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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 12-15375
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 4:11-cr-00033-CDL-MSH-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
LANCE BROWN,
Defendant-Appellant.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Georgia
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(July 31, 2013)
Before HULL, JORDAN and BLACK, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
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Lance Brown appeals his 24-month sentence, imposed after the district court
determined that he had violated the conditions of his supervised release by failing
to comply with his court-mandated mental health treatment. Brown’s guideline
range was four to ten months, but the district court determined that a within-range
sentence was inadequate to comply with several 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors and
sentenced Brown to 24 months. On appeal, Brown contends his sentence was
procedurally unreasonable because the district court’s explanation for his sentence
was inadequate. Brown also argues that his sentence was substantively
unreasonable because it failed to advance the purposes of sentencing and because
the district court did not account for his personal characteristics or his
rehabilitative needs. After review, we affirm Brown’s sentence.
Procedural Reasonableness
When reviewing a sentence, we must first determine that the “district court
committed no significant procedural error.” Gall v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 586,
597 (2007). A sentence is procedurally reasonable if the district court properly
calculated the guideline range, treated the Guidelines as advisory, considered the
§ 3553(a) factors, did not select a sentence based on clearly erroneous facts, and
adequately explained the chosen sentence. Id. We have never required a
sentencing judge to “articulate his findings and reasoning with great detail or in
any detail for that matter.” United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160, 1195 (11th Cir.
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2010) (en banc). However, a “sentencing judge should set forth enough to satisfy
the appellate court that he has considered the parties’ arguments and has a reasoned
basis for exercising his own legal decisionmaking authority.” Rita v. United
States, 127 S. Ct. 2456, 2469 (2007). In Rita, the Supreme Court reasoned that,
although the district court had provided a limited explanation of its sentence, the
record showed that the court had listened to the evidence and arguments and was
aware of the various factors that would justify a lower sentence. Id. at 2469.
Brown’s sentence was not procedurally unreasonable. The district court
articulated the various § 3553(a) factors that it believed justified the above-
guideline range sentence. Moreover, the record indicates that the district court
heard sufficient evidence to support its conclusion, including the probation
officer’s testimony that Brown had (1) made serious threats to harm others;
(2) indicated that he would continue to refuse to cooperate; and (3) proven to be
“unsupervisable.” In combination with the evidence presented at Brown’s
revocation hearing, the district court’s reference to various § 3553(a) factors was
sufficient to explain Brown’s sentence. See Rita, 127 S. Ct. at 2469.
Substantive Reasonableness
We review the totality of the facts and circumstances to gauge for
substantive error. Irey, 612 F.3d at 1189-90. The district court must impose “a
sentence sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to comply with the purposes”
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listed in § 3553(a)(2). Id. at 1196. The weight given to each § 3553(a) factor is “a
matter committed to the sound discretion of the district court.” United States v.
Clay, 483 F.3d 739, 743 (11th Cir. 2007). We must vacate a sentence if we are
“left with the definite and firm conviction that the district court committed a clear
error of judgment in weighing the § 3553(a) factors by arriving at a sentence that
lies outside the range of reasonable sentences dictated by the facts of the case.”
United States v. Pugh, 515 F.3d 1179, 1191 (11th Cir. 2008) (quotations omitted).
Brown’s 24-month sentence was substantively reasonable. The district
court was within its discretion to weigh the § 3553(a) factors as it did and to
determine that the 24-month sentence was necessary to comply with the purposes
of sentencing. See Clay, 483 F.3d at 743. There is nothing in the record to leave
this Court with the “definite and firm conviction” that the 24-month sentence was
substantively unreasonable. See Pugh, 515 F.3d at 1191. Accordingly, we affirm
Brown’s sentence.
AFFIRMED.
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