12-4032
Myers v. City of New York
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER
FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE
PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT
FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC
DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST
SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the
2 Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the
3 16th day of July, two thousand thirteen.
4
5 PRESENT:
6 JON O. NEWMAN,
7 RALPH K. WINTER,
8 CHRISTOPHER F. DRONEY,
9 Circuit Judges.
10 _____________________________________
11
12 Anthony E. Myers,
13
14 Plaintiff-Appellant,
15
16 v. 12-4032
17
18 The City of New York, Warden Evelyn Maribal,
19 and Michael Bloomberg,
20
21 Defendants-Appellees.
22 _____________________________________
23
24
25 FOR APPELLANT: Anthony E. Myers, pro se, Brooklyn, New York
26
27 FOR APPELLEES: Dona B. Morris (Pamela Seider Dolgow and Jeffrey Scott
28 Dantowitz, on the brief) for Michael A. Cardozo, Corporation
29 Counsel of the City of New York, New York, New York
30 Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Southern District of
31 New York (Engelmayer, J.).
1 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND
2 DECREED that the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
3 Appellant Anthony E. Myers appeals from the district court’s judgment dismissing his 42
4 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint for failure to state a claim, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
5 12(b)(6). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of
6 the case, and the issues on appeal.
7 We review de novo a district court’s dismissal of a complaint under Federal Rule of Civil
8 Procedure 12(b)(6), “accepting all factual claims in the complaint as true, and drawing all
9 reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor.” Famous Horse Inc. v. 5th Ave. Photo Inc., 624
10 F.3d 106, 108 (2d Cir. 2010). The complaint must plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief
11 that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). Although all
12 allegations contained in the complaint are assumed to be true, this rule is “inapplicable to legal
13 conclusions.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). While pro se complaints must contain
14 sufficient factual allegations to meet the plausibility standard, we look for such allegations by
15 reading pro se complaints with “special solicitude” and interpreting them to raise the “strongest
16 [claims] that they suggest.” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474-75 (2d Cir.
17 2006) (per curiam) (emphasis omitted).
18 After an independent review of the record and relevant case law, we conclude that the
19 district court properly dismissed Myers’s § 1983 complaint for failure to state a claim for
20 substantially the same reasons articulated by the district court judge in his well-reasoned opinion
21 and order dismissing the complaint. To the extent Myers claims on appeal that the district court
22 should not have vacated the entry of default judgment against Mayor Michael Bloomberg, he is
2
1 incorrect because, at the time the defendants made their motion to dismiss, they were not yet
2 aware that Mayor Bloomberg had been properly served. In any event, the defendants’ motion to
3 dismiss noted that Myers’s claims against Mayor Bloomberg could also be appropriately
4 dismissed on the merits, and the district court granted the defendants’ request to deem the motion
5 made on Mayor Bloomberg’s behalf.
6 District courts should generally not dismiss a pro se complaint without granting the
7 plaintiff leave to amend. See Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 112 (2d Cir. 2000). However,
8 leave to amend is not necessary when it would be futile. See id. (finding leave to replead would
9 be futile where the complaint, even when read liberally, did not “suggest[] that the plaintiff has a
10 claim that she has inadequately or inartfully pleaded and that she should therefore be given a
11 chance to reframe”). Here, Myers admitted that he did not properly exhaust his administrative
12 remedies prior to bringing suit, and thus granting him leave to amend would be futile.1
13 We have considered Myers’s remaining arguments on appeal and find them to be without
14 merit. For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is hereby AFFIRMED.
15
16 FOR THE COURT:
17 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk
18
1
Because Myers did not exhaust his administrative remedies before bringing suit, we
need not consider whether his complaint alleges that the individual defendants were personally
involved in any of the alleged constitutional violations or whether the City of New York could
be liable under Monell v. City of New York Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
3