UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 13-4113
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
RANDALL K. TAYLOR,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern
District of West Virginia, at Parkersburg. Robert C. Chambers,
Chief District Judge. (6:12-cr-00135-1)
Submitted: July 2, 2013 Decided: July 18, 2013
Before MOTZ and DIAZ, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Mary Lou Newberger, Federal Public Defender, Jonathan D. Byrne,
Appellate Counsel, David R. Bungard, Assistant Federal Public
Defender, Charleston, West Virginia, for Appellant. R. Booth
Goodwin, II, United States Attorney, Lisa G. Johnston, Assistant
United States Attorney, Charleston, West Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Randall Keith Taylor pled guilty, without a written
plea agreement, to failure to register as a sex offender, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2250 (2006). The district court
sentenced Taylor to eighteen months’ imprisonment and fifteen
years’ supervised release. On appeal, Taylor argues that his
fifteen-year term of supervised release is procedurally
unreasonable because the district court failed to make an
individualized assessment and that his fifteen-year term of
supervised release is substantively unreasonable because it is
greater than necessary to achieve the purposes of sentencing.
We affirm.
A “term of supervised release . . . [is] part of the
original sentence,” United States v. Evans, 159 F.3d 908, 913
(4th Cir. 1998), “and is reviewed for reasonableness.” United
States v. Preston, 706 F.3d 1106, 1121 (9th Cir. 2013); see Gall
v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 46, 51 (2007) (stating that
appellate review of sentence is for abuse of discretion). We
review for “significant procedural error[s],” including “failing
to consider the [18 U.S.C.] § 3553(a) [(2006)] factors[] . . .
or failing to adequately explain the chosen sentence.” Gall,
552 U.S. at 51. To avoid procedural error, “the district court
must make an individualized assessment,” wherein it applies the
relevant § 3553(a) factors to the specific facts of the
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defendant’s case. United States v. Carter, 564 F.3d 325, 328
(4th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Taylor argues that the district court’s reasons for
imposing the fifteen-year term of supervised release were not
individualized and could have been stated for any defendant
being sentenced to a term of supervised release. We disagree.
In fashioning the sentence, the district court considered
Taylor’s criminal history, stating that the fifteen-year term of
supervised release would “help make sure the defendant, who has
a significant criminal history, does not violate the law in some
other fashion.” (J.A. 85). * Further, the district court
considered the need to deter Taylor from repeating his offense,
noting that the fifteen-year term of supervised release would
“assist the Government to prosecute Mr. Taylor should he in the
future fail again to register as he’s required.” (J.A. 85). We
conclude that the district court demonstrated that it conducted
an individualized assessment and that Taylor’s sentence is
procedurally reasonable.
Taylor also argues that his sentence is substantively
unreasonable. We review the substantive reasonableness of a
sentence for abuse of discretion, “examin[ing] the totality of
the circumstances.” United States v. Mendoza-Mendoza, 597 F.3d
*
“J.A.” refers to the joint appendix filed by the parties.
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212, 216 (4th Cir. 2010). Assuming, without deciding, that the
supervised release term is not entitled to a presumption of
reasonableness on appeal, see United States v. Goodwin, ___ F.3d
___, ___, 2013 WL 1891302 at *5-*9 (7th Cir. May 8, 2013) (No.
12-2921), we conclude that the supervised release term is
nevertheless substantively reasonable. The district court was
statutorily authorized to impose Taylor’s fifteen-year term of
supervised release. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(k) (2006) (authorizing
range of five years to life of supervised release for violation
of 18 U.S.C. § 2250). Moreover, the district court adequately
considered the § 3553(a) factors applicable to the imposition of
supervised release. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(c) (2006). We find
Taylor’s argument that his fifteen-year term of supervised
release does not reflect his history and characteristics or the
nature and circumstances of the instant offense unpersuasive.
The district court referenced Taylor’s “significant criminal
history” when explaining the fifteen-year term of supervised
release (J.A. 85) and expressed concern that Taylor registered
for years in Ohio and understood his obligation, but when he
moved to West Virginia, Taylor “decided just not to comply.”
(J.A. 75). Further, the district court found that Taylor’s
sentence “reflects the nature and circumstance of the offense,
[and] the history and characteristics of [Taylor].” (J.A. 89).
Although Taylor argues that the district court should have
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considered that his offense was not as serious as other sex
offenses, the district court was not permitted to consider the
seriousness of Taylor’s offense when determining the term of
supervised release. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(c). Accordingly, we
conclude that that Taylor’s term of supervised release is
substantively reasonable.
We therefore affirm the district court’s judgment. We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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