UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 12-4877
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
BOBBIE RAY EDWARDS, a/k/a Tank,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Newport News. Arenda Wright ALLEN,
District Judge. (4:11-cr-00055-AWA-DEM-10)
Submitted: June 4, 2013 Decided: July 25, 2013
Before WILKINSON, NIEMEYER, and KING, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Craig W. Sampson, BARNES & DIEHL, PC, Chesterfield, Virginia,
for Appellant. Neil H. MacBride, United States Attorney,
Alexandria, Virginia; Laura P. Tayman, Assistant United States
Attorney, Richard D. Cooke, Assistant United States Attorney,
OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Newport News, Virginia,
for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Bobbie Ray Edwards was convicted of heroin trafficking and
related firearms offenses, and the district court sentenced him
to life imprisonment plus 60 months. On appeal, Edwards
contends that the district court erred (1) in denying his motion
to suppress evidence seized during a traffic stop and (2) in
denying his request to represent himself. We reject both
arguments and affirm.
As agents with the Drug Enforcement Administration
accumulated sufficient evidence to believe that Edwards was
involved in drug trafficking and while they were presenting
evidence to the grand jury, the agents decided to arrest Edwards
before receiving the indictment, concluding that “it was the
best interest of the community to attempt to arrest Mr. Edwards”
immediately. The plan was to observe Edwards in his automobile
until he committed a traffic infraction and then to stop him for
the infraction, with a K-9 officer on standby.
Law enforcement officers observed Edwards stop by the curb
on Marshall Avenue in Newport News, Virginia, to talk to two
individuals on the sidewalk. After completing the conversation,
Edwards “pulled away from the curb without using his signal and
proceeded southbound on Marshall Avenue.” The detective
observing the traffic violation notified another officer in a
marked vehicle to pull Edwards over. A short time thereafter, a
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K-9 officer arrived on the scene with a drug dog, and the dog
alerted to the presence of drugs. As the officer who stopped
the vehicle asked Edwards to step out of the car, he placed him
in handcuffs and led him to the patrol car. While they were
proceeding to the patrol car, Edwards’ shirt came open, and the
officer observed a gun in his waistband. The officers removed
that gun and found two others in the automobile, as well as
marijuana and a drug grinder.
During the suppression hearing, the officers testified to
their observation of the traffic infraction, and Edwards gave
testimony denying having committed the infraction. He stated
that he was certain he used his blinker before entering traffic.
The district court resolved the credibility dispute against
Edwards and denied his motion to suppress. The court indicated
that it found Edwards’ testimony less credible because of his
criminal history, his potential criminal liability to life
imprisonment, and inconsistencies that he had given about his
academic record. More importantly, the court found the
officers’ testimony more credible. While it turned out that
Edwards did not testify inconsistently about his academic
record, we nonetheless are not in a position to overrule the
district court’s credibility finding. Accordingly, we affirm
the district court’s ruling on the suppression motion.
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With respect to Edwards’ request to represent himself
without an attorney, Edwards testified that he did not trust his
attorney and that his attorney was a poor one. He stated
“that’s one of the reasons I feel like I have to proceed pro
se.”
The district court engaged in a lengthy colloquy with
Edwards, informing him that if he were found to be guilty, he
was likely to be facing a mandatory term of life imprisonment.
When the court asked Edwards if he was intelligently asking to
represent himself, Edwards responded, “Well, somewhat pressured
into doing it.” Edwards added, “I just feel like I have to
represent myself. . . . I don’t feel I have too much choice.”
The court then questioned Edwards’ attorney, who
acknowledged that there had been some strategic differences
between himself and Edwards, but that they had had constructive
meetings.
The government’s attorney argued strongly against Edwards’
request, telling the court, “I think that the defendant is
trying to manipulate himself into preserving an appellate issue.
I think that he’s giving us a -- anything other than an
unequivocal waiver.”
The court ultimately denied Edwards’ request, stating:
I’m going to allow Mr. Dunn to stay in. . . . Mr.
Edwards, I’m not going to change my mind. You’re
looking at severe penalties, and you need somebody
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that knows what they are doing. And I believe that
everything that [the government] said is correct, and
I believe that you disagree with [your attorney’s]
strategies and his opinions, but the law doesn’t
require that you agree with all that.
Because of the reasons that Edwards gave the district court
during the hearing, we conclude that the district court did not
err. Although a defendant may conduct his own defense, even to
his own detriment, the court must nonetheless be certain that in
choosing self-representation, the defendant knowingly,
intelligently, and voluntarily waives his right to counsel. See
United States v. Frazier-El, 204 F.3d 553, 558 (4th Cir. 2000).
Accordingly, an exercise of the right of self-representation
must be “(1) clear and unequivocal; (2) knowing, intelligent and
voluntary; and (3) timely.” Id. (internal citations omitted).
“The requirement that the assertion be clear and unequivocal ‘is
necessary to protect against an inadvertent waiver of the right
to counsel by a defendant’s occasional musings,’ and it also
‘prevents a defendant from taking advantage of and manipulating
the mutual exclusivity of the rights to counsel and self-
representation.’” United States v. Bush, 404 F.3d 263, 271 (4th
Cir. 2005) (quoting Frazier-El, 204 F.3d at 558-59). And when a
court is faced with ambiguity, vacillation, or a potential
manipulation, it must ascribe a “constitutional primacy to the
right to counsel.” Frazier-El, 204 F.3d at 559 (internal
quotation marks omitted).
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Here, the district court denied Edwards’ request after a
long colloquy with him and after hearing argument from both
Edwards’ counsel and the government. The court heard from
Edwards -- both in his pleadings and in his testimony -- that he
felt like he was being forced into representing himself pro se.
For example, in his first written request, Edwards stated, “I
reluctantly rather proceed pro-se given access to the law
library.” (Emphasis added). At the hearing, Edwards repeated
the theme, saying, “I just feel like I have to represent
myself. . . . I don’t feel I have too much choice.”
In addition to expressing reluctance and showing
hesitation, Edwards frequently cited his disappointment in the
quality of his counsel as a reason for seeking to proceed pro
se. As he explained in one of his letters to the court, “I
would rather proceed pro-se than be represented by Attorney Dunn
who’s already continuing the violation of my constitutional
rights to competent assistance of counsel.”
The district court noted both the ambivalence and potential
manipulation in rejecting Edwards’ request. In the totality of
these circumstances, we do not believe that the district court
erred in denying the request.
For all of the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of
conviction entered against Edwards.
AFFIRMED
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