CLD-326 NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
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No. 13-2005
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WALIYYUDDIN S. ABDULLAH,
Appellant
v.
THE SMALL BUSINESS BANKING DEPARTMENT OF BANK OF AMERICA; THE
SMALL BUSINESS BANKING DEPARTMENT WELLS FARGO BANK
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On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil No. 2:13-cv-00305)
District Judge: Honorable J. Curtis Joyner
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Submitted for Possible Summary Action
Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
July 11, 2013
Before: RENDELL, JORDAN and SHWARTZ, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: July 29, 2013)
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OPINION
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PER CURIAM
Waliyyuddin Abdullah, proceeding in forma pauperis, appeals pro se the dismissal
of an amended complaint brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000d and 42 U.S.C. § 1981. 1
For the reasons that follow, we will summarily affirm. See LAR 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6.
Abdullah alleged two different sets of misconduct by the defendants. He alleged
that Wells Fargo did not respond to a single request for information about a small
business loan, and that Bank of America 1) sent him information about a line of credit
instead of a loan, and 2) that it did not respond to his application for a line of credit. His
amended complaint alleged that branch employees at both banks misinformed him about
the minimum amount of revenue required to be eligible for a small business loan.
Abdullah alleged that these actions were the equivalent of being denied the opportunity to
apply for a loan program for which he was otherwise qualified. He also alleged that
absent another explanation from the defendants, he “can only conclude one purpose for
this misinformation and denial, discrimination.” Acting prior to service under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), the District Court dismissed the amended complaint for failure to
state a claim. It also denied leave to further amend as futile.
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We exercise plenary review over
the District Court’s dismissal for failure to state a claim. See Lazaridis v. Wehmer, 591
F.3d 666, 670 (3d Cir. 2010) (per curiam). Dismissal is appropriate where the pleader
has not alleged “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim that is
1
The District Court liberally construed appellant’s amended complaint as including
claims under both statutes. The complaint actually only cited to 42 U.S.C. § 2000d.
2
plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). The standard
requires a two-part analysis, first separating the complaint’s factual allegations from its
legal conclusions, and second, taking only the factual allegations as true, deciding
whether the plaintiff has alleged a plausible claim for relief. See Fowler v. UPMC
Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210-11 (3d Cir. 2009).
To state a claim for violation of § 1981, a plaintiff must allege that 1) he is a
member of a racial minority; 2) the defendant intentionally discriminated against the
plaintiff on the basis of race; and 3) the discrimination negatively affected his ability to
engage in one of the protected activities, including formation of a contract. Brown v.
Philip Morris, Inc., 250 F.3d 789, 797 (3d Cir. 2001). 2 To state a claim for violation of
§ 2000d, a plaintiff must allege 1) intentional discrimination on the basis of race or
national origin 2) by a program receiving federal funds. 3 In either context, the standard
for alleging intentional discrimination is the same. See Pryor v. National Collegiate
Athletic Ass’n, 288 F.3d 548, 569 (3d Cir. 2002).
Here, appellant alleged that the only explanation for the appellees’ conduct was
racial discrimination, but that is a legal conclusion not entitled to be assumed true. See
2
Because it does not change our analysis, we do not analyze whether the test for a claim
of racially discriminatory lending applies, as in either case the complaint’s deficiency in
alleging racial discrimination would be fatal. See Anderson v. Wachovia Mortg. Corp.,
621 F.3d 261, 275 (3d Cir. 2010).
3
We note that the District Court did not analyze, nor do we, whether the federally
guaranteed loan program at issue here brings the defendants within the ambit of 42
U.S.C. § 2000d. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-4a.
3
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 681 (holding that allegation in complaint that conduct was motivated
“solely on account of religion, race, and/or national origin” was conclusory and “not
entitled to be assumed true.”) (citation omitted). Appellant failed to allege any facts
supporting this conclusion. See Sarullo v. U.S. Postal Service, 352 F.3d 789, 798 (3d
Cir. 2003) (per curiam) (holding plaintiff in racial discrimination claim must “establish
some causal nexus between his membership in a protected class and” the adverse action).
In his argument in support of this appeal, Abdullah alleged for the first time that he is
African-American, that the relevant actors from the banks are Caucasian, and that the
banks are aware of his race. Even if these facts had been contained in his complaint, they
would be the only facts from which to draw an inference of racial animus. That the
plaintiff and defendant are different races is not sufficient to plausibly state a claim of
racial discrimination. See Santiago v. Warminster Twp., 629 F.3d 121, 133 (3d Cir.
2010) (“Allegations that are merely consistent with a defendant’s liability or show the
mere possibility of misconduct are not enough.”) (quotation omitted).
The District Court dismissed Abdullah’s original complaint for substantially the
same reasons we have identified and gave appellant an opportunity to amend. See
Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 114 (3d Cir. 2002). His amended
complaint did not correct the deficiencies identified by the District Court. In these
circumstances, we conclude that the District Court need not have extended further leave
to amend. See Hill v. City of Scranton, 411 F.3d 118, 134 (3d Cir. 2005).
4
For the reasons given, we will summarily affirm the judgment of the District
Court.
5