NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
________
No. 11-4383
_________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
GARFIELD BUTLER,
also known as Douglas K. Lindsay,
Garfield Butler,
Appellant
________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey
(D.C. No. 1-11-cr-00097-001)
District Judge: Honorable Joseph E. Irenas
_______
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
(Submitted July 9, 2013)
Before: GREENAWAY, JR., SLOVITER, and BARRY, Circuit Judges
(Opinion Filed: July 19, 2013)
__________
OPINION
__________
1
SLOVITER, Circuit Judge.
Garfield Butler appeals the sentence imposed by the District Court following his
guilty plea to illegal reentry in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326. For the reasons that follow,
we will vacate the sentence and remand to the District Court for resentencing.1
I.
Butler is a native and citizen of Jamaica who came to the United States as a
teenager and was deported in 2006, after serving a fourteen-year sentence for drug
trafficking. Shortly thereafter, he returned to this country. In 2010, Butler was pulled
over for a traffic violation in New Jersey. He presented false identification documents to
the officer, but his true identity was quickly discovered. Butler was charged with the
New Jersey offense of exhibiting false documents as proof of identification, to which he
pled guilty. The federal government then indicted Butler for illegal reentry in violation
of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) and (b)(2). Butler pled guilty to that offense as well, and was
sentenced to forty-six months‟ imprisonment and a three-year term of supervised release.
He raises two issues on appeal.
II.
Butler first alleges that the District Court erred in imposing a term of supervised
release pursuant to the 2010 U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual (“Guidelines”), when
1
The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231; we have appellate
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a).
2
the 2011 Guidelines were applicable. Because Butler did not object to supervised release
at sentencing, we may intervene only if the District Court committed a plain error that
affected Butler‟s substantial rights and undermined “the fairness, integrity or public
reputation of judicial proceedings.” Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 135 (2009)
(internal quotation marks omitted); Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b).
The 2010 Guidelines directed sentencing courts to order a term of supervised
release whenever they imposed a prison sentence of more than one year. See U.S.S.G. §
5D1.1 (2010). Butler‟s pre-sentencing report was written on the basis of the 2010
Guidelines and cited § 5D1.1. Effective November 1, 2011, however, that provision was
amended to include the caveat that
[t]he court ordinarily should not impose a term of supervised release in a case in
which supervised release is not required by statute and the defendant is a
deportable alien who likely will be deported after imprisonment.
U.S.S.G. § 5D1.1(c). 2 In Butler‟s case, supervised release was not required by statute,
see 8 U.S.C. § 1326; 18 U.S.C. § 3583, and Butler faced deportation after imprisonment,
2
The commentary provides further explanation:
Unless such a defendant legally returns to the United States, supervised release is
unnecessary. If such a defendant illegally returns to the United States, the need to
afford adequate deterrence and protect the public ordinarily is adequately served
by a new prosecution. The court should, however, consider imposing a term of
supervised release on such a defendant if the court determines it would provide an
added measure of deterrence and protection based on the facts and circumstances
of a particular case.
3
see 8 U.S.C. §§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii); 1101(a)(43)(B). The record suggests that, at the time
of sentencing, removal proceedings were already underway.
Sentencing courts must apply the guidelines in effect at the time of sentencing. 18
U.S.C. § 3553(a)(4)(A)(ii); United States v. Wood, 486 F.3d 781, 790 (3d Cir. 2007). In
addition, they must consider, among other sentencing factors, “any pertinent policy
statement” by the Sentencing Commission that is “in effect on the date the defendant is
sentenced.” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(5). On the date of Butler‟s sentencing – November 30,
2011 – the 2011 Guidelines were in effect, but there is no indication that the District
Court was aware of the change to § 5D1.1. The Court simply imposed a term of
supervised release without discussion. The government concedes that it did so on the
basis of the 2010 Guidelines, and that this was plain error. The government argues,
however, that the error did not affect Butler‟s substantial rights.
We cannot agree. It is true that the District Court could still have imposed a term
of supervised release pursuant to the 2011 Guidelines upon a finding that Butler‟s case
justified “an added measure of deterrence and protection.” U.S.S.G. § 5D1.1(c) cmt. n.5;
see also United States v. Dominguez–Alvarado, 695 F.3d 324, 329-30 (5th Cir. 2012)
(upholding imposition of supervised release pursuant to § 5D1.1(c) so long as sentencing
court provides “particularized explanation”). But the District Court made no such
U.S.S.G. § 5D1.1 cmt. n.5.
4
finding.3 As we have noted before, “[i]t is difficult to conclude that a District Court
would have reached the same result in a given case merely because it could have
reasonably imposed the same sentence on a defendant.” United States v. Vazquez-
Lebron, 582 F.3d 443, 447 (3d Cir. 2009). For that reason, procedural errors in
sentencing are “seldom harmless,” and presumptively affect a defendant‟s substantial
rights even if the correct application of the Guidelines might produce the same result. Id.
With respect to the final step of plain error analysis, “we will generally exercise
our discretion to recognize a plain error in the (mis)application of the Sentencing
Guidelines.” United States v. Irvin, 369 F.3d 284, 292 (3d Cir. 2004). Because the
District Court plainly erred in imposing supervised release pursuant to the 2010
Guidelines, and may have done otherwise on consideration of § 5D1.1(c) (2011), we will
remand for the District Court to determine whether a term of supervised release is
warranted.
III.
Secondly, Butler alleges that the District Court erred by including his New Jersey
false-identification conviction in his criminal history calculation, rather than considering
it as conduct “relevant” to his reentry offense under Guidelines § 1B1.3(a)(1). In
particular, Butler challenges the District Court‟s legal determination that “relevant
conduct” under § 1B1.3(a)(1) requires temporal proximity. Because Butler contests the
3
On the contrary, the contrast between the District Court‟s reflexive imposition of
supervised release and its thoughtful analysis of every other issue at sentencing is strong
evidence that the Court did not consider whether supervised release was necessary.
5
District Court‟s general construction of the Guideline, independent of the particular facts
of his case, our review is plenary. See United States v. Richards, 674 F.3d 215, 218 (3d
Cir. 2012); United States v. Abrogar, 459 F.3d 430, 433-36 (3d Cir. 2006).4
To calculate a defendant‟s sentencing range pursuant to the Guidelines, a
sentencing court must make two central determinations: the “offense level” and
defendant‟s criminal history category. See U.S.S.G. §1B1.1. The offense level depends
on all “relevant conduct,” including
all acts and omissions committed, aided, abetted, counseled, commanded, induced,
procured, or willfully caused by the defendant . . . that occurred during the
commission of the offense of conviction, in preparation for that offense, or in the
course of attempting to avoid detection or responsibility for that offense.
Id. § 1B1.3(a)(1)(A). To determine the defendant‟s criminal history category,
meanwhile, the court must consider any “prior sentence,” except if it was for conduct that
is relevant under § 1B1.3. See id. §§ 4A1.1, 4A1.2 & cmt. n.1. This ensures that the
same conduct will never be considered toward both the offense level and the criminal
history category. See United States v. Rivera-Gomez, 634 F.3d 507, 510-12 (9th Cir.
2011) (explaining “interlocking definitions of relevant conduct and prior sentence”).
4
The government argues that the dispute centers on the District Court‟s application of the
rule to the facts, which we review only for abuse of discretion. See Richards, 674 F.3d at
219-23. We disagree but note that we would reach the same result under that standard.
6
At Butler‟s sentencing, the District Court assumed “for purposes of deciding the
case” that Butler presented the false identification documents to the New Jersey police
officer in order “to avoid detection as an illegal immigrant here in the United States
following an illegal re-entry.” App. at 115. Nonetheless, the District Court held that this
conduct was not relevant under § 1B1.3(a)(1). The District Court reasoned that “the
relevant conduct exception applies only when, in a temporal sense, the conduct assists in
the commission of the original crime.” App. at 116.
This interpretation was erroneous. According to its plain terms, § 1B1.3(a)(1)
defines relevant conduct to include any act committed by the defendant “to avoid
detection or responsibility” for the underlying offense, without regard to temporality.5 If
Butler presented false identification to avoid detection as an illegal reentrant, that conduct
was relevant within the meaning of § 1B1.3(a)(1). See Rivera-Gomez, 634 F.3d at 513
(“[I]f Rivera-Gomez resisted arrest in order to „avoid detection or responsibility‟ for the
illegal reentry offense . . . , the district court erred in accounting for the conduct as a prior
sentence, rather than as part of the offense level.”); United States v. White, 335 F.3d
1314, 1320 (11th Cir. 2003) (where White “gave a false name „to avoid detection or
responsibility for [the reentry] offense,‟” the district court “clearly erred” by assessing
criminal history points for his false-information conviction).6
5
Sentencing courts consider temporal proximity to determine whether separate offenses
are part of the “same course of conduct” pursuant to § 1B1.3(a)(2), see, e.g., United
States v. Kulick, 629 F.3d 165, 171 (3d Cir. 2010), but that provision is not at issue here.
6
The government invokes United States v. Washington, 549 F.3d 905 (3d Cir. 2008), for
the proposition that “a prior conviction constitutes „relevant conduct‟ only if it is
7
Classifying prior conduct as relevant to the offense level rather than a defendant‟s
criminal history score does not require the sentencing court to ignore it, as the District
Court seems to have feared. On the contrary: It means that the sentencing court must
take it into account in assessing, inter alia, the specific offense characteristics and
applicable Chapter Three adjustments. See § 1B1.3(a). Furthermore, the sentencing
court may consider all relevant conduct in the discretionary determination of the final
sentence.
In Butler‟s case, as the government notes, classifying his false-identification
conduct as “relevant” may actually result in a higher Guidelines range, should the District
Court determine that it warrants an adjustment. See, e.g., U.S.S.G.§ 3C1.1 & cmt. n.4(G)
(adjustment for obstruction of justice applies if defendant made false statements that
“significantly obstructed or impeded the official investigation or prosecution of the
instant offense”). Alternatively, Butler‟s conduct “may warrant a greater sentence within
the otherwise applicable guideline range.” Id. cmt. n.5. On the other hand, the District
Court could determine that no adjustment applies, and sentence Butler to less than forty-
temporally and operationally connected to the current offense.” Response Br. at 36.
Washington neither asserts nor supports that rule. It simply notes that this court, in Irvin,
369 F.3d at 292, found Irvin‟s prior-conviction conduct to have occurred “during the
commission” of the sentencing offense because it was temporally and operationally
related. See Washington, 549 F.3d at 920-21. Neither case imposes a temporal
requirement on the avoid-detection prong of § 1B1.3(a)(1). The government also urges
us to follow United States v. Vargas-Garcia, 434 F.3d 345 (5th Cir. 2005), in which the
court held that Vargas-Garcia‟s resisting-arrest offense was not “relevant conduct,” but
rather an offense separate from his illegal reentry that could properly be considered in
calculating his criminal history. Id. at 349. We are not persuaded by the reasoning in
Vargas-Garcia and decline to follow it.
8
six months‟ imprisonment. We therefore cannot say that the District Court‟s error was
harmless.
IV.
For the foregoing reasons, we will vacate the judgment of sentence and remand for
resentencing in accordance with this opinion.
9