FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION AUG 02 2013
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U .S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
RICHARD GARY HALL, No. 10-17074
Plaintiff - Appellant, D.C. No. 5:07-cv-03233-RMW
v.
MEMORANDUM *
D. LEVORSE; et al.,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of California
Ronald M. Whyte, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted July 24, 2013 **
Before: ALARCÓN, CLIFTON, and CALLAHAN, Circuit Judges.
California state prisoner Richard Gary Hall appeals pro se from the district
court’s judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendment violations in connection with his housing assignment. We
have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo, Lacey v. Maricopa
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
County, 693 F.3d 896, 911 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc), and we affirm.
The district court properly dismissed Hall’s action as time-barred because
Hall filed his action after the applicable statute of limitations and statutory tolling
period had expired. See Cal. Civ. Proc. Code §§ 335.1, 352.1(a) (setting forth
California’s statute of limitations for personal injury claims and the additional
tolling for prisoners); Pouncil v. Tilton, 704 F.3d 568, 573-74 (9th Cir. 2012)
(§ 1983 actions are governed by the forum state’s statute of limitations, but federal
law determines when a § 1983 claim accrues; under federal law, accrual occurs
when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury which is the basis of
the action).
Contrary to Hall’s contentions, neither equitable tolling nor equitable
estoppel applies because Hall should have reasonably been aware of the existence
of his claims within the limitations period and defendants did not wrongfully
prevent Hall from asserting his claims. See Lukovsky v. City & County of San
Francisco, 535 F.3d 1044, 1051-52 (9th Cir. 2008) (discussing requirements for
equitable tolling and equitable estoppel).
The district court properly denied Hall’s motion to amend because the
deficiencies in his complaint could not be cured by amendment. See Lucas v.
2 10-17074
Dep’t of Corr., 66 F.3d 245, 248 (9th Cir. 1995) (dismissal of a pro se complaint
without leave to amend is proper if the deficiencies in the complaint cannot be
cured by amendment).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by staying discovery pending
the resolution of defendants’ motion to dismiss because Hall did not show that he
suffered any prejudice. See Hallett v. Morgan, 296 F.3d 732, 751 (9th Cir. 2002)
(setting forth standard of review and describing trial court’s broad discretion in
discovery matters which “will not be disturbed except upon the clearest showing
that denial of discovery results in actual and substantial prejudice to the
complaining litigant.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).
AFFIRMED.
3 10-17074