A second trial resulted in a verdict totaling $1,594,229 plus
prejudgment and post-judgment interest. Coe filed a motion to alter or
amend the judgment, arguing that the district court had miscalculated
prejudgment interest. The district court denied both motions. Centeno-
Alvarez moved for an award of attorney fees, based upon the offer of
judgment that Coe rejected. The district court granted the motion, but
reduced the amount of attorney fees from the $1,440,102 requested to
$210,000. Coe now presents this appeal.
At issue is whether the district court abused its discretion by
awarding Centeno-Alvarez attorney fees and whether the district court
erred by awarding prejudgment interest on appellant's award of future
damages.' This court reviews a district court's decisions regarding
attorney fees and prejudgment interest for an abuse of discretion. MC.
Multi-Family Dev. v. Crestdale Assocs., 124 Nev. 901, 916, 193 P.3d 536,
546 (2008).
The district court erred in its award of attorney fees
Coe argues that all of the factors that a district court must
apply in awarding attorney fees under Beattie v. Thomas, 99 Nev. 579, 668
P.2d 268 (1983), weigh against an award of attorney fees and the award
should be reversed.
"Coe also asserts that Centeno-Alvarez's counsel committed
prejudicial misconduct warranting either a new trial or reversal on appeal
by making inflammatory and disparaging remarks against respondent and
his counsel, making Golden Rule arguments, expressing personal opinion,
and engaging in jury nullification. We have found each of these claims to
be without merit.
SUPREME COURT
OF
NEVADA
2
(0) 1947A
This court can only overturn an order of attorney fees if the
district court's exercise of discretion in evaluating the Beattie factors is
arbitrary or capricious. Uniroyal Goodrich Tire v. Mercer, 111 Nev. 318,
324, 890 P.2d 785, 789 (1995), superseded by statute on other grounds as
stated in RTTC Commn'ns, LLC v. Saratoga Flier, Inc., 121 Nev. 34, 41-
42, 110 P.3d 24, 29 (2005). In exercising its discretion in awarding
attorney fees and costs, a district court must evaluate "(1) whether the
plaintiffs claim was brought in good faith; (2) whether the defendants'
offer of judgment was reasonable and in good faith in both its timing and
amount; (3) whether the plaintiffs decision to reject the offer and proceed
to trial was grossly unreasonable or in bad faith; and (4) whether the fees
sought by the offeror are reasonable and justified in amount." Beattie, 99
Nev. at 588-89, 668 P.2d at 274. However, in Yamaha Motor Co. v.
Arnault, this court concluded that a district court must consider Beattie
factors in a different way when the plaintiff, rather than the defendant,
has given the offer of judgment. 114 Nev. 233, 252, 955 P.2d 661, 673
(1998). In such cases, instead of determining whether the plaintiffs claim
was brought in good faith, the district court should evaluate whether the
defendant's defenses were litigated in good faith. Id. The Yamaha court
also held that no single Beattie factor is determinative and that the
district court has broad discretion in awarding attorney fees so long as all
factors are considered in a non-arbitrary manner. Id. at 251 n.16, 955
P.2d at 672 n.16.
Here, the Beattie analysis was improperly conducted contrary
to Yamaha because the district court evaluated whether the plaintiffs
claims were brought in good faith, not whether the defendant defended in
good faith. Therefore, the district court abused its discretion in its
SUPREME COURT
OF
NEVADA
3
(0) 1947A
consideration of the first Beattie factor. However, because no single factor
is determinative, this court must also look to the district court's
consideration of the other factors.
In considering the second factor, the court found that the
plaintiffs offer of judgment was in good faith and was reasonable in
timing and amount because he already had accumulated $220,000 in
medical bills and his doctors correlated his injuries with the accident.
This portion of the analysis does not appear arbitrary.
As to the third Beattie factor, however, the district court
stated in its order that the "defendant's rejection of the offer of judgment
was grossly unreasonable" based upon the fact that "plaintiffs medical
bills were over $220,000.00 at the time the offer of judgment was served,"
that his medical records indicated that he required further extensive
medical treatment, and that "defendant had stipulated to liability."
However, at a hearing on December 15, 2010, the district court stated that
defendant's rejection of the offer "was a completely reasonable position to
take by any stretch." Based on the statement of the district court and the
fact that the offer of judgment was more than six times the amount of
plaintiffs medical bills at the time of the offer, we conclude that the
district court's contradictory determination that defendant's rejection was
grossly unreasonable was an abuse of discretion.
Regarding the fourth Beattie factor, the reasonableness of the
attorney fees, the district court considered each of the Brunzell factors and
awarded an attorney fee equivalent to $100 per each attorney hour. See
Brunzell v. Golden Gate Nat'l Bank, 85 Nev. 345, 349, 455 P.2d 31, 33
(1969). We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in
analyzing the fourth Beattie factor.
SUPREME COURT
OF
NEVADA
4
(0) 1947A
3*ZWSIEWZZItalklUINini-tMdE
Considering all four Beattie factors together, the district court
abused its discretion in its consideration of two of the factors. Accordingly,
we vacate the award of attorney fees and remand this matter to the
district court for reconsideration of the Beattie factors in accordance with
this order.
The district court did not err in awarding prejudgment interest
Coe argues that the district court's decision to award
prejudgment interest on the award of future damages was an abuse of
discretion. NRS 17.115 allows the court to give the prevailing party
interest on the judgment from the time of the offer to the time of entry of
the judgment. NRS 17.115(4)(d)(2). In Uniroyal, this court clarified that
NRS 17.115 does not distinguish between past and future damages in the
judgment, so any interest awarded on the judgment applies to all of the
judgment, including both past and future damages awarded. 111 Nev. at
324, 890 P.2d at 789-90. Further, this court in Uniroyal stated that the
purpose of awarding prejudgment interest on future damages is to
" provide[ ] a financial incentive for early settlement of litigation," and
therefore the type of damages are immaterial to the purpose of the statute.
Id. Here, the district court's award of prejudgment future damages falls
within the scope of NRS 17.115 as contemplated in Uniroyal. Therefore,
the district court did not err by awarding prejudgment interest on both
past and future damages. Based on the foregoing, we
SUPREME COURT
OF
NEVADA
5
(0) 1947A 74**
ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED IN
PART AND VACATED IN PART AND REMAND this matter to the
district court for proceedings consistent with this order.
Gibbons
J.
Saitta
cc: The Honorable James M. Bixler, District Judge
Leonard I. Gang, Settlement Judge
Ranalli & Zaniel, LLC/Henderson
Lemons, Grundy & Eisenberg
Ganz & Hauf
Vannah & Vannah
Eighth District Court Clerk
SUPREME COURT
OF
NEVADA
6
(0) 1947A •