UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 12-5048
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
JOHN JUNIOR KEARNEY,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle
District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. Catherine C. Eagles,
District Judge. (1:12-cr-00139-CCE-1)
Submitted: July 9, 2013 Decided: July 18, 2013
Before NIEMEYER and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
J. Darren Byers, LAW OFFICES OF J. DARREN BYERS, P.A., Winston-
Salem, North Carolina, for Appellant. Andrew Charles Cochran,
OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Greensboro, North
Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
John Junior Kearney appeals his conviction and 100-
month sentence following his guilty plea to being a felon in
possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)
(2006). In accordance with Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738
(1967), Kearney’s counsel has filed a brief certifying that
there are no meritorious issues for appeal but questioning
whether the district court adequately complied with Fed. R.
Crim. P. 11 when accepting Kearney’s plea and whether Kearney’s
sentence is reasonable. Although notified of his right to do
so, Kearney has not filed a supplemental brief. We affirm.
Where, as here, a defendant did not move to withdraw
his plea, we review his Rule 11 hearing for plain error. United
States v. Martinez, 277 F.3d 517, 525 (4th Cir. 2002). Because
the district court substantially complied with Rule 11 when
accepting Kearney’s plea, we conclude that the plea was knowing
and voluntary and, therefore, final and binding.
We review Kearney’s sentence for reasonableness, using
an abuse of discretion standard. Gall v. United States, 552
U.S. 38, 51 (2007). We must first review for significant
procedural errors, including improperly calculating the
Guidelines range, failing to consider the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)
(2006) factors, sentencing under clearly erroneous facts, or
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failing to adequately explain the sentence. Id. at 51; United
States v. Evans, 526 F.3d 155, 161 (4th Cir. 2008). Only if we
find a sentence procedurally reasonable may we consider its
substantive reasonableness. United States v. Carter, 564 F.3d
325, 328 (4th Cir. 2009).
Here, we conclude that Kearney’s sentence is both
procedurally and substantively reasonable. The district court
correctly calculated Kearney’s Guidelines range and clearly
explained the basis for imposing a sentence within that range
based on the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors and Kearney’s
individual circumstances. See United States v. Montes-Pineda,
445 F.3d 375, 379 (4th Cir. 2006) (within-Guidelines range
sentence is presumed reasonable).
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire
record and have found no meritorious issues for appeal. We
therefore affirm Kearney’s conviction and sentence. This court
requires that counsel inform Kearney, in writing, of his right
to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for further
review. If Kearney requests that a petition be filed, but
counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous,
counsel may move in this court for leave to withdraw from
representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof
was served on Kearney. We dispense with oral argument because
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the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the
materials before this court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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