November 15, 2011, Assistant Corporation Counsel

Ryan O'Rourke responded to the judge in a letter. Manitowoc

County took the position that Samuel was entitled to a review

hearing by the circuit court because Samuel's transfer was for

reasonable medical and clinical judgment under Wis. Stat.

§ 51.35(1)(e)1., but that he was not entitled to an

administrative hearing within ten days of the transfer because

he was not transferred for a violation of treatment conditions

under § 51.35(1)(e)2.-3.

¶10 The Department referred the matter to the Manitowoc

County Public Defender's office. On November 22, 2011, the
Manitowoc County Public Defender's office appointed attorney

Jewel Scharenbroch to represent Samuel. On November 30, 2011,
Samuel, by his attorney, filed a petition for review of his

transfer and a petition to transfer from inpatient to outpatient
treatment for failure to hold a timely review hearing. Samuel

argued that under Wis. Stat. § 51.35(1)(e) and Elizabeth M.P., a

patient is entitled to a review hearing within ten days of the

transfer when the transfer results in more restrictive placement

and lasts for more than five days, regardless of the reason for
6
 No. 2012AP665

transfer. Samuel argued that according to Elizabeth M.P.,

because he did not receive a hearing within ten days of his

transfer under § 51.35(1)(e)3., he must be returned to

outpatient status. 267 Wis. 2d 739, ¶28.

¶11 On December 19, 2011, the Manitowoc County Circuit

Court, Judge Jerome L. Fox, held a hearing on Samuel's

petitions. At the hearing, the court heard testimony from

Samuel and from Lori Fure, Samuel's social worker. Fure

testified that Samuel was transferred because he had become

"increasingly psychotic and his behavior had become out of

control." She testified that "[h]is medication had been

increased and yet he continued to become more psychotic and more

out of control to the point where he was totally delusional and

punching holes in the wall." She further stated that the group

home could no longer handle Samuel. Based on her experience as

a social worker and her understanding of Samuel's case, Fure

testified that inpatient care was the least restrictive level of

treatment appropriate for Samuel at that time.

¶12 Fure denied that Samuel was transferred because of
violations of his treatment conditions. Fure testified that

Samuel was subject to treatment conditions while he was placed
in outpatient care, including, inter alia, "[r]efrain from

consuming alcoholic beverages" and "[r]efrain from any acts,

attempts, or threats to harm myself or others." Fure testified

that Samuel had consumed alcohol a couple of days prior to his

transfer, but "that's not a reason to transfer somebody."

Further, though Samuel had made vaguely threatening statements,
7
 No. 2012AP665

Fure testified that Samuel had not been transferred because of

an act or a threat to harm himself or others.

¶13 Samuel also testified. His attorney asked him why he

punched the door, and Samuel responded that "[o]ne plane of

reality was shot down in my——my real world, and when the two

worlds met up, I could tell that I wanted to make it concrete

and meet up with my mental state of affairs."

¶14 The court found that the reason for Samuel's transfer

was his delusional behavior, not for a violation of his

treatment conditions. The court interpreted Wis. Stat.

§ 51.35(1)(e) as requiring a hearing within ten days only when a

transfer is made for a violation of treatment conditions, not

when a transfer is made for reasonable medical and clinical

judgment. However, the circuit court concluded that language in

Elizabeth M.P. could be interpreted as requiring a hearing

within ten days regardless of whether the subject is being

transferred for reasonable medical and judgment or for a

violation of treatment conditions. 267 Wis. 2d 739, ¶26

("Transfers pursuant to § 51.35(1)(e) require a hearing within

ten days."). The circuit court noted, however, that other

language in Elizabeth M.P. in fact differentiated the two types

of transfers. The circuit court suggested that Elizabeth M.P.'s

statement——requiring a hearing within ten days for all transfers

under § 51.35(1)(e)——related to its discussion of whether

hearings under § 51.35(1)(e)3. were mandatory or permissive.

See id., ¶¶20-25. In other words, the statement in Elizabeth

8
 No. 2012AP665

M.P. could be read as "a hearing under (1)(e)3. is mandatory,

not permissive."

¶15 The circuit court concluded that it was not necessary

to hold a hearing within ten days for Samuel, since his transfer

was based on reasonable medical and clinical judgment rather

than a violation of a treatment condition. As Samuel was not

entitled to a hearing within ten days, the circuit court denied

his petition for a transfer from inpatient to outpatient care.

The circuit court concluded that inpatient care was the least

restrictive placement appropriate for Samuel.

¶16 On March 27, 2012, Samuel filed a notice of appeal

from the circuit court's order. On September 5, 2012, the court

of appeals certified the question of whether Elizabeth M.P.'s
statement——requiring a hearing within ten days for transfers

made under Wis. Stat. § 51.35(1)(e)——is contrary to the plain

language of the statute. The court of appeals noted that the

inconsistency in Elizabeth M.P. was apparent, but that it was

powerless to address the inconsistency. See Cook v. Cook, 208

Wis. 2d 166, 189-90, 560 N.W.2d 246 (1997) (holding that the

court of appeals may not overrule, modify, or withdraw language

from its prior published decisions).

¶17 On November 14, 2012, we accepted the court of

appeals' certification.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶18 The question presented in this case is whether Wis.

Stat. § 51.35(1)(e) mandates a hearing within ten days for all

transferred patients, including those transferred for reasonable
9
 No. 2012AP665

medical and clinical judgment under § 51.35(1)(e)1., or whether

the mandate applies only to those transferred due to a violation

of treatment conditions under § 51.35(1)(e)2.-5. The

interpretation and application of § 51.35 present questions of

law that we review de novo while benefitting from the analyses

of the court of appeals and circuit court. See State v.

Ziegler, 2012 WI 73, ¶37, 342 Wis. 2d 256, 816 N.W.2d 238;

Heritage Farms, Inc. v. Markel Ins. Co., 2012 WI 26, ¶24, 339

Wis. 2d 125, 810 N.W.2d 465. The circuit court made factual

findings about the reason for Samuel's transfer, and "[w]e

uphold a circuit court's findings of fact unless they are

clearly erroneous." Phelps v. Physicians Ins. Co. of Wis.,

Inc., 2009 WI 74, ¶34, 319 Wis. 2d 1, 768 N.W.2d 615.

III. ANALYSIS

¶19 We hold that Wis. Stat. § 51.35(1)(e) does not require

a hearing to be conducted within ten days of a transfer when the

transfer is based on reasonable medical and clinical judgment

under § 51.35(1)(e)1. We withdraw any language from Elizabeth

M.P. to the contrary. We further hold that a hearing must be

conducted within ten days of a transfer when (1) the transfer

"results in a greater restriction of personal freedom for the

patient for a period of more than 5 days" or is "from outpatient

to inpatient status for a period of more than 5 days" and (2)

the transfer is based on "an alleged violation of a condition of

a transfer to less restrictive treatment" under § 51.35(1)(e)2.-

3.

10
 No. 2012AP665

¶20 "'[T]he purpose of statutory interpretation is to

determine what the statute means so that it may be given its

full, proper, and intended effect.'" Heritage Farms, 339

Wis. 2d 125, ¶26 (quoting State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court

for Dane Cnty., 2004 WI 58, ¶44, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681

N.W.2d 110). Statutory interpretation "'begins with the

language of the statute. If the meaning of the statute is

plain, we ordinarily stop the inquiry.'" Kalal, 271

Wis. 2d 633, ¶45 (quoting Seider v. O'Connell, 2000 WI 76, ¶43,

236 Wis. 2d 211, 612 N.W.2d 659). "Statutory language is given

its common, ordinary, and accepted meaning, except that

technical or specially-defined words or phrases are given their

technical or special definitional meaning." Kalal, 271

Wis. 2d 633, ¶45. Statutory language is interpreted in context,

and it must be understood in relation to surrounding language

and surrounding statutes. Id., ¶46. Courts interpret statutes

"to avoid absurd or unreasonable results." Id. When statutory

interpretation yields a plain meaning, extrinsic sources need

not be consulted, "although legislative history is sometimes

consulted to confirm or verify a plain-meaning interpretation."

Id., ¶¶46, 51.

¶21 Wisconsin Stat. § 51.35(1), which governs the transfer

of patients and residents, states in relevant part:

(a) Subject to pars. (b), (d), and (dm), the
department or the county department under s. 51.42 or
51.437 may transfer any patient or resident who is
committed to it, or who is admitted to a treatment
facility under its supervision or operating under an
agreement with it, between treatment facilities or

11
 No. 2012AP665

from a treatment facility into the community if the
transfer is consistent with reasonable medical and
clinical judgment, consistent with s. 51.22(5), and,
if the transfer results in a greater restriction of
personal freedom for the patient or resident, in
accordance with par. (e).

. . . .

(e)1. Whenever any transfer between different
treatment facilities results in a greater restriction
of personal freedom for the patient and whenever the
patient is transferred from outpatient to inpatient
status, the department or the county department
specified under par. (a) shall inform the patient both
orally and in writing of his or her right to contact
an attorney and a member of his or her immediate
family, the right to have counsel provided at public
expense, as provided under s. 51.60, and the right to
petition a court in the county in which the patient is
located or the committing court for a review of the
transfer.

2. In addition to the rights and requirements
specified in subd. 1., within 24 hours after any
transfer which results in a greater restriction of
personal freedom for the patient for a period of more
than 5 days or any transfer from outpatient to
inpatient status for a period of more than 5 days and
if the transfer is due to an alleged violation of a
condition of a transfer to less restrictive treatment,
the department or the county department specified
under par. (a) shall ensure that the patient is
provided a written statement of the reasons for the
transfer and the facts supporting the transfer and
oral and written notice of all of the following:

a. The requirements and rights under subds.
3. to 5.

b. The patient's right to counsel.

c. The patient's right to have counsel
provided at public expense, as provided under s.
51.60.

d. The rights of the patient's counsel to
investigate the facts specified in the written

12
 No. 2012AP665

statement of reasons for the transfer, to consult
with the patient prior to the patient's waiving a
hearing under subd. 3., to represent the patient
at all proceedings on issues relating to the
transfer, and to take any legal steps necessary
to challenge the transfer.

3. Within 10 days after the transfer specified in
subd. 2., a hearing shall be held on whether the form
of treatment resulting from the transfer is least
restrictive of the patient's personal liberty,
consistent with the treatment needs of the patient,
and on whether the patient violated a condition of a
transfer to less restrictive treatment that resulted
in a transfer under subd. 2. The hearing shall be
held before a hearing officer designated by the
director of the facility to which the patient has been
transferred. The hearing officer may not be a person
who has had direct responsibility for making treatment
decisions for or providing treatment to the subject
individual. The patient may appear at the hearing,
either personally or by counsel, and may present and
cross-examine witnesses and present documentary
evidence. The hearing may be waived by the patient
only after consultation with counsel. Any waiver made
shall be in writing and witnessed by the patient's
counsel.
Wis. Stat. § 51.35(1)(a), (e) (emphasis added).

¶22 Samuel argues that all transfers under Wis. Stat.

§ 51.35(1)(e) require a review hearing within ten days of the
transfer. He points to language in Elizabeth M.P. that
"[t]ransfers pursuant to § 51.35(1)(e) require a hearing within

ten days." 267 Wis. 2d 739, ¶26. Samuel argues that this

interpretation reinforces the policy that a patient who is the

subject of a mental health commitment has a right to the least

restrictive placement necessary to address his or her mental

health issues. See, e.g., Wis. Stat. § 51.001(2) ("To protect

personal liberties, no person who can be treated adequately

13
 No. 2012AP665

outside of a hospital, institution or other inpatient facility

may be involuntarily treated in such a facility."). Samuel also

points out that if the two types of transfers are subject to

different procedures, the reason for transfer can be manipulated

to avoid a hearing within ten days. Finally, Samuel points to

case law holding that statutory time limits in civil commitment

proceedings are strictly enforced, and failure to comply with

time limits deprives a court of jurisdiction over the person who

is the subject of the proceedings.

¶23 Manitowoc County argues that the plain language of the

statute requires a hearing within ten days only when the

transfer is based on a violation of a treatment condition. See

Wis. Stat. § 51.35(1)(e)2.-3. (stating that "if the transfer is

due to an alleged violation of a condition of a transfer to less

restrictive treatment" a hearing shall be held "[w]ithin 10 days

after the transfer"). The County further argues that if there

must be a hearing within ten days for all transfers under

§ 51.35(1)(e), that interpretation would effectively eliminate

transfers for reasonable medical and clinical judgment. The

subdivision that sets out the Department's burden of proof at

the hearing within ten days requires it to prove that there was

a violation of a treatment condition: "[t]he department seeking

the transfer has the burden of proving . . . that the patient

violated a condition of a transfer to less restrictive treatment

that resulted in a transfer under subd. 2." § 51.35(1)(e)4.

Additionally, the County argues that the statements at the end

of Elizabeth M.P.——requiring a hearing within ten days for all
14
 No. 2012AP665

transfers under § 51.35(1)(e)——are contrary to the plain

language of the statute and contrary to the reasoning of the

opinion itself. See Elizabeth M.P., 267 Wis. 2d 739, ¶17

("However, § 51.35(1)(e)1 and (1)(e)2 seem to indicate different

forms of transfers. . . . [S]ubdivision 2 exists to further

protect the rights of those whose transfer" is due to a

violation of a treatment condition). Finally, the County states

that though Samuel makes compelling policy arguments, those

arguments should be made to the legislature because policy

arguments cannot overcome the plain language of § 51.35(1)(e).

¶24 We conclude that the plain language of the statute

does not make the hearing within ten days of a transfer under

Wis. Stat. § 51.35(1)(e)3. applicable to transfers based on

reasonable medical and clinical judgment under § 51.35(1)(e)1.

Several reasons support our interpretation. First, subdivisions

(1)(e)1. and (1)(e)2. provide different rights and procedures

depending on the nature of the transfer. Subdivision

(1)(e)1. provides rights4 for patients transferred for

"reasonable medical and clinical judgment," see § 51.35(1)(a),
when the transfer "results in a greater restriction of personal

freedom for the patient" or when the transfer is "from

4
Under Wis. Stat. § 51.35(1)(e)1., the department must
inform the patient of the right to contact an attorney and a
member of his or her immediate family, the right to have an
attorney provided at public expense under Wis. Stat. § 51.60,
and "the right to petition a court in the county in which the
patient is located or the committing court for a review of the
transfer."

15
 No. 2012AP665

outpatient to inpatient status," collectively discussed as a

more restrictive transfer. Subdivision (1)(e)2. provides rights5

"[i]n addition to the rights and requirements specified in subd.

1." when a more restrictive transfer lasts "for a period of more

than 5 days" and is "due to an alleged violation of a condition

of a transfer to less restrictive treatment." Thus, the

legislature differentiated between the two types of transfers by

providing additional protections to a patient when a more

restrictive transfer lasts for longer than five days and results

from an alleged violation of a treatment condition.6

¶25 Second, consistent with the differentiation in rights

under subdivisions (1)(e)1. and (1)(e)2., the procedures for the

hearing within ten days of a transfer under subdivision (1)(e)3.

are made applicable only to more restrictive transfers under

5
Under Wis. Stat. § 51.35(1)(e)2., the department must
provide the patient with "a written statement of the reasons for
the transfer and the facts supporting the transfer." The
department must also provide oral and written notice of the
hearing procedures under subdivisions (1)(e)3.-5., the rights to
counsel provided at public expense under Wis. Stat. § 51.60, and
the rights of the patient's counsel in representing the patient
throughout the review of the patient's transfer.
6
Under both Wis. Stat. § 51.35(1)(e)1. and (1)(e)2., the
patient has the "right to have counsel provided at public
expense, as provided under s. 51.60." Section 51.60, governing
appointment of counsel, provides that for adults "[i]n any
situation under this chapter in which an adult individual has a
right to be represented by counsel, the individual shall be
referred as soon as practicable to the state public defender,
who shall appoint counsel for the individual under s. 977.08
without a determination of indigency." Wis. Stat.
§ 51.60(1)(a). The individual may waive counsel if the waiver
is knowing and voluntary. § 51.60(1)(b).

16
 No. 2012AP665

(1)(e)2.——those lasting longer than five days and resulting from

an alleged violation of a treatment condition. Subdivision

(1)(e)3. states, in relevant part: "Within 10 days after the

transfer specified in subd. 2., a hearing shall be held

on . . . whether the patient violated a condition of a transfer

to less restrictive treatment that resulted in a transfer under

subd. 2." (Emphasis added.) It would be contrary to the plain

language of the statute to interpret subdivision (1)(e)3. as

providing a hearing within ten days for transfers made for

reasonable medical and clinical judgment. The plain language

applies the transfer review hearing within ten days, as set

forth in subdivisions (1)(e)3.-5., only to transfers under

(1)(e)2.——those resulting in a more restrictive placement that

last for more than five days and that are a result of an alleged

violation of a condition of treatment.

¶26 Third, we are persuaded by the County's argument that

Samuel's interpretation of the statute leads to an absurd result

because his interpretation could effectively eliminate the

County's ability to transfer a patient for reasonable medical
and clinical judgment, or could put the County in the untenable

position of being required to allege and prove that the transfer
was due to a violation of a treatment condition even if the

transfer was only for reasonable medical and clinical judgment.
A transfer based upon reasonable medical and clinical judgment

can differ from a transfer based upon a violation of a treatment

condition. Under the statute, when the County transfers a

patient based on reasonable medical and clinical judgment, the
17
 No. 2012AP665

County need not prove that the patient violated a treatment

condition, but it does need to prove that the transfer was based

on reasonable medical and clinical judgment. See Wis. Stat.

§ 51.35(1)(a), (1)(e)1. In fact, the statute specifically

allows for transfers that are "consistent with reasonable

medical and clinical judgment." Id. On the other hand,

§ 51.35(1)(e)4., the subdivision that requires a hearing within

ten days for certain transfers, requires that the "department

seeking the transfer has the burden of proving . . . that the
patient violated a condition of a transfer to less restrictive

treatment that resulted in a transfer under subd. 2." Wis.

Stat. § 51.35(1)(e)4. (emphasis added). If we interpret

§ 51.35(1)(e) as requiring a hearing within ten days for all

transfers, not just those that are for a violation of a

treatment condition, the County would be required to prove a

violation of a treatment condition, even if the transfer was

based on reasonable medical and clinical judgment. The County

should not be asked to falsify its reasons for transfer. Thus,

it is absurd to interpret the statute to provide for a hearing

within ten days for all transfers under § 51.35(1)(e) and to

require the County to prove a violation of a treatment condition

regardless of the reason for transfer. We must interpret

statutory language reasonably, "to avoid absurd or unreasonable

results." Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶46.

¶27 The legislative history of Wis. Stat. § 51.35 confirms

our plain language interpretation. Id., ¶51 (stating that

"legislative history is sometimes consulted to confirm or verify
18
 No. 2012AP665

a plain-meaning interpretation"). A prior version of the

statute did not address transfers due to alleged violations of

treatment conditions. See Wis. Stat. § 51.35(1)(e) (1985-86).

In 1987, the legislature amended § 51.35(1)(e):

Note: The repeal and recreation of s. 51.35(1)(e) by
this bill creates procedural rights in addition to
those in current law for persons who are transferred
between facilities or from outpatient to inpatient
status and applies these rights to patients who, due
to an alleged violation of a condition of a transfer
to less restrictive treatment: (1) are transferred to
a more restrictive facility for longer than 5 days; or
(2) or transferred from outpatient to inpatient status
for more than 5 days.
See 1987 Wis. Act 366, § 14 (emphasis added). One of the newly
created procedural rights in 1987 Wis. Act 366 was a right to an

administrative hearing within ten days of the more restrictive

transfer. Id. The legislative note to 1987 Wis. Act 366

reinforces that the hearing within ten days was meant to be

applicable only to more restrictive transfers resulting from an

alleged violation of a treatment condition.

¶28 Considering our interpretation of Wis. Stat.

§ 51.35(1)(e), we next turn to consider whether Elizabeth M.P.

comports with our interpretation. In that case, Elizabeth was

the subject of a mental health commitment, was initially treated
at an inpatient facility, and in March 2002, was transferred to

an outpatient facility. Elizabeth M.P., 267 Wis. 2d 739, ¶¶2-3.
On May 28, 2002, a notice was filed to transfer Elizabeth from

outpatient to inpatient care under § 51.35(1). Id., ¶3. An

19
 No. 2012AP665

affidavit from Fond du Lac's corporation counsel gave the

reasons for Elizabeth's transfer:

An affidavit by the corporation counsel for Fond
du Lac county, attached to this notice, indicated that
since Elizabeth's outpatient placement she had refused
to take her court-ordered medication, had become
delusional, argumentative and aggressive, and had
failed to take her psychotropic medication as
prescribed. The affidavit further indicated that
Elizabeth's mental condition had substantially
deteriorated, that she was unable to meet the demands
of everyday life, and that she had violated conditions
of her commitment 'in that she has failed to comply
with recommended treatment.'
Id., ¶4. Elizabeth filed a motion for immediate release from

inpatient treatment, arguing that she was entitled to and did

not receive a hearing within ten days under Wis. Stat.

§ 51.35(1)(e)3. Id., ¶7. The circuit court concluded that

Elizabeth's transfer was made pursuant to subdivision (1)(e)1.,

not subdivisions (1)(e)2.-3., and she was therefore not entitled

to a hearing within ten days. Id. The circuit court

subsequently conducted a transfer review hearing under

§ 51.35(1)(e)1. and approved of the transfer, "finding that the
least restrictive environment consistent with Elizabeth's needs

was inpatient status." Id., ¶9. Elizabeth appealed the circuit
court's approval of her transfer. Id.

¶29 The court of appeals reviewed "whether the circuit

court had jurisdiction to transfer Elizabeth to inpatient status

when judicial review of the County's decision to transfer her

was not held within ten days as required by Wis. Stat.

20
 No. 2012AP665

§ 51.35(1)(e)3." Id., ¶10. The court of appeals interpreted

§ 51.35(1)(e):

[Subdivisions] 51.35(1)(e)1 and (1)(e)2 seem to
indicate different forms of transfers. The provisions
suggest that while only one transfer provision and its
various subdivisions all serve to protect the rights
of patients, subdivision 2 exists to further protect
the rights of those whose transfer 'results in a
greater restriction of personal freedom for the
patient for a period of more than 5 days or any
transfer from outpatient to inpatient status for a
period of more than 5 days' where the transfer 'is due
to an alleged violation of a condition of a transfer
to less restrictive treatment.'
Id., ¶17 (quoting Wis. Stat. § 51.35(1)(e)2.) (footnote
omitted). The court concluded that Elizabeth's transfer had

been pursuant to subdivision (1)(e)2. because "the document

affecting her transfer relates the rights that are enumerated in

§ 51.35(1)(e)3 to 5," including a right to a review hearing

within ten days of her transfer. Id., ¶18. Further, one of the

reasons for her transfer was her alleged failure to take court-

ordered medications as her treatment conditions required. Id.,

¶19.
¶30 The court then considered whether a hearing within ten

days under Wis. Stat. § 51.35(1)(e)3. is mandatory or directory.
Id., ¶20. The court concluded that a hearing within ten days

under § 51.35(1)(e)3. is mandatory. Id., ¶25. In other words,

there is no discretion in holding a hearing under subdivision

(1)(e)3. because the statute requires that "'a hearing shall be

held.'" Id., ¶21.

21
 No. 2012AP665

¶31 However, the court of appeals, in its concluding

paragraphs, broadly stated that "[t]ransfers pursuant to

§ 51.35(1)(e) require a hearing within ten days." Id., ¶26; see

also id., ¶28. The court did not clearly differentiate between

the two types of transfers when it reached its conclusions.

¶32 The statements in the concluding paragraphs of

Elizabeth M.P. do not comport with the plain language of Wis.

Stat. § 51.35(1)(e). Moreover, the concluding paragraphs are

not consistent with the underlying analysis of the Elizabeth
M.P. decision, wherein the court of appeals did distinguish

between transfers under subdivisions (1)(e)1. and (1)(e)3. See

id., ¶17 ("However, § 51.35(1)(e)1 and (1)(e)2 seem to indicate

different forms of transfers. . . . [S]ubdivision 2 exists to

further protect the rights of those whose transfer" is due to a

violation of a treatment condition). As a result, we withdraw

any language in Elizabeth M.P. that is contrary to our

conclusion that § 51.35(1)(e) does not require a hearing to be

conducted within ten days of a transfer when the transfer is

based on reasonable medical and clinical judgment under

§ 51.35(1)(e)1.

¶33 Applying our interpretation of Wis. Stat.

§ 51.35(1)(e) to the facts of this case, we conclude that Samuel

was not entitled to a hearing within ten days of his transfer

under subdivision (1)(e)3. because his transfer was based on

reasonable medical and clinical judgment, not a violation of a

treatment condition. Samuel's social worker testified that he

had become "increasingly psychotic and his behavior had become
22
 No. 2012AP665

out of control." The transfer form stated that "Samuel is

presenting as delusional. His thoughts are confused and he is

agitated. He repeatedly stated he put a hole in the door

because 'someone was shot down and should be taken care of.'"

The circuit court was not clearly erroneous in finding that

Samuel had been transferred based on reasonable medical and

clinical judgment. See Phelps, 319 Wis. 2d 1, ¶34, (stating

that we uphold a circuit court's factual findings unless they

are clearly erroneous). We therefore affirm the circuit court's

denial of Samuel's petition to transfer and conclude that he was

not entitled to a hearing within ten days of his transfer under

§ 51.35(1)(e)3. because his transfer was based on reasonable

medical and clinical judgment.7

7
A patient who is transferred under subdivision (1)(e)1.——a
transfer for reasonable medical and clinical judgment that
results in a more restrictive placement——is entitled to the
rights as set forth in that subdivision, including "the right to
petition a court in the county in which the patient is located
or the committing court for a review of the transfer." Samuel
received a review of his transfer in front of the Manitowoc
County Circuit Court, which upheld the transfer because it
concluded that inpatient placement was the least restrictive
treatment appropriate for Samuel's needs. Samuel does not
challenge that portion of the circuit court's order.

23
 No. 2012AP665

IV. CONCLUSION

¶34 We hold that Wis. Stat. § 51.35(1)(e) does not require

a hearing to be conducted within ten days of a transfer when the

transfer is based on reasonable medical and clinical judgment

under § 51.35(1)(e)1. We withdraw any language from Elizabeth

M.P. to the contrary. We further hold that a hearing must be

conducted within ten days of a transfer when (1) the transfer

"results in a greater restriction of personal freedom for the

patient for a period of more than 5 days" or is "from outpatient

to inpatient status for a period of more than 5 days" and (2)

the transfer is based on "an alleged violation of a condition of

a transfer to less restrictive treatment" under § 51.35(1)(e)2.-

3.

By the Court.—The order of the circuit court is affirmed.

Though it may be better practice to hold a hearing within
ten days for all patients transferred under Wis. Stat.
§ 51.35(1)(e), the statute does not mandate that procedure for
transfers based on reasonable medical and clinical judgment
under § 51.35(1)(e)1. At oral argument, Manitowoc County stated
that after Samuel's case, it had in fact been conducting a
hearing within ten days for all patients transferred under
§ 51.35(1)(e), which had not resulted in a great burden on the
County. As the plain language of § 51.35(1)(e) does not require
a hearing within ten days for patients transferred for
reasonable medical and clinical judgment under subdivision
(1)(e)1., arguments to change the procedure should properly be
made to the legislature.

24
 No. 2012AP665.ssa

¶35 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J. (concurring).1 I agree

with the majority opinion and Manitowoc County that the plain

language of Wis. Stat. § 51.35(1)(e)1. and § 51.35(1)(e)2.

provides different procedures, depending on the grounds stated

for the patient's transfer. But interpreting these provisions

literally, as the majority opinion does, without examining them

in the context of Chapter 51 and without considering the

policies and procedures the legislature has explicitly

established in Chapter 51 violates the majority opinion's stated

rules of statutory interpretation requiring it to interpret a

statute reasonably to avoid absurd or unreasonable results.

¶36 I write not only to disagree with the majority

opinion's statutory interpretation, but also as importantly, to

commend Manitowoc County. When the County discovered what

happened in the present case, it reviewed its practices. As a

result of its self-examination, Manitowoc County is working with

the entities across the State in which patients from Manitowoc

County reside. The County has adopted procedures that follow

the statutes, adhere to legislative policies, and protect

patients' statutory liberty rights and interests, without

increasing costs. Hats off to Manitowoc County!

I

¶37 In the present case, Samuel J.H. was transferred on

September 22, 2011, from outpatient status in Manitowoc County

1
I concur because I would not, in the present case, turn
the clock back and give Samuel J.H. the ten-day hearing at this
time. He was afforded judicial review on the merits of his
transfer and his inpatient placement has been upheld.

1
 No. 2012AP665.ssa

to inpatient status in an inpatient facility in Green Bay,

Wisconsin, about 40 miles away. Samuel J.H. stayed in Green Bay

four days and on September 26, 2011, was transferred to the

Trempealeau County Health Care Center in Whitehall, Wisconsin,

about 215 miles from Green Bay.

¶38 On the day that Samuel J.H. was transferred from

Manitowoc to Green Bay, he was provided with a piece of paper

informing him that he had the following rights:

1. The right to contact a lawyer and a member of his

family;

2. The right to have counsel provided at public expense

"if indigent;" and

3. The right to petition a court in the county in which

he is located or the committing court for review of

the transfer.

¶39 This piece of paper was apparently intended to satisfy

Wis. Stat. § 51.35(1)(e)1. and § 51.60(1)(a). I do not think it

does. At a minimum, the form Samuel J.H. was given seems to

conflict with Wis. Stat. § 51.60(1)(a) with regard to the

appointment of counsel. The form seems to indicate Samuel J.H.

is entitled to counsel at public expense only if he is indigent,

but § 51.60(1)(a) explicitly requires no such indigency

determination.2

2
Section § 51.60(1)(a), the section specifically referenced
in § 51.35, explicitly states that the state public defender
shall appoint counsel for any adult who has a right to be
represented by counsel without a determination of indigency.

2
 No. 2012AP665.ssa

¶40 Furthermore, Wisconsin Stat. § 51.60 requires that a

patient "be referred as soon as practicable to the state public

defender . . . ." Wisconsin Stat. § 51.60 is entitled

"Appointment of Counsel" and reads, in pertinent part:

(1) Adults. (a) In any situation under this chapter
in which an adult individual has a right to be
represented by counsel, the individual shall be
referred as soon as practicable to the state
public defender, who shall appoint counsel for
the individual under s. 977.08 without a
determination of indigency (emphasis added).
¶41 Samuel J.H. was not referred to the State Public

Defender as soon as practicable.3 Indeed, the State Public

In contrast, the form given to Samuel J.H. states the right
to counsel as follows: "The right to have counsel provided at
public expense, as provided under s. 967.06 and ch. 977, if
Subject is a child or is indigent. . . ."

A patient who receives and reads this form could easily be
confused regarding the right to counsel and at whose expense
counsel will be provided.

At the bottom of the form, the following Note appears:

In Manitowoc County, the Public Defender can be
reached as follows:

State of Wisconsin Public Defender
933 South Eighth Street, Suite 102
Manitowoc, WI 54220
(920) 683-4690
3
At oral argument, Assistant Corporation Counsel Ryan
O'Rourke touched on the interpretation of the word "refer." He
explained that in Manitowoc County, transferred patients are now
"referred to the public defender's office and then [corporation
counsel] leave[s] it in [the public defender's] hands as to make
the decision on whether someone needs to be appointed. At least
[we] notify [the public defender] and make them aware of it, and
then that agency is responsible for making their own decision as
to whether they're statutorily obligated to appoint counsel."

3
 No. 2012AP665.ssa

Defender was not informed of Samuel J.H.'s transfer until Samuel

J.H. himself wrote a letter to Manitowoc County Circuit Court

Judge Jerome Fox in November 2011. Judge Fox then informed the

Manitowoc County Corporation Counsel of Samuel J.H.'s letter,

and corporation counsel then referred the matter to the State

Public Defender. Majority op., ¶¶8-10.

¶42 Thus, nearly two months passed between Samuel J.H.'s

transfer to inpatient status and his referral to a public

defender. But for Samuel J.H.'s own action in sending a letter

to the Manitowoc County Circuit Court, he may never have had

counsel appointed and may never have had a hearing. The initial

failure of the County to refer Samuel J.H.'s transfer to the

State Public Defender and the County's placing the onus on

Samuel J.H. to obtain counsel (and advise his family) do not

comport with Wis. Stat. § 51.35(1)(e)1. or § 51.60. The purpose

of the statutes and the legislative policy have been skirted in

the present case by the majority opinion and the rights of the

mentally ill have been diluted.

¶43 The legislature has declared that any person in need

of care must have "access to the least restrictive treatment"

appropriate for his or her needs and that in order "to protect

personal liberties, no person who can be treated adequately

Oral Argument at 51:17-52:35, Manitowoc County v. Samuel J.H.,
2012AP665, available at
http://www.wiseye.org/Programming/VideoArchive/EventDetail.aspx?
evhdid=7191 (last visited June 28, 2013).

4
 No. 2012AP665.ssa

outside of a hospital, institution or other inpatient facility

may be involuntarily treated in such a facility."4

¶44 The majority opinion does not facilitate least

restrictive treatment and does not comport with the

legislature's balancing the personal liberty interests of the

individual and the protection of the individual and the public.5

4
Wisconsin Stat. § 51.001, "Legislative Policy," reads as
follows:

(1) It is the policy of the state to assure the
provision of a full range of treatment and
rehabilitation services in the state for all
mental disorders and developmental disabilities
and for mental illness, alcoholism and other drug
abuse. There shall be a unified system of
prevention of such conditions and provision of
services which will assure all people in need of
care access to the least restrictive treatment
alternative appropriate to their needs, and
movement through all treatment components to
assure continuity of care, within the limits of
available state and federal funds and of county
funds required to be appropriated to match state
funds.

(2) To protect personal liberties, no person who can
be treated adequately outside of a hospital,
institution or other inpatient facility may be
involuntarily treated in such a facility
(emphasis added).
5
The court has recognized that "[c]urrent mental health
statutes reflect a balance between treating mental illness and
protecting the individual and society from danger on the one
hand, and personal liberty of the individual on the
other. . . . Hence, from the first section of [Chapter 51], we
see the tension between the role of the government to provide
caring treatment (sometimes involuntarily and, if necessary, by
force) and the personal liberty of the individual." Outagamie
County v. Melanie L., 2013 WI 67, ¶¶43, 58, ___ Wis. 2d ___, ___
N.W.2d ___.

5
 No. 2012AP665.ssa

¶45 Samuel J.H. has committed no crime. The State is

providing him treatment because he has a mental illness. If the

State is to restrain those with a mental illness, it must guard

their liberty interests scrupulously. The legislature has

explicitly adopted this policy and accorded the individual the

services of the State Public Defender.

¶46 The majority opinion has wandered off the clearly

marked legislative course mandating the protection of the basic

liberty interests of the mentally ill.

¶47 The majority opinion does not guard the liberty

interests of the mentally ill scrupulously.

¶48 The majority opinion fails to harmonize

§ 51.35(1)(e)1. and § 51.35(1)(e)2. and interpret the provisions

in the context of the expressed legislative policy and the

procedural safeguards. The majority opinion severely undermines

a patient's statutory procedural rights, including the patient's

statutory right to government-paid counsel. In failing to

interpret and apply the statutes in a manner that makes sense

and respects the legislative purpose and policy, the majority

opinion allows manipulation of the rights of the mentally ill.6

6
The transferring entity determines what kind of hearing
the patient gets by the way it fills out the transfer form.
Samuel J.H. questions whether the entity should be able to
decide not only on the transfer but also on the hearing rights
of the patient.

6
 No. 2012AP665.ssa

Statutes must not be interpreted and applied in such a manner as

to permit manipulation of the procedural rights of the mentally

ill or to render statutory provisions meaningless or

superfluous.

¶49 The result the majority opinion reaches is

unreasonable in light of the text of the statute, the rights

statutorily granted Samuel J.H., and the explicit legislative

policy.

II

¶50 To ensure the rights of patients and compliance with

the statutes, counties should follow Manitowoc's lead.

¶51 Manitowoc County Corporation Counsel explained at oral

argument that subsequent to Samuel J.H.'s case, the County

realized that Wis. Stat. § 51.35 was not well implemented. The

County then worked with the various entities in which Chapter 51

patients reside and created and is following a standard written

policy. The County now gives notice to the State Public

Many patients, including Samuel J.H., probably could be
classified under either Wis. Stat. § 51.35(1)(e)1. or
§ 51.35(1)(e)2. or both statutory provisions. Samuel J.H.'s
social worker testified that he had violated two conditions of
his outpatient treatment, but she asserted that he was not
transferred because of these violations of his treatment
conditions. Majority op., ¶12. Thus, the transferring entity
often, if not always, has an opportunity to decide between
whether the patient is transferred for "medical and clinical"
reasons or a "violation of conditions."

The majority opinion provides a blueprint for how
authorities can fill out transfer papers to ensure that a
patient does not receive a ten-day hearing. Unfortunately, the
majority opinion may render the ten-day hearing and the
procedural protections in § 51.35(1)(e)2.-5. relics of the past.

7
 No. 2012AP665.ssa

Defender immediately when a patient is being transferred. A

ten-day hearing is ordinarily held. Assistant Corporation

Counsel Ryan O'Rourke noted that providing a ten-day hearing in

every transfer is not a significant burden.7 Corporation counsel

stated that the new effort does not require substantially more

time or effort,8 and in the end, ensures that the process is

7
Oral Argument at 40:30-40:45, Manitowoc County v. Samuel
J.H., 2012AP665, available at
http://www.wiseye.org/Programming/VideoArchive/EventDetail.aspx?
evhdid=7191 (last visited June 28, 2013).
8
At oral argument, Assistant Corporation Counsel O'Rourke
explained that some facilities in which Chapter 51 patients
reside did not know how to appoint a hearing officer, indicating
that the facilities may not be familiar with the statutory
requirements of hearings. This revelation is cause for concern,
yet the majority opinion remains oblivious to the practice. The
Manitowoc County Corporation Counsel is assisting the facilities
with which it works.

Assistant Corporation Counsel O'Rourke advised the court as
follows:

[T]he biggest problem with Samuel J.H.'s case that I
have with how it happened was that counsel wasn't
appointed right away. And the statute doesn't require
us to, the statute simply requires that we notify him
of his right to counsel and provide him the contact
information, but we as a county have taken it upon
ourselves to, regardless of the reason for transfer,
our office is notified immediately, which wasn't
always happening. Probate is notified immediately,
which wasn't always happening, whether we think a
hearing's necessary or not, and the public defender is
notified through probate and an attorney is appointed
immediately, so that we're not having this delay that
we had in Samuel's case where it was a month and a
half before he requested the hearing. Under the
statute do I think we have to do that? No, but I
believe it's better procedure.

8
 No. 2012AP665.ssa

fair. As Corporation Counsel explained, "[I]t's the more

legally conservative approach to take to protect the transfer."9

¶52 Because the majority opinion's interpretation of Wis.

Stat. §§ 51.35 and 51.60 has wandered off the clearly marked

legislative course of protecting the basic liberty interests of

the mentally ill and leads to an absurd and unreasonable result,

I cannot join the majority opinion. A reasonable and harmonious

reading of §§ 51.35 and 51.60 leads to the conclusion that all

patients with outpatient status transferred to inpatient status

are referred to counsel and granted a hearing within ten days to

determine whether the form of treatment resulting from the

transfer is the least restrictive alternative and consistent

with the treatment needs of the patient.

¶53 A measure of a society is how it treats its weakest

members. The legislature has incorporated this ethos into the

Oral Argument at 34:23-35:18, Manitowoc County v. Samuel J.H.,
2012AP665, available at
http://www.wiseye.org/Programming/VideoArchive/EventDetail.aspx?
evhdid=7191 (last visited June 28, 2013).
9
Assistant Corporation Counsel O'Rourke said in full:

Subsequent to Samuel J.H., and not that this has any
effect on Samuel's case, but procedurally what we've
done as a county is it became clear to me we needed a
standard written set of policies to follow, we
implemented those, we are holding the hearing
regardless of the reason for transfer now, simply
because I believe it's the more legally conservative
approach to take to protect the transfer.

Oral Argument at 33:48-34:15, Manitowoc County v. Samuel J.H.,
2012AP665, available at
http://www.wiseye.org/Programming/VideoArchive/EventDetail.aspx?
evhdid=7191 (last visited June 28, 2013).

9
 No. 2012AP665.ssa

statutes, and this court should interpret the statutes to

achieve the clearly stated legislative policy and purpose. The

majority opinion does not.

¶54 For the reasons set forth, I write separately.

10
 No. 2012AP665.ssa

1